DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 336 796 CS 507 590

TITLE Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (74th, Boston, Massachusetts, August 7-10, 1991). Part XI: China and the Media.

INSTITUTION Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

PUB DATE Aug 91

NOTE 247p.; For other sections of these proceedings, see CS 507 580-596.

PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC10 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS Comparative Analysis; Correlation; *Cultural Influences; Facsimile Transmission; Foreign Countries; Foreign Students; Higher Education; *Mass Media Effects; Media Research; *News Reporting; *Photojournalism; Political Attitudes; Political Influences; Television Viewing

IDENTIFIERS *China; *Media Coverage

ABSTRACT

The China and the Media section of the proceedings contains the following seven papers: "Impact of U.S. Culture on Political Attitude of Students from People's Republic of China" (Xinshu Zhao and Yu Xie); "Facsimile in Revolution and Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War'" (Kurt Kent and Xuejun Yu); "Newspaper Photography in China" (Keith R. Kenney); "Production and Selection of Chinese Newspaper Photographs" (Keith R. Kenney); "Chinese Students' American Television Uses and Their Acceptance of American Values: A Correctional Analysis" (J. J. Jaw); "Factors Influencing Cross-National News Treatment of a Critical National Event: A Comparative Study of Six Countries' Media Coverage of the 1989 Chinese Student Demonstrations" (Shujen Wang); and "The Rational vs. Irrational Public: Modeling Media Effects in the People's Republic of China" (Xinshu Zhao and others). (RS)

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ED336796

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1991 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATION IN JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION (74th, Boston, MA, August 7-10, 1991).

Part XI: China and the Media.

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Impact of U.S. Culture on Political Attitude of Students from People's Republic of China

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August 1991

Paper Presented to International Communication Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication

This research is supported by a summer research stipend generously provided by the School of Communications, Pennsylvania State University, where the first author was instructor and then assistant professor in 1989-1990. Assistance of Yijun Gu, Peilu Shen and Haiqin Wu in data collection, helpful comments of Edward Friedman and John McNelly, and encouragement of Brian Winston, Katherine Frith and Joseph Keefer are gratefully acknowledged. Three anonymous reviewers of international division have also provided valuable comments, although, due to time limit, we will not be able to adopt all their suggestions into this paper until next revision.

Impact of U.S. Culture on
Political Attitude of Students from People's Republic of China

Abstract

How did the Chinese students' stay in the United States affect their attitudes toward the official ideology of Chinese Government? Published academic theories or popular writings offer no clear answer. They, in fact, contradict each other. Westernization theory predicts that the stay should make them more critical of the Communist ideology, disillusion theory predicts that the stay should make the students more favoring the Communist ideology, while no-effect theory predicts that there should be effect of staying at all.

This study took these hypotheses and tested them against questionnaire survey data collected in Wisconsin and in Beijing. Regression technique was used to analyze the data.

The results did not support the most widely held belief that Chinese students in the U.S. were being westernized, nor did they support some P.R.C. leaders' early hope that the students would be disillusioned. Instead, the data supported the third hypothesis -- while students' home culture and some specific part of American culture had strong influences on students' attitude, the years spent in the U.S. did NOT have a notable effect.

Impact of U.S. Culture on Political Attitude of Students from P. R. China

In 1978, as a prominent part of the "open door" policy, the People's Republic of China started to send large number of students to the western countries. By 1988 more than 60,000 Chinese [1] students and scholars had gone abroad, [2] including some 56,000, or 93%, to the United States. [3] During 1987-1988 academic year, the number of students from China in the U.S. increased by 25.7%, which was the fastest growth rate among all foreign students. [4] They also became one of the largest foreign student groups in the United States, second only to students from Taiwan. [5] This trend continued after the military crackdown in June 1989, despite the widespread fear that the Chinese government might stop it. [6] Taking into account people who returned to China, it has been estimated that there are currently more than 40,000 Chinese students and scholars in the United States. [7]

The number, be it in tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands, may seem tiny considering China's population of more than a billion, nor do this group typify ordinary Chinese students or scholars, not to mention ordinary Chinese people. Before June 1989, they were refereed to as "China's new elite", "China's future leaders", or "successor generation of Communist

China". [8] After June 1989, they were more often regarded as the only ones who openly "vowed to carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy" or "the source of political disturbance". [9] Nevertheless they have attracted much attention from educators, politicians and researchers both in China and in the West, precisely because of their uniqueness and significance. [10]

Furthermore, they are by far the largest number of students any communist country has ever allowed to go abroad in history [11]. Its historical significance, some western scholars believe, is not limited to China's own development process. Instead, it may also have wider implications for the global East-West interaction. [12] Given the expectation for a sharp increase in the number of Soviet and Eastern European students who will soon follow Chinese footsteps to the West, the experience of the Chinese students has also attracted much attention from the former East Bloc countries. [13]

One issue has become increasingly noticeable ever since the first group of students left China some ten years ago. That is, what effects western culture may have on the students' political attitudes? Most of the Chinese leaders are only interested in the knowledge of science and technology that the students will bring home and openly resent the western ideology and cultural values that may "pollute" the Chinese society. [14] Many westerners, however, expect, if not hope, that the Chinese will not only learn science and technology but also understand, if not accept, the culture and ideologies of his or her host country. [15] Many

Chinese intellectuals, including students themselves, take the attitude of "absorb" whatever, be it science or ideology, that they see as useful for China. [16]

But have the ideological beliefs and political attitudes of the students been affected by their staying in the West? If they have, how?

This study attempts to answer these questions. It focuses on Chinese students in one of the Western countries, the United States, and focuses on one aspect of their political attitudes, the attitudes toward Chinese official ideology. The following pages will derive from academic and popular writings three hypotheses that are contradictory to each other regarding how staying in the United States might affect the students' attitudes toward the Chinese official ideology. These hypotheses will then be tested by comparing survey data collected in Beijing and in Wisconsin, and by statistically analyzing the Wisconsin data.

I. Theories and Hypotheses

When the door was just opened, Chinese leaders were confident in the ability of "their" students to reject the "dross" while absorbing from the West useful techniques. [17] This confidence stems deeply from their categorical belief in the superiority of China's social system to that of the West. Why, the orthodox theorists frequently asked in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, had the "born red" youngsters lost their confidence in the Chinese social system, while the older people, particularly those who had been educated in the West before the 1950s, showed more loyalty? The reason, they believed, was that youngsters had suffered from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and heard about highways and high-rises of the West, but had never been exposed to the pervasive vices rooted in the capitalist society. The younger generation had been poisoned by the illusionary surface of the West, they said. Originally this reasoning was meant to defend the present system rather than to support sending students abroad. But when those who did advocate sending students argued that the best way to disillusion the youngsters was to expose them to the facts, the old guards acquiesced. [18]

Consistent with these arguments is a Disillusionment Hypothesis predicting that

> **H1:** The longer a Chinese student lives in the U.S., the more likely he or she will develop a negative attitude toward the capitalist ideology and, therefore, a positive attitude toward the official ideology of the Chinese government. This hypothesis is represented in Figure 1 by the slope ascending from left to right.

Figure 1 About Here

This hypothesis, however, runs counter to the classic ideal of America as a melting pot. [19] The ideal, expressed for the first time in the eighteenth century when America was still in the making, expected that immigrants of different origins would come to form a new, distinctive nation with a distinctive culture and, on the other hand, every new comer would identify himself with the new culture and become part of the new culture. [20] Later, when the nation and the culture were regarded as already in existence, similar process was often labeled as "assimilation" or "absorption" -- new comers came to be assimilated or absorbed into the existing American culture. [21] As a descriptive theory, this view was supported by many observations on new immigrants. For instance, foreign born immigrants, their communities, and their foreign language newspapers were found to be loyal to the United States, even when she was at war with their ancestral nations. [22]

A view along this line, more often called "westernization", is widely held by both Chinese and American writers when they analyze the situation of Chinese students. [23] For example, Tan wrote:

> "Think about it. Thousands of Mainland students, coming from an autocratic society which had for a long time been locked away from the world, were suddenly thrown into a totally different, free, open society. It should not be difficult to imagine the puzzle, the uncertainty, the trepidation, the vacillation, and the alienation in their mind after their actual experience of the complete freedom and democracy."
>
> "It's not unusual" Tan also wrote "for

> overseas students to defect to the freedom, to apply for political asylums, or even publicly criticize the Chinese Communist government, which makes the government lose all its face."
>
> "Those who returned", Tan wrote in another paragraph "did not carry back only the specialized knowledge and skill but also the western beliefs in freedom and democracy, which are not welcomed by the Communist Party, which have constituted a substantial threat and negative influence." [24]

Even the Chinese government has recognized "westernization" as a fact, and has taken this factor into policy considerations. Several times the Chinese government considered, although unsuccessfully, reducing the number of students going to the West, particularly to the United States, for the fear that too many students would be "too westernized". [25] After the 1989 upheavals in China, the Chinese government decided that some 90% of the students in the United States and Canada had been so "westernized" that they would constitute a threat to the political stability in China if many of them would return to China in the near future, and therefore it was in the government's best interest if most of them stayed abroad for the timebeing. [26]

While politicians and journalists were concerned with students' political attitudes because of their presumed impact on the politics at home, a Canadian scholar in comparative education raised a more philosophical question: who, China or the West, really benefits from China's educational cooperation with the West? Is the cooperation really a help for China's development or just another version of the penetration of cultural imperialism? [27] The question appears truly serious if one assumes that some students, who will be westernized and lose the identity with their home culture, will lead China in the future. The question appears even more serious if one recalls that China has been considered one of the few developing countries that have successfully achieved self-reliance and cultural independence.

Consistent with this dominant view is a Westernization Hypothesis predicting that

> **H2**: The more time a Chinese student lives in U.S. culture, the more likely he or she will develop a positive attitude toward the capitalist ideology and, therefore, a negative attitude toward the Communist ideology of the Chinese government. This hypothesis is represented in Figure 1 by the slope descending from left to right.

Although the above two hypotheses predict exactly the opposite directions of the effects, both predict that there exists an effect. The next hypothesis predicts that an effect, if it exists at all, should be relatively weak.

Opposing the ideal of melting pot is the doctrine of "symphony orchestra", or "cultural pluralism", arguing that America should encourage immigrants and their children to retain their distinctiveness, and contribute to the American culture by being "many different players constitute an intricate but harmonious whole". [28] As a descriptive theory, this view can also be supported by some studies on new immigrants. Kessner and Caroli, for example, observed that in New York China Town the political views of new immigrants were largely decided by where they had been from, i.e. mainland, Taiwan, or Hongkong. Particularly, those who fled mainland China in the 1970s, even though they deeply resented their treatment in China, nevertheless encouraged a U.S. foreign policy in favor of mainland China. [29]

Elaborating on this pluralistic view, one may argue that the two hypotheses stated previously have ignored two facts about the Chinese students. First, almost all of them were highly educated, mature adults who had spent at least 20 years in China. [30] It is reasonable to assume that before leaving China most of them had had a set of quite developed political and ideological beliefs. Some of these beliefs should be strong and stable enough that they should not be easily and dramatically changed by simply living for a few years in a different culture, no matter how different it was. Instead, home culture should have a clearer effect.

The second fact is that the overwhelming majority of these students were in natural sciences or technologies. [31] As studious students, most of them devoted most their time in laboratories or with computers. [32] It is unlikely that the time spent with formulas, computers or test tubes would have much influence on one's beliefs about politics at home. Instead, a more specific part of American culture, such as news media, might have a clearer effect. (See Figure 2 for a schematic view of the relation between the attitude and the three factors).

Figure 2 About Here

This theory does not deny the possibility that the students' political attitudes may have changed during their stay in the United States. Instead, it denies the interpretation that their stay in the United States caused these changes. The changes, if they did happen, may have been caused by the events in China that coincided with their stay abroad. Or maybe the changes were natural results of students' years of pondering over the experience of their nation, regardless where they pondered. This reasoning is supported by the reports that in the past few years people, particularly intellectuals and students, who stayed in China seem to be as "westernized", if not more, as those who went abroad.[33] After all, among the twenty one student leaders who were on the Chinese government's most wanted list following June 4, 1989, none of them had spent a single day abroad.

Consistent with this reasoning is a No-Effect hypothesis predicting that

> **H3**: A student's attitude toward Chinese official ideology is not significantly affected by the number of years he or she has lived in the U.S.. Instead, one's

home culture and some particular parts of the U.S. culture may have a clearer effect.

II. Data

In late February and early March 1987, a questionnaire was prepared in Chinese and distributed to 150 students from People's Republic of China at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. [34] A total of 116 (77.3%) completed questionnaires were returned to the researchers.

Although the questionnaire interviews were limited to one campus, students in this sample should not be very different from students affiliated with other universities. There are many random elements in the application and admission process when a student enters a U.S. university. And, as a relatively small, homogeneous group, most of these students have very similar educational and personal backgrounds, and are now under very similar academic and living conditions, no matter where they are in the United States. Therefore, the research based on this data set may help to provide an enhanced empirical understanding of effects of the U.S. culture on students from China.

From March to June 1987, another study was conducted in Beijing by a group of researchers affiliated with the Beijing Municipal Labor Union of Educators or Beijing Normal University. [35] In the study over 1,600 young teachers of fourteen colleges and universities in Beijing were surveyed in questionnaire form.

Although the two studies were not planned as a comparison, similarities between the two warrant a comparison. First, the data were collected at almost the same time. Collection of the Beijing data started when collection of the Wisconsin data was not yet completed. No significant events happened between February and June 1987 that might change the political attitudes of the respondents in either studies. Second, respondents of the two studies were akin. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. were from big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and so on. [36] They were either university teachers/research fellows before their leaving China, or would have been assigned a similar job had they not gone abroad. Many of them still hold their position at Chinese universities while studying in the U.S.. Third, very similar or even identical questions regarding political attitudes were asked in both studies. The following Measurement section contains further discussion on this point.

III. Measurement

The main dependent variable, respondents' attitude toward communist ideology of Chinese government, is measured by the mean score on three questions concerning Marxism, Socialism, and Chinese Communist Party (see Table 1) on a five-category Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). [37] The questions touched directly three of the "Four Cardinal Principles" that have been written into Chinese Constitution. The inclusion of the "Four Principles" in the

Constitution has been for years the focus of the heated debate between the Chinese government and dissidents. For example, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy was outlawed by a Shanghai court because "it is publicly against the Four Cardinal Principles". Fang Lizhi, a leading physicist and outspoken dissident who took refugee in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, was wanted by the Chinese government partly because "he violated the Four Cardinal Principles". Fang was recently allowed to leave China only after he had admitted his violation of the "Four Cardinal Principles." [38]

Table 1 About Here

The three questions were chosen not only because of their face validity, but also because of their near normal distributions and fairly high reliability score after being aggregated into one attitude measure (Cronbach Alpha: 0.81). [39] To facilitate interpretation, the aggregated attitude scale was linearly transformed so that 100 represents maximum support for the Chinese official ideology, 0 represents minimum support, and 50 represents neutral (see, for example, Figure 1).

Further more, there were also three questions asked in the Beijing study concerning Marxism, Socialism, and Chinese Communist Party. The English translation of the questions are

-- "We must take Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought to be the guiding ideology in our country's revolution and construction."

-- "In China's revolution and construction we must adhere to and uphold the Party's leadership."

-- "Only socialism can rescue China."

A comparison of the above three questions with those asked in Wisconsin, as shown in Table 1, indicates that the two questions regarding Marxism touched the same topic but they were not exactly the same, the two questions regarding the Party were quite the same in meaning although different in wording, the two questions regarding socialism were identical word by word.

Unfortunately the Beijing study did not use Likert scale. Instead, nominal categories, such as "It depends on how things actually turn out", "It is too complicated to express in a simple and clear manner", "I have doubts about this", were provided to the respondents. The different response categories employed by the two studies will necessarily make our comparison, which will be presented in the following Findings section, relatively rough.

The main independent variable in the Wisconsin study was the amount of exposure to American culture, measured by number of year(s) each respondent spent in the United States.

Since the No-Effect hypothesis predicts that exposure to home culture and exposure to some particular media in the United States should have a clearer effect than exposure to American culture in general, two additional independent variables were included. The exposure to the home culture was approximated by the respondents' age. The exposure to specific media available in the United States was measured by asking the respondents how many hours per week they spent with various media in the past month.

Six media usage indices were created:

1) The Chinese government publication: total hours spend reading People's Daily, China Daily, and Outlook.
2) Chinese dissident publications: total hours spent reading China Spring and Cheng Ming (Speak Out).
3) New York Times: hours spent reading New York Times.
4) Local newspaper: hours spent reading Wisconsin State Journal.
5) TV: hours spent watching TV.
6) Radio: hours spent listening to radios.

IV. Findings: Comparing the Two Data Sets

Sun, Zhang and their colleagues reported that 30.7-40.7 percent of the Beijing respondents, when they responded to the three attitude questions, expressed doubt about the necessity for the "Four Cardinal Principles". Stanley Rosen, who has written extensively on survey research in China, interpreted this as a clear evidence showing "that the official party line on the 1986-87 demonstrations had failed to convince a majority (of young teachers in China)." [40]

In the Wisconsin data, as shown in Table 1, the responses were quite evenly distributed -- for each of the three questions, there were roughly one third negative responses, one third positive responses, and one third neutral responses. Apparently in spring 1987 there were no significant differences between Chinese students/scholars in Wisconsin and their peers in Beijing in terms of attitudes toward "Four Cardinal Principles", which is consistent with "No-Effect" hypothesis.

Because of the differences in response scale/categories, as discussed in the measurement section, we are unable to make the comparison more precise, or more detailed. The major testing of the hypotheses, therefore, has to rely on careful analysis of the Wisconsin data.

V. Findings: Analyzing the Wisconsin Data

In the Wisconsin data, years spent in the United States do not appear to affect respondents' political attitude. The students who have spent four, five or more years in the United States are not very different in terms of political attitude from those who have spent only one or two years (See Figure 3). The single linear correlation between political attitude and years spent in the United States is negligible (R=0.07, P=0.24). Since the curve in Figure 3 appears to have a U shape, polynomial regression functions of various orders were tested to fit the curve. Although some of them does produce a better fit than linear regression, none of them suggests a statistically significant relation between the two variables. Analysis of Variance technique, which assumes no linearity in the relation between the dependent and the independent variables, does not manifest any effect either.

Figure 3 About Here

Age, however, is clearly related to the attitude. As shown in Figure 4, those who are 36 years or older tend to be more supportive of the Chinese official ideology than those between 31 and 35, while those between 31 and 35 in turn tend to be more supportive than those between 21 and 30. The single linear correlation between attitude and age is substantial and statistically highly significant ($R = 0.33$, $P<0.001$).

Figure 4 About Here

These results appear to suggest that years spent in the United States do not have a clear effect on students' attitude toward the Chinese official ideology, whereas their age does. However, it is possible that the observed relation between attitude and years spent in the United States is confounded by a third variable, age. That is, years spent in the United States may indeed have a westernization effect, but those who have been here longer also tend to be older, and older people tend to have a more positive attitude toward the Chinese government and, as a result, the effect of age cancels the effect of years spent in the United States to produce the flat line in Figure 3.

Figure 5 About Here

In order to control for the age effect, we examined the effect of years spent in the United States after the respondents were divided into different age groups. It is shown in Figure 5 that there is no clear pattern of effect of years spent in the

United States within each age group. To be sure, we constructed a multiple regression equation to perform a more formal test. [41] After Age has been entered into the equation, Years Spent In the United States can explain almost no additional variance (Incremental R Square<0.1%, P=0.80). This result suggests that the flat curve in Figure 3 can not be explained by an artifact due to Age.

To avert possible bias due to other variables, we further replaced age with sex, date of college graduation in China, visa type, current academic status (graduate student, post doctoral student, visiting scholar, or other), or financial sources (The Chinese government, foundations, the University, or self/family savings) in the multiple regression equation. We also entered all these variables simultaneously as one block. None of these tests, however, manifests a statistically significant incremental R square contributed by the years spent in the United States. These results suggest that there is no effect of years spent in the United States on respondents' attitude.

Figure 6 About Here

A different way to look at the data is to reverse what is represented in Figure 5. Instead of grouping respondents according to their age and then examining the effect of years spent in the United States, we may group respondents according to their years spent in the United States and then examine the effect of age. Figure 6 presents the results from such an exercise. The pattern is still there that older respondents tend to be more positive toward the Chinese official ideology. In a multiple regression run, after Years Spent In the United States has been entered into the equation, Age explains a substantial amount of additional variance (Incremental R Square=9.19%, P=0.0005). This result suggests that the age effect as shown in Figure 4 can not be explained by an artifact due to years spent in the United States, and it is likely that age does have a stronger effect than years spent in the United States. [42]

There is a possibility that students' attitude may change rapidly during the first several months of being in the United States. Years spent in the United States as measured in this study is unable to capture this effect directly since all those who have been here one year or less have been grouped into one category. [43] To test this possibility, the variance in attitude of the first year students was compared with the that of other students. Given the fact that the mean in attitude is about the same as that of any other years, if there is indeed a dramatic change in attitude in the first year, we should observe a larger variance. [44] To the contrary, we observed smaller variance. (Standard Deviation for the first year students: 0.18; Standard Deviation for other students: 0.24; for the difference in variance: F=1.50, DF=1/113, P=0.22). This result implies that there is not a dramatic attitude change during students' first year in the United States.

One may argue, based on Figure 3, that the entire curve is on or below the line of 50 so most of the students are fairly critical toward Chinese official ideology hence most of them, no matter how many years they have spent in the United States, have been westernized. If this is what westernization means, they were "westernized", but they were "westernized" before leaving China.[45] The westernization under this definition has nothing to do with a student's physical presence in a western country and is beyond the scope of the present study, although it promises an interesting topic for the future research.

Figure 7 About Here

There does not appear to exist a relation between attitude and time spent reading Chinese government publications. Although the single linear correlation score has a positive sign as one may expect, and P value barely passes the 0.05 criterion (R=0.17, P=0.045), a closer look at the curve, as shown in Figure 7, does not suggest a clear pattern, especially if those "outlier" who spent more than 8 hours reading are excluded. In a multiple regression tests, after Age or Time Spent Reading New York Times have been entered into an equation, Times Spent Reading Chinese Government Publications does not produce a significant additional R Square. This further suggests the possibility that the statistically significant single correlation is an artifact due to one or both of these two variables.

There does not appear to exist a relation between attitude and time spent with dissident publications either. Although the correlation coefficient has a negative sign as one may expect, it is surprisingly small (R=-0.09) and statistically insignificant (P=0.17).

The relationship between attitude and time spent with TV, radio, and local newspaper is even more negligible. The correlations are close to zero, and statistically insignificant.

Figure 8 About Here

There is a clear relation between respondents' time spent reading New York Times and their attitude. As shown in Figure 8, more time one spent reading New York Times, the more likely he or she is critical toward Chinese official ideology. The single linear correlation between the two variables is substantial and statistically significant (R = -0.30, P=0.001).

We must hasten to state that there is no guarantee that the observed correlation necessarily represents the effect of reading New York Times on respondents' attitude. An alternative explanation is "selective exposure", that is, a person's critical view toward Chinese official ideology leads him or her to read more New York Times. However, our common knowledge about Chinese students' mentality does not support such an explanation. New York Times is generally regarded by the students as a neutral information source. Their reading behavior may be strongly affected by the degree of personal interest in the news from China, but is unlikely to be influenced by the direction of their attitude. Further more, if the students do selectively expose themselves to various media according to their political attitudes, they should have stronger reasons to do so with Chinese government publications or dissident publications, since both of them are perceived as more opinionated than New York Times on Chinese political issues. The minimum relation we observed between students' attitude and their exposure to Chinese government and dissident publications not only question any effects of these media on the attitude, but also shed doubts on the possibility of selective exposure due to attitude.

Table 2 About Here

In summary, our data suggest that only New York Times, but not any other media, may have had an effect on students' attitude toward Chinese official ideology. One possible explanation for such a result, as shown in Table 2, is that New York Times is the only medium that possesses both of the two qualities: 1) a substantial amount of news coverage on China and 2) an image perceived by students as a neutral information source rather than a propaganda tool. in 1988, when data was collected, TV, radio, and local media had little coverage on China so it is not surprising that they did not have much effect on people's attitude concerning Chinese issues. Chinese government publications and dissident publications, however, may have suffered from a credibility problem since both positioned themselves at the extremes of the debates, and both were perceived more as the propaganda tools rather than information providers.

To compare the predictive powers of the two independent variables that appear to affect students' attitudes, we entered both of them, with alternating orders, into multiple regression equations. When other variables and Time Spent Reading New York Times are entered first, Age contributes an additional 6.69% R square (P=0.0032). When other variables and Age are entered first, Time Spent Reading New York Times contributes an additional 6.62% R square (P=0.032). This comparison suggests that Age and Times Spent Reading New York Times are about equally important when they are used to predict a student's attitude.

VI. Conclusion

Our data support neither the westernization hypothesis nor the disillusionment hypothesis. Instead, they fit quite well both the prediction and underlying assumptions of the non-effect hypothesis. The political attitude of Chinese students in the United States did not appear to be very different from that of their peers who stayed in China. The number of years spent in the United States did not have a clear effect on students' attitude. Instead, age, as an indicator of the home culture, and time spent with New York Times, as an indicator of a particular part of the U.S. culture, may have had stronger influences.

Since the measures employed by this study touched a very important aspect of Chinese students' political beliefs, the findings should motivate us to question any unconditional acceptance of either the westernization or the disillusionment assumption. However, the fact that an effect did not manifest in one important aspect does not imply that it will not manifest in any other aspects. We did not measure, for example, students' attitude toward the U.S. political and economic system, the U.S. government, or the American people; neither did we measure students' attitude toward their own life, family, or career, or toward any social issue in China. It is possible that westernization or disillusionment or other forms of effect existed in these and many other aspects. The lack of empirical evidence to support or negate any of these possibilities calls for more research effort in the area.

The results of this study may have also been affected by the particular time of the data collection. We argued, for example, that one possible reason for the minimum effect of American broadcast media and local media was that these media had little coverage on the news from China. This was certainly the case in early 1987. This was probably also the case at most of other times. But it was not the case in spring 1989 when many American media, broadcast and print, national and local, placed the upheavals in China ahead of all other events. What if the opinion poll was conducted in June 1989? Although such moment is an exception rather than a norm, its significance warrants much attention from researchers.

More than twenty years ago, Mann, a Chicago historian, wrote "What America ought to be, of course, is a matter of personal preference. As a matter of record, however, America has been both a melting pot and a symphony orchestra." [46] This study did not go beyond Mann's insight. It did not, and should not, try to confirm which theory was true, and which was false. It only attempted, we believe successfully, to find which theory should be applied to this particular group of people, at this particular moment of history, with regard to this particular aspect of their lives.

Notes

[1] In this study, "China" and "the People's Republic of China" are used interchangeably, and "Chinese students and scholars" refer to those who are from the mainland China.

[2] Probably no one knows for sure the exact number. The number adopted here was announced in the fall of 1988 by Li Tieying, the Minister of Chinese State Education Commission, (People's Daily, October 8, 1988, p. 1). About five months before Li's announcement, an article in The Chronicle of Higher Education (May 11, 1988, p. A1) estimated the number to be 50,000. The discrepancy between the two could be partly explained by the possibility that a large number of students went to the U.S. in the fall of 1988. However, nearly six months after Li's announcement, He Dongchang, the Vice Minister of Chinese State Education Commission, announced a smaller number, 51,000 (Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 1989; reported in Center Daily News, March 28, 1989). Li and He both can not be right if they were talking about the same group of people. No explanation has been offered as of today by the Chinese government regarding the discrepancy.

[3] Leo A. Orleans Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), p. 112. After analyzing the immense difficulties in obtaining an accurate number, the author made the estimation based on records from the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, and the U.S.

Immigration and Naturalization Service. Other estimations do exist. For example, an estimation of 36,000 appeared in New York Times (March 24, 1988, p. 1), and another estimation of 30,000 appeared in The Chronicle of Higher Education (May 11, 1988, p. A1). No information was given to explain the methods or sources of the latter two estimations. For a detailed description of the difficulties in estimating this number, see Orleans, p. 77-86.

[4] Institute for International Education, Open Door: 1987-1988 (New York: Institute for International Education, 1988), Cited in People's Daily (Overseas Edition) (July. 14, 1988), Center Daily News (October 27, 1988), and Washington Post, (May 3, 1989).

[5] Institute for International Education.

[6] New York Times (January 25 & 26, 1990) reported that some 7,000 Chinese students went to the United States in the second half of 1989 calender year. The number of visa applications approved by the Chinese government and received by the American Embassy and consulates rose by 60% after June 1989 (New York Times, January 26, 1990). The Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. announced that in 1988 about 4,800 self sponsored students left China for the United States; the number increased to 7,400 in 1989; among the 7,400, some 5,000 left China after June (See People's Daily, May 30, 1990). The Chinese Security Ministry announced that in 1989 the total number of permissions granted to Chinese citizens to go abroad to attend private matters were 238,301, an 11% increase over

1988. Among those grantees 132,727, or 56%, were able to obtain a foreign visa and actually went abroad. This number represented a 3.4% increase over 1988 (See People's Daily, May 12, 1990). It appeared in these reports that Chinese students, the Chinese government and western correspondents all agree that "the main obstacle to going abroad is not the Chinese government but United States Embassy" and embassies of other Western countries (New York Times, January 25, 1990; World Journal, January 29 & May 23, 1990). This phenomenon does not necessarily imply that no one in the Chinese government ever tried to change the overseas student policy. A secret document of Chinese Education Commission, which was obtained and made public by the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (World Journal, June 3, 1990), indicated that the Commission, together with the Public Security Ministry, the National Safety Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Communist Party's Propaganda Department, and the Party's Personnel Department, decided to 1) stop using government fund to send students to the United States and Canada to study for graduate degrees; 2) reduce government fund used to send visiting scholars to these two countries, and support only those who are politically reliable. Documents announcing rigid restrictions on privately supported students and scholars have also been circulated within the government (World Journal, March 25, 1990). The impact of these policy changes, however, remains to be seen, since the resistance, corruption, and bureaucracy within and outside the government are expected to affect the effectiveness of the new policy.

[7] Estimation by Thomas L. Friedman, a New York Times correspondent. See New York Times (January 24, 1990, p. A1 & January 25, 1990, p. A6). Gong Ji, an overseas Chinese author, wrote in World Journal (June 15, 1990) that the number should be more than 60,000. The Chinese government secret document, which was mentioned in Note 6, estimated the total number of Chinese students and scholars currently in the United States to be more than 50,000. Since the number of Chinese students and scholars in Canada were reportedly between 4,000 to 6,000 (World Journal May 23, 1990), one may guess that the Chinese government's estimation of those in the U.S. were between 44,000 and 46,000.

[8] Orleans, p. 53; Fred Strebeigh, "Training China's New Elite" The Atlantic 263:4 (April 1989), 72-80.

[9] See, for example, CBS and CNN coverage on the Independence Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars, (July 30 and 31, 1989) and World Journal (June 13, 1990), p. 31.

[10] See, for example, Orleans, p. 19-35; David M. Lampton with Joyce A. Madancy and Kristen M. Williams, A Relationship Restored, Trends in U.S.-China Education Exchanges, 1978-1984 (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986). Ruth Hayhoe, "A Comparative Analysis of Chinese-Western Academic Exchange," Comparative Education 20:1 (1984): 39-55.

[11] Orleans, p. 53.

[12] Hayhoe; Orleans, p. 53-56.

[13] Interview with Serguei N. Goncharov, a Soviet Sinologist conducting research at Stanford University. See World Journal Weekly (June 17, 1990) p. 7.

[14] World Journal (June 13, 1990); World Journal Weekly (March 25, 1990); Also see Orleans, p. 8 & p. 26.

[15] Ruth Hayhoe, "Penetration or mutuality? China's educational cooperation with Europe, Japan, and North America," Comparative Education Review 30:4 (November 1986): 532-559.

[16] Weiyi Tan, "Why Overseas Students Didn't Return" The Quest New 53 (May 1988): 23-25.

[17] Hayhoe, "A Comparative Analysis".

[18] As often was the case in China when an issue was judged by propagandists as lacking propaganda value, the details of this debate was not well documented in Chinese publications. The description presented here were based on the information gathered from Xinshi Baogao Hui (situation report meetings) and private notes.

[19] Assuming, of course, that the dominant ideology in the American culture runs counter to the communist ideology of the Chinese government.

[20] Arther Mann, Immigrants in American Life, (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1968) p. 23-25, 121, & 139-42.

[21] Mann, 146-49; John J. Appel, "Cultural Pluralism vs. Absorption," in The New Immigration, ed. John J. Appel (New York: Jerome S. Ozer, 1971); Thaddeus Sleszynski, "The Second Generation of Immigrants in the Assimilative Process", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science XCIII (January 1921), 156-61, reprinted in The New Immigration, ed. Appel.

[22] Mann, p. 114 - 8.

[23] The Times Higher Education Supplement (May 6, 1983); New York Times, (February 11, 1988); Center Daily News (May 3, 1989); The Quest, p. 1.

[24] The Quest, p. 23-25.

[25] New York Times (February 11 & March 24, 1988); World Journal Weekly (March 25, 1990).

[26] The secret document of Chinese Education Commission cited in Note 6; also see Ling Xu (former official of Education Desk of Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. who defected to the United States on May 2, 1990) "We Must See Clearly the Essence," World Journal (June 13, 1990).

[27] Ruth Hayhoe, "Penetration or Mutuality?".

[28] Mann, p. 120, p. 142-146.

[29] Thomas Kessner & Betty Boyd Caroli Today's Immigrants, Their Stories: A New Look at the Newest Americans, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) p. 233-60.

[30] Orleans, p. 97.

[31] Orleans, p. 99-103.

[32] Lampton, p. 109 - 10.

[33] Stanley Rosen "Editor's Introduction" Chinese Education 22:3 (fall 1989) p. 3-5; Edward Friedman "The Crushing of the Democracy Movement in China and the Struggle to Reform Leninist Dictatorship," Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin - Madison (July 1989).

[34] According to the Office of International Students & Faculty of the University, at the time there were more than 200 students from People's Republic of China who were affiliated with the University of Wisconsin-Madison. So it is estimated that more than 50 of them were not reached due to address change, being out of the town, or other reasons.

[35] Jun Sun, Rui Zhang, et al. "An Investigation of the Conditions of Young Teachers". Xin Shiqi Daxuesheng Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu Yanjiu (Research on College Students' Ideological and Political Education in the New Period) (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 1988) p. 170-85; an English translation of the article appeared in Chinese Education 22:3 (fall 1989) 34-60.

[36] Orleans, p. 93.

[37] For an explanation of the technique, see P.J. Runkel and J.E. Mcgrath, Research on Human Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972).

[38] Xinhua News Agency (June 25, 1990), reported by World Journal (June 25, 1990).

[39] The mathematic maximum of Cronbach Alpha is 1, which represents a perfect consistency between measures, and the minimum value is 0, which represent a perfect inconsistency between measures. For technical details, see L.J. Cronbach, "Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests" Psychometrika 16 (1951): p. 297-334.

[40] Rosen, "Editor's Introduction".

[41] For a detailed treatment of the technique, see the multiple regression part of Thomas Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott, Regression: A Second Course in Statistics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981).

[42] For interpretations of incremental R Square, see Wonnacott and Wonnacott.

[43] In the original questionnaire we did ask the respondents in what month and year they came to the U.S.. Due to the sensitive nature of the issues, we decided to eliminate the information about arrival months to ensure confidentiality.

[44] The rationale is based on the fact that about half of the first year students in our sample were in their first or second month, and the rest of them are in their fifth or sixth month. A big difference in attitude between these two halves implies statistically a larger variance in attitude than that of other groups. If a big change in attitude occurs between sixth month and twelfth month, we should observe a difference in attitude between the first year students and other students. But this difference is not observed. So the change, if it does exist, can only occur between first/second month and fifth/sixth month. This requires that the first/second month students be very different from all the other students, e.g. be more supportive. It also requires that fifth/sixth month students be very different in an opposite direction, e.g. be more critical, otherwise the group average wouldn't have been about the same as others'.

[45] This is, in fact, another common use of the word "westernization". Deng Xiaoping, for example, has reportedly charged that several Chinese intellectuals were responsible for touching off a wave of student demonstration in China by advocating "Westernization" (New York Times, Jan. 15, 1987).

[46] Mann, p. 121.

Figure 1: Predicted Effects of Years In U.S.A. on Attitude



Figure 2


Influence of Home Culture Before Coming to U.S.
(Age)
Influence of U.S. Culture in General
(Years Spent in U.S.)
Influence of Specific Media in U.S.
(Time Spent with Various Media)
Attitude to Chinese Official Ideology
(3 questions on Likert scale)

Figure 3: Attitude By Years In U.S.A.



Figure 4: Attitude by Age





Figure 5: Attitude By Years In U.S.A.
Grouped by Age

Figure 6: Attitude by Age
Grouped by Years in U.S.A.



Figure 7: Attitude by Hours Reading Chinese Government Publications



Figure 8: Attitude by Hours Reading New York Times



Table 1

Distribution of Attitude Measures:

	Totally Agree %	Basically Agree %	Neutral %	Basically Disagree %	Totally Disagree %	Don't Know %
Q3: Marxism as a science has been outdated.	12.9	25.9	32.8	17.2	6.9	4.3
Q5: We should accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China.	3.4	24.1	31.9	19.0	17.2	4.3
Q7: Only the socialism can rescue China.	3.4	16.4	35.3	24.1	15.5	5.2

Table 2

	Chinese Government Publications	U.S. Media	Chinese Dissident Publications
Heavy News Coverage on China	*People's Daily,* *Out Look,* *China Daily*	*New York Times*	*China Spring,* *Speak Out*
Little or No News Coverage on China		TV, Radio, Local Newspaper	

International Communication Division
AEJMC
1991

Facsimile in Revolution and Sun Tzu's The Art of War

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Paper prepared for presentation to the International Communication Division at the annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Boston, Massachusetts, August 7-10, 1991.

Acknowledgments

This study was made possible through the support of the College of Journalism and Communications, University of Florida. The authors wish to thank Ms. Dolores Jenkins, Mass Communication Bibliographer, University of Florida Libraries, for her assistance.

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Facsimile in Revolution and Sun Tzu's The Art of War

Abstract

The principles of The Art of War, written by Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in 400 B.C., are used to analyze the applications of fax machines in the Panamanian and Chinese crises in 1988 and 1989. The results are examined in the light of symbolic interactionism theory. Fax machines offer a powerful political weapon in revolution, it was concluded, and Sun Tzu's basic military strategies remain valid in the age of the fax machine.

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Abstract

The principles of The Art of War, written by Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in 400 B.C., are used to analyze the applications of fax machines in the Panamanian and Chinese crises in 1988 and 1989, respectively.

The study demonstrates the significance of the fax machine in these two crises. The fax machine was used by the political dissidents to inform, encourage, and embolden the revolutionaries and to engage in psychological warfare attacks on the authoritarian governments. This newly popular technology proved a powerful political weapon in social revolution.

Sun Tzu's basic military strategies in The Art of War cumulate ancient Chinese wisdom on military thought, and they remain valid in the fax machine era as shown by events in these two crises. Sun Tzu's remarkable military thinking has a variety of implications for today's warfare and revolution.

The analysis of Sun Tzu's classic and the employment of fax machines in the crises supports symbolic interactionism as a vital approach to communication theory. The analysis also furthers our understanding of the definitions of the self and situation through communication.

Facsimile in Revolution and Sun Tzu's The Art of War

> War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. (Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 63)

During the past decade, the facsimile machine has shown the most dramatic growth of the communication inventions. Facsimile, or fax, refers as a verb to "the transmission of images of original documents, including print and graphics, by electronic means, usually via the telephone network but also by radio" (Dordick, 1986, p. 312) or, as a noun, to the practice of faxing, to the documents received via fax, or to the fax hardware. Faxing a document to the far corners of the world takes only about 20 seconds (Wood, 1989). Not only has fax fundamentally changed today's business operations, it also has had a strong impact on many aspects of international life.

The fax was acclaimed as the "machine of the year" of 1989 (Zimmer, 1990, p. 54). During the crises in Panama in 1988 and China in 1989, fax demonstrated its potential for aiding those who oppose dictators and giving power to a great number of people.

The use of fax in revolution[1] will be examined from both a military perspective and a communication perspective. Was the use of fax in Pamama and China merely an isolated phenomenon, or does it bear a larger meaning? The military of the two countries eventually did fire their weapons; do military principles provide an avenue for engaging a larger meaning for fax? And if established military principles apply to the use of fax, does an underlying stratum of thought about communication both illuminate the use of fax in revolution and shed light on military principles?

In the present paper, the role of fax in revolution will be examined by presenting some of the basic military principles of Sun Tzu, the most famous ancient Chinese military thinker, juxtaposing those principles with description of fax applications in contemporary crises. Some communication implications will then be considered.

Sun Tzu's Military Principles and the Practice of Fax Machine Use in the Chinese and Panamanian Crises

Sun Tzu's[2] The Art of War, variously dated from about 500 to 320 B.C. (Griffith, 1963, pp. 1-11), ranks as one of the most famous military classics of all time. It sums up the ancient Chinese military advisor's accumulated wisdom on how warfare should be conducted, in respect to both the means employed and the ends sought (Fairbank, 1974, p. 5). As Clausewitz[3] has influenced Western military thought, Sun Tzu has had a profound impact on Eastern--and Western--military and political thinking. Before 760 A.D., Sun Tzu's classic was introduced into Japan and used for the instruction of Japanese warriors (Griffith, p. 169). It was the major source of Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare strategy (Clavell, 1983, p. 2; Griffith, pp. 45-56). Sun Tzu's remarkable strategy is understood by the former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Red Army as "the victorious army attacks a demoralized and defeated enemy" (Griffith, p. xi), and the work is required reading in Russian military and political circles (Clavell, p. 2). An excerpt from The Art of War is found in one of the basic military strategy texts of the National Defense University of the United States (Thibault, 1984).[4] Sun Tzu's The Art of War was chosen as the source for military principles to be examined in the present study for its contemporary as well as its historical prominence.

From available historical sources, it appears that Sun Tzu was a native of Qi[5] State (now Shandong Province) in China during the fourth century B.C. (Griffith, 1963, pp. 11). Although we know little about his personal life, his thirteen-chapter The Art of War, distinguished by perceptiveness, imagination, and creativity, stands first in esteem among the many respected Chinese books on war.

"Sun Tzu remains the philosopher of the traditional Chinese golden mean" (Wilden, 1987, p. 249). His "theory of war is poetic, holistic, organistic, existentially realistic, moderate, . . . oriented toward persuasion rather than killing" (Wilden, p. 249), toward negotiation rather than destruction. While emphasizing "mental, moral, physical, and circumstantial factors" (Griffith, 1963, p. 40) operating in war, Sun Tzu believed that "the moral strength and intellectual faculty" of human beings were decisive (Griffith, p. 39). "The strategic and tactical doctrines expounded in The Art of War are based on deception, the creation of false appearances to mystify and delude the enemy, the indirect approach, ready adaptability to the enemy situation, flexible and coordinated manoeuvre of separate combat elements, and speedy concentration against points of weakness" (Griffith, p. 9).

Information in Warfare

Sun Tzu considered information about both sides in warfare to be vitally important. He wrote: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle" (1983, p. 18).

Based on sound information, Sun Tzu wrote, "the skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy. Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle" (1963, p. 87). "He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them" (1983, p. 41).

The validity of Sun Tzu's ancient wisdom concerning the importance of information in warfare has been demonstrated in contemporary situations. The "fax-in" campaign of information to China during the June 1989 Chinese democracy movement provides a pointed illustration of application of Sun Tzu's principles. When the Beijing authorities declared martial law on May 20, 1989, they "put a stranglehold on almost all nongovernmental communication channels, radio, television, print, and even computer mail" (Zimmer, 1990, p. 54). But fearing serious damage to its economy and international trade, the government left telephone lines open. That act almost became the Beijing rulers' Achilles' heel. Fax machines in mainland China were flooded with articles from the outside press sent by overseas Chinese protesters. The "fax-in" brought light to the nation's information blackout (Zimmer, p. 54). Mainland Chinese fax networks were linked to their U.S. counterparts. Since the Beijing student democracy movement started in April 1989, Chinese students in the eastern United States have run the Boston Chinese Information Center to counter the Chinese government's misinformation. The center's leader said, "People had articles clipped out, xeroxed from magazines, and we would fax them to China" (Brown, 1989, p. 12). The center was making fax machines "a key part of an information network for the continuing struggle for democracy in China" (Zimmer, p. 55).

After July 1988, when Panama's independent newspapers and radio stations were shut down, thousands of Panamanians read articles about Panama from The Christian Science Monitor, the Wichita Eagle-Beacon, and other news media right after they appeared in the United States. "In a strange marriage of state-of-art telecommunications and underground political networks, foreign press stories about Panama were sent there daily, sheet by sheet, on fax machines owned by Panamanians living abroad" (Benesch, 1988. p. 6). Law firms, banks, and travel agencies received faxes and sent them on again. Each person receiving faxed material "is expected to resend it to other machines on the 'interfax' network in the country, and then to photocopy the fax material as a flyer" (Benesch, p. 7).

Psychological Warfare

Sun Tzu is one of the great masters of psychological warfare. He considered mental states a fundamental element of successful warfare. "Those skilled in war avoid the enemy when his spirit is keen and attack him when it is sluggish and his soldiers homesick" (1963, p. 108). The mental states of those engaged in war depend on their leaders' behavior: "By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril" (p. 64).

Sun Tzu deemed an attack on the mind of the enemy an indispensable preliminary to battle (Griffith, 1963, p. 41). "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy" (1963, p. 77).

In warfare, according to Sun Tzu, the "primary target is the mind of the opposing commander" (Griffith, 1963, p. 41). "Shape him," he wrote (Griffith, p. 42). In "shaping" the opposition, the commander "seizes the initiative, attacks the opponent's strategy, and obliges him to maneuvre within the unfavorable strategic context thus created" (Wilden, 1987, p. 279). But Sun Tzu believed that a wise general pursues a still more advanced stategy toward the opponent: "shaping him while letting him think he is shaping you" (Wilden, p. 279). Sun Tzu wrote, "The crux of military operations lies in the pretense of accommodating one's self to the designs of the enemy" (1963, p. 139).

Fax proved to be an effective weapon for psychological warfare in the Panamanian and Chinese crises. Fax provided information and propaganda materials to encourage and embolden the revolutionaries in their attack on the minds of the dictators. The fax was one of the major instruments of choice for overseas Chinese students in keeping activists in Beijing informed of what was being said about them. By late-night telephone calls and fax transmissions, full stories from the Western press "appeared on university campuses every morning, pasted on boards or passed from hand to hand" (Pratt, 1989, p. 109). The Tiananmen hunger strikers read about themselves in faxed material from around world the day following their demonstrations. They received supporting views from abroad through fax machines, videotapes, the VOA, and the

BBC, and even through computer information networks (Pratt). Fax became a fuel for the 1989 China revolution.

When hundreds of citizens of Beijing were massacred by the Chinese army on June 4, 1989, the fax served a most vital purpose. "Pictures of the corpses, taken by Western photographers, were faxed back into China and distributed" (Zimmer, 1990, p. 54). Countering the Chinese officials' "big lie" that nobody was killed, pictures spread the truth of the massacre (Brown, 1989, p. 12; "From the Barrel," 1989, p. 32).

In the 1988 Panamanian crisis, fax culture was advanced enough to allow exiled journalists to send into the country full-blown underground newspapers (Benesch, 1988, p. 6). Among those newspapers was El Cruzado in Miami, edited by Alberto Conte, the exiled president of the Panama Journalists Association. Its readers included businessmen and government officials inside Panama. Conte said, "I also sent it to Noriega's top generals" to influence the minds of the authorities (Zimmer, 1990, p. 55).

Indirect Approach

"Sun Tzu's view [of strategy and tactics] is dominated by the limitless combinations, interpenetrations, and interchanges of the direct and the indirect approaches" (Wilden, 1987, p. 249) toward the enemy in warfare. Sun Tzu believed that the expert general is able to approach his objective indirectly as well as directly (Griffith, 1963, p. 41). Sun Tzu wrote, "He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious" (1963, p. 106).

Among the tactics of the indirect approach of Sun Tzu, deception and spying in military operations rank high. Sun Tzu believed that "a skilled general must master the complementary arts of simulation and dissimulation, . . . creating shapes to confuse and delude the enemy, [thereby concealing] his true dispositions and ultimate intent" (Griffith, 1963, p. 41). Sun Tzu wrote: "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity; when near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him" (1963, p. 66).

He added: "When he (the enemy) concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you" (1963, pp. 67-69).

Further: "There is no place where espionage is not used" (1963, p. 147). "Therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move" (p. 149).

Deceiving the opponent has also been a strategy of the fax-in campaign of Chinese students studying abroad. In October 1989, exiled Chinese journalists and students in the United States wrote, edited, and printed a fake copy of The People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party organ, to be faxed into China as a protest against the government's crackdown on student protesters.[6] About 6,500 fax numbers in China and faxing directions were published as one page of the bogus edition, a supplement to an alternative weekly in Los Angeles (Stein, 1989).

Speedy Attack on Weak Points

"Victory is the main object in war," Sun Tzu wrote. "If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. . . . For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited" (1963, p. 73). "Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations" (p. 76).

He stressed, "Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions" (1963, p. 134).

Sun Tzu believed that the good general moves his troops to take advantage of the enemy, marches swiftly, and strikes "like a lightning bolt from above the nine-layed heavens" (commentator Yu Tu in Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 86).

Fax can be a powerful political weapon, as it allows a swift attack on the enemy's weak points. One year after the Beijing democracy movement, overseas Chinese political protesters faxed messages back to China, urging people to "take a walk to Tiananmen Square" on April 5, the 1990 date of the Qingming festival, the traditional Chinese memorial day for the dead, to commemorate the 1989 democracy demonstrations and those killed in the subsequent massacre. The message was spread throughout Beijing. Students at some universities planned to take a "silent walk" on the Square on April 5. Chinese authorities were so frightened by the message that they closed the square to the public for the entire week of commemorative activities associated with the Qingming festival ("A Strange Kind," 1990).

Fax provided rapid support for revolution in Panama in 1988. Articles of dissidents and small underground newspapers published by exiled Panamanians living abroad were faxed to Panama daily for distribution on the streets (Benesch, 1988). Through a network of fax machines, the exiles waged a people's war against the regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Before the October crackdown, some 30,000 photocopies of faxed materials were distributed in one day during anti-government protests in Panama City (Benesch).

Discussion

The juxtaposition of military principles drawn from Sun Tzu's classic and description of the uses of fax in the two crises suggests that sound military doctrine supports the application of fax in movements of revolution. The significance of the new communication technology of fax machines gains substance from the consonance of the use of fax in Panama and China with established principles of war.

Fax poses a new challenge to authoritarian governments. It serves as one of the best ways to keep people in touch.[7] In many applications, fax permits easier, cheaper, and faster communication than other technologies (Burgess, 1990, p. H4). For point-to-point communication, for example, fax is faster than mail and cheaper than telex. Unlike the telephone, fax can leave a record. Fax can transmit visual images of all kinds--handwritten Chinese characters, for example, as well as pictures and charts. Fax is convenient and easy to control, and portable units are available. In addition, fax can be used to make recipients think that a message is urgent. "Fax has become a staple of international communications" (Burgess, p. H4). No government can totally shut down its telephone transmission without hurting its economy and international trade.[8]

Fax offers a powerful tool for information dissemination. Decision-making in contemporary war depends largely on the available information. If we accept Sun Tzu's dictum that "war is a matter of vital importance to the state" (1963, p. 63), we could add that information is a matter of vital importance to war.

The use of fax in revolutionary situations shows the potential of this fast-growing technology to implement many aspects of military strategies. "By relating war to the immediate political context, that is to alliances or the lack of them, and to unity and stability on the home front and high morale in the army as contrasted with disunity in the enemy country and low morale in the enemy army, Sun Tzu attempted to establish a realistic basis for a rational appraisal of relative power" (Griffith, 1963, pp. 39-40). Revolutionaries can employ fax to reduce the opponent's power and increase their own power. By engaging in the activities of psychological warfare, for instance, revolutionaries can upset the minds and plans of the enemy, spread false rumors and misleading information, corrupt officials, create internal discord, and nurture Fifth Columns (Griffith, 1963, p. xi).

Use of the fax machine and other new electronic media could become characteristic of future revolutions. Fax machine use has increased rapidly during the past five years

(Burgess, 1990). As it gets faster, smarter, and cheaper, fax will become more and more available. In the Panamanian and Chinese crises, revolutionaries used fax machines as well as other new electronic communication media such as the photocopier, audiocassette recorder, video cassette recorder, and even the personal computer tied into a world-wide communication network. By permitting more personal control, storage, and reproduction and faster transmission of information, the new electronic communication technologies make it possible for revolutionaries to penetrate censorship and information blackouts, transmit dissident information across borders, and direct or aid revolution. Fax helps in establishing information networks inside and outside countries undergoing revolutionary turmoil.

Examination of Sun Tzu's strategy and fax's role in revolution suggests a theory that underlies both, one that provides a deeper understanding of the phenomena of communication in times of social upheaval. That theory, symbolic interactionism, enhances our understanding of both communication and revolution.

Symbolic interactionism considers interaction among humans through symbols as the binding force of society (Littlejohn, 1983). It emphasizes the importance of symbols and the meanings we construct for them through interaction. From the symbolic interactionist viewpoint, "the roles we take in society and the images we have of ourselves are shaped through interaction with other people. . . . People create their own worlds through the use of symbols and meanings" (Littlejohn, pp. 72-73). To influence others through messages, communicators must correctly anticipate the kinds of responses that their selection of symbols will arouse in members of the audience. "It is the creative imagination which is responsible for the influence which others exercise over the self" (Mead, 1982, p. 67). Through role-taking, or imagining oneself in the place of another individual, a communicator may more sensitively select symbols that will elicit the desired responses in the receiving person (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, pp. 253-254).

Sun Tzu has been praised not only as a great military strategist, but also as a master of human communication. Sun Tzu's basic military strategy, as described above, is to use all kinds of symbols and meanings to create a symbolic environment to "shape" or manipulate the opponent. He emphasizes unsettling the enemy general's mind and upsetting his plans (Fairbank, 1975, p. 5), changing his attitude and inducing his compliance, leading him to "his own ill-conceived pursuit of unfeasible goals," making him "realize his inferiority" (Fairbank, p. 11). In the "symbolic world" the commander has created, the enemy finally surrenders or at least retreats without having fought.

Consideration of Sun Tzu's classic and the employment of fax in revolution can further our understanding of the definition of self and situation through communication.

According to symbolic interactionism, the self may fruitfully be viewed as a result of the process of exchanging significant symbols. People are objects to themselves, perceiving themselves, having conceptions of themselves, communicating with themselves, and acting toward themselves (Blumer, 1969, p. 62). With the mechanism of self-interaction, people act toward their worlds, interpreting what confronts them and organizing their actions on the basis of their interpretations (Blumer, 1969, p. 63).

People define the situations they encounter, and they adapt to those situations as defined. Human communication, direct and indirect, verbal and nonverbal, is designed to present various aspects of the self that the communicator believes to be appropriate to the situation. "In attempting to define a situation, [people go] through a two-part process. First, [they need] information about the other people in the situation. Second, [they need] to give information about [themselves]. This process of exchanging information enables people to know what is expected of them" (Littlejohn, 1983, p. 179).

From the discussion of Sun Tzu's classic and fax use in crises, it appears that in revolution, definition of the self and definition of the situation depend on communication. Fax provides one means of constructing those definitions. Support is lent to DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach's assumption that "individual and group media dependency relations become more intense when the social environment is ambiguous, threatening, and/or rapidly changing" (1989, p. 316).

Conclusion

Fax played important roles in the Chinese and Panamanian crises. It kept dissidents inside and outside the countries in touch, overcoming government-erected barriers. Fax was used to provide information for the opponents of government within the two countries and to attack the authoritarian rulers. Fax proved to be an effective political weapon in times of upheaval.

The basic principles and strategies of Sun Tzu enhance our understanding of the use of fax in these crises. The emphasis of Sun Tzu on the basic importance of information, on knowledge of self and enemy, on psychological warfare, on deception, and on the importance of speed all found echoes in the use of fax. Further research on the use of advanced communication technologies in times of revolution would benefit from study of additional military principles and more detailed consideration of their implications.

Consideration of Sun Tzu's ideas in relation to the use of fax in Panama and China strengthens our appreciation of the usefulness of symbolic interactionism, one approach to understanding the nature of human communication. Symbolic interactionism applies in situations of social conflict as well as social harmony. Symbolic interactionism ideas may be consciously utilized, it would seem from the present study, for purposes of deception as well as self-knowledge; the ideas may aid in interpreting information about a revolutionary situation.

The study also serves as an illustration of the central role of communication in human affairs, as asserted by Schramm: "The doors from communication open on almost every corner of human life" (1983, p. 16). Consideration of The Art of War and its relation to use of fax in China and Panama suggests that human behavior in many crucial respects remains the same now as some 2,500 years ago. In attempting to construct the unified theory about which Schramm remained so hopeful, scholars may benefit by considering historical, even ancient, evidence. While the present study remains suggestive rather than conclusive, the surprising consonance among use of fax, Sun Tzu's principles, and symbolic interactionism does suggest that findings of a more concrete, detailed nature will result from future study.

Footnotes

[1] The term revolution is used to cover a variety of situations of upheaval and disorder, including open warfare, guerilla resistance, and political, social, or cultural revolution. The political revolution may come from the left or from the right. The key element running through the situations to which the term is applied remains the realization of or attempt at fundamental change in existing arrangements. Revolutions may fail. Times of widespread upheaval often result in literature of extraordinary depth, as witness The Iliad and The Odyssey, for example, or the focal work of the present paper, The Art of War. (See Griffith, 1963, p. 21, for conditions at the time of Sun Tzu.)

[2] Sun Tzu is sometimes referred to as Sun Wu, Wu Tzu, or even as Sun Wu Tzu. The various names arise from the practice in ancient China of substituting Tzu, a term of great honor applied only to revered scholars, for an individual's given name, while retaining the patronymic. The substitution was permanent. The combinations Wu Tzu and Sun Wu Tzu to denote the individual herein called Sun Tzu occur infrequently in contemporary sources. Another Tzu was Confucius.

[3] Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian general and author of the influential book On War.

[4] The Art of War has been the subject of countless commentaries (Griffith, 1963, p. 1). A brief introduction to the scholarly examination of the work is provided by Griffith (1963, pp. ix-x, 1-19), who also provides historical context for the book (pp. 20-38) and intersperses commentary generously throughout the text, amply footnoting sources and points of contention among commentators and translators.

"Sun Tzu was first brought to the attention of the Western world by a Jesuit missionary to Peking, Father J. J. M. Amiot, whose interpretation of 'The Art of War' was published in Paris in 1772 . . ." (Griffith, 1963, p. ix; see also Appendix III, "Sun Tzu in Western Languages," pp. 179-183). "Napoleon used all of Sun Tzu to his own advantage to conquer most of Europe. It was only when he failed to follow Sun Tzu's rules that he was defeated" (Clavell, 1983, p. 6). Sun Tzu's influence on the French apparently died with Napoleon; no later translations into French appeared during the almost 200 years following that of Amiot (Griffth, 1963, p. 180), and after Napoleon his principles were apparently neither taught nor followed in the French miliary (Griffith, 1963, pp. 181-182).

The first translation into English appeared in Tokyo in 1905 (Griffith, 1963, p. 182). It was followed by a London edition of 1910 and three others during World War II.

See also Griffith (1963, pp. 169-178), Appendix II, "Sun Tzu's Influence on Japanese Miliary Thought."

[5] Qi in Pin Yin orthography (used since 1952) was spelled, in the earlier Roman orthography, Ch'i.

[6] Some U.S. publications objected to the creation and distribution of fake newspapers. See Stein, 1989.

[7] The present paper was written before publication of Ganley's 1991 article on the new communication technologies, many points of which agree closely with arguments advanced here.

[8] International direct-dialing telephone facilities have been installed in at least 122 of the world's approximately 160 countries, according to AT&T.

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NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPHY IN CHINA

BY

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Presented to the Visual Communication Division
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Newspaper Photography in China

This study analyzes the agenda of photographic coverage in Chinese newspapers. It also examines the way people are depicted in newspaper photographs. Finally, this study considers whether photographs are shaped and selected according to an ideological framework that suits a particular group in Chinese society. Nine newspapers are compared based upon the agenda, depiction and ideology of their photographic coverage.

The **subject matter** and **direction** of photographs were studied because agenda setting theory suggests news media establish or strongly influence topics of public debate. Exposure to media news may not tell people what to think, but people are told what to think about.[1] Research in the United States indicates that journalistic photographs have great persuasive powers to shape people's attitudes and belief systems.[2] They can attract readers' attention,[3] produce intense emotional reactions,[4] and have a type of raw realism that enhances credibility.[5] It is assumed that journalistic photographs have similar effects upon Chinese readers. Determining the agenda of photographic coverage is worthwhile, therefore, because photographs help to structure the public's perceptions of socio-political reality.

The depiction of coverage was measured by assessing the **balance** of photographic coverage of different genders, age groups, and occupations of people, and by determining if journalists' **treatment** of those people was favorable, neutral or unfavorable. The balance and treatment of photographic coverage are measures used to infer whether journalists are biased or impartial.[6] If there is a disproportionate number of photographs of one gender, age group and occupation, and if those people are consistently depicted in a favorable or unfavorable manner, then journalists are thought to be biased.

The ideological nature of photographic coverage was determined by deciding if **values** expressed in photographs consistently reflect the values of a particular group of people, and if the **style** of photographs indicates they were manipulated to reflect those values. Values are important because they indicate which elements of life are cherished or preferred.[7] Style of photographs is important because it indicates whether a photograph is free of interference by the photographer or the main actor(s) appearing in the photograph.[8] The consistency of values and the way photographs are made are measures used to infer whether news is framed out of ideological considerations or from other considerations. If the values expressed in photographs are only relevant to a particular group of people, and if photojournalists pose people in order to make a point, then photographic coverage is thought to be ideological.

Studying bias and ideology of photographic coverage is of more than just academic importance. Two surveys in the 1980s showed that people in China are losing credibility in their news media. A 1985 survey found that most people thought newspapers were "credible" or "basically credible." Journalists were considered to be conveyors of information rather than mere propagandists.[9] A 1988 survey, however, found that 65 percent of the people agreed the press was losing credibility.[10] One reason for declining credibility may be that news coverage in the late 1980s was biased and ideological.

A limitation of this investigation is that only nine newspapers were studied out of a total of 2,509 in 1987.[11] A sample of nine different newspapers, however, is larger than many other studies of the Chinese press, and the author believed it would be better to study a few newspapers in depth than many newspapers in a shallow manner.

Although generalizations are somewhat risky, results of this study have potential value. First, they should add to the store of knowledge of China by providing an understanding of newspaper photography in China. Various aspects of Chinese newspaper have been investigated, including articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and advertisements, but not photographs. Understanding newspaper photographs will supplement previous studies of the Chinese news media. Second, the results should interest visual communication scholars because the content of photographs in Chinese and American newspapers is compared and contrasted. Third, the study provides theoretical and operational definitions of ideology in photographs. Although a few semiologists have investigated the connotational meanings of photographs, this is the first time that the values and style of journalistic photographs have been studied in order to understand whether an ideological framework was present. Such theoretical and methodological advances would be useful to any scholars who wish to understand the meanings of photographs.

Literature Review

A search of the literature uncovered only one (unpublished) study of the content of photographs in Chinese newspapers. For a sample of five newspapers taken in January 1985, photographs were coded according to seven content categories. Results showed that photographs of "life and people" were predominant, and depending upon the newspaper, they ranged from 20-40 percent of the total. "Sports news" photographs were least common; they ranged from 2-12 percent. The percentage of photographs of "state affairs" ranged from 8-18 percent. Photographs of "economic news" ranged from 8-34 percent. Photographs of "world news" ranged from 0-27 percent. Photographs of "travel" ranged from 3-10 percent. Photographs of "culture and art" ranged from 5-23 percent. Photographs of "science or animals" ranged from 1-14 percent.[12]

These subject matter categories differ from categories used by Western researchers. For example, there is no category for accident-disaster, for violence-armed conflicts, for crime-corruption, for social-political problems, or for sex.

Several studies of news content in Chinese newspapers have shown that the image of the United States in People's Daily reflected the attitude of the power elite toward the United States.[13] Another group of studies show how news content changes when there is a shift in the dominant ideology of government and Party leaders.[14] Although these studies have value, they do not attempt to identify the presence of many aspects of Chinese Communist ideology in the news media, nor do they study aspects of ideology in a cross-sample of publications. One study, however, identifies several ideological values of the "new socialist man." During the Cultural Revolution, an analysis of editorials in Liberation Army Daily found that "human will and determination," "service to the people," "the priority of the human element over material or technological advancement," and "self-sacrifice/self-negation" were important values.[15] Only one study was discovered which analyzed the content of a variety of news publications. In a study of 11 regional newspapers, Mills found significant variation among newspapers in their reporting of foreign policy toward the superpowers.[16]

Almost all of these studies of news content confirm the idea that the power elites use the media as a means to impose ideological hegemony on Chinese society. According to Chin-Chuan Lee, director of the China Times Center: "The media transmit official messages, legitimize issues, and encourage mass endorsement of the regime-prescribed ideology. The media, in short, mirror the ruling ideology and usher in power/policy shifts."[17]

Because the dominant ideology changes as different power groups rise or fall and as policies shift, it is difficult to specify values of the power elite in China. One value that has continued through time, however, is that the Chinese should be loyal to all members of a community, not just to those with whom they have a personal relationship. Maoist slogans of "serve the people" and "fight self" show that dedication to the public cause and a conscious suppression of selfish inclinations were important values before 1978. In the 1980s, the theme of collectivism has changed somewhat, and now the principle of socialism is "to each according to his labor." Material incentives are used to spur production, and individuals are encouraged to pursue profitable enterprises. Yet collectivist values have not been abandoned. Selfless behavior, service to others, generosity and good manners are still emphasized.[18]

A second, related value that has continued through time is egalitarianism and populism. The Chinese Communists recognize the existence of classes and the necessity of maintaining political authority, yet they generally seek to minimize material and psychological inequalities. They wish to eradicate "irrational subordination," of younger generations to the elderly and of women to men. In the 1980s, despite policies permitting accumulation of wealth, egalitarianism remains a value in Chinese politics. The policy of rural decollectivization is justified by emphasizing the benefits to poorer peasants. Policies that allow some to get rich first are defended by saying the social value of production exceeds the individual reward; therefore, society is better off.[19]

A third value that continues with some changes is that the Chinese should be committed to political activism and class struggle. Since the Cultural Revolution, official emphasis has shifted away from antagonistic struggle and toward activism for modernization. The new slogan is "stability and unity." Struggle techniques such as criticism and self-criticism, however, are still used. Military struggle against an enemy is a common theme in the media, and struggle against bourgeois cultural influence continues.[20]

A fourth value of government and Party leaders is that the Chinese should be self-reliant. Party leaders insist that human efforts can overcome all obstacles, and they urge people to employ their own initiative and capacities to accomplish tasks. Dependence on higher authorities, religion, and superstition is discouraged, as is resignation to one's fate. In the 1980s, there were numerous campaigns against the "iron rice bowl" of total job security, and individuals who have succeeded through their own efforts are encouraged and their successes are publicized. Self-reliance is also a caution against excessive dependence on the import of technology.[21]

Pre-reform Chinese society took for granted several other values. Because China had a socialist economy, they believed the state should own the means of production, and that central planning was needed to direct the economy. People accepted the orthodoxy of the Party's absolute rule over all affairs. They felt that tight ideological control of individual expression was necessary, and they were hostile toward Western ideas.[22]

In the 1980s, however, moderate reformers in the Party hierarchy began to challenge the orthodox economic values of the dominant ideology. As early as November 1979, Zhao

Ziyang excluded the planned economy from the list of principles implied by a commitment to socialism; and by late 1985, Deng Xiaoping had done the same. Although averse to risk, moderate reformers believed that the marketplace, rather than the state, should control the production and sale of agricultural goods and a few small manufactured goods. Fairly stringent controls over other aspects of the economy should remain, however, in order to preserve a balanced economy. The principle of public ownership became more flexible so as to allow for the "existence of a variety of economic forms" while ensuring the "dominant position of the economic sector under public ownership."[23]

Radical reformers wanted to transform China's socialist economy to more of a capitalist economy. They believed the marketplace should be the most important mechanism for the allocation of goods and services and the determination of prices. Markets should control not only agricultural goods, but almost all aspects of production, including capital and labor. State owned industrial and commercial enterprises should be restructured, and individual and private enterprises should be encouraged. The economy should be grounded in the sanctity of private property rights. They even encouraged the Chinese government to experiment with the sale of stocks.[24]

Moderate reformers also began to challenge the Party's absolute authority over all aspects of Chinese life. They believed Party cadres should consult more with members of an organization and create a more open organizational climate. They sought to reduce the Party's control over personnel appointments in non-Party organizations and thereby minimize its interference in day-to-day operations. They implemented the managerial responsibility system and decreased the amount of direct Party intervention in economic management. Moderate reformers were opposed, however, to any sign of political pluralization that would challenge the dominance of the Party in Chinese political life. Radical reformers wished to go further. They called for direct, contested elections so that political legitimacy could be derived from the consent of the governed. They called for democratization of the political system.[25]

Moderate and radical reformers also challenged the values of conservative leaders concerning freedom of thought and the indoctrination of youth. Conservative leaders believed that politics should shape public opinion and Chinese culture. Arguing "there is only one truth," the Red Flag, an important official publication, also insisted that "freedom of speech, literary creation, and publication" must adhere to "the four basic principles." Conservative leaders also believed the state has the right, even the obligation, to promote moral conduct by educating youth in an official doctrine believed to be morally valid. On the other hand, moderate reformers believed greater freedom of thought was required to modernize China. Intellectual, scientific and technical questions should be addressed on their merits, without regard to ideological considerations. Radical reformers believed that freedom of thought should also include the freedom to discuss political matters. Indoctrination of youth could be overdone and limit independent thinking.[26]

Method

A variety of newspapers were chosen to make up the sample. Three Party organ newspapers, representing national, provincial and city circulation levels, were selected. People's Daily was selected because it represents Party policies at the national level. Fujian Daily was selected because the author lived in Fujian for one year while teaching photojournalism at Xiamen University. He believed it would be easier to understand the contextual meanings of photographs in a local newspaper. Xiamen Daily was selected because it was the author's local newspaper.

In addition to Party organ newspapers, evening newspapers from two large Chinese cities were selected. Evening newspapers are different from Party organ newspapers because they have both a mandate to respond to readers' needs and an economic imperative to respond to those needs. Evening newspapers are largely funded by individual subscriptions and somewhat by advertising. Photographs are selected, therefore, in order to attract readers. Two of the most popular evening newspapers, each with circulations near one million, are Beijing Evening News and Xinmin Evening News (from Shanghai).[27]

China Daily, China's first national English-language daily newspaper, was selected because it is a pioneer in photojournalism reform. Targeted to Western readers inside and outside of China, the newspaper is heavily influenced by Western journalism, and its editor-in-chief Feng Xiliang was educated at the University of Missouri. Editors and reporters highly value photographs and staff photographers are regularly sent on assignments throughout the country. Since its first publication on June 1, 1981, China Daily has carried a large photo on its front page every day, and sometimes stories are cut in order to leave more space for photographs. A picture page is regularly published on Fridays.[28]

Target papers are another large category of newspapers in China. Owned by various organizations, these newspapers serve organization members in the same way that trade journals serve their readers. Liberation Army Daily was selected because it was the only military newspaper that could be obtained. By speaking for the vast military establishment, the newspaper also carries considerable clout in the political arena.[29] Of the various newspapers owned by mass organizations, Worker's Daily and China Youth News were selected because they have such large circulations and great potential influence over clearly defined segments of the population. Worker's Daily features material about economic developments, trade union activities, the welfare of workers and other labor-related matters.[30] China Youth News emphasizes news of particular interest to youth, such as educational matters, culture, sports and employment.[31]

The February 1987 issues were selected for study because it was the first month the author could subscribe to all nine newspapers. It was not, however, a "typical" time period. After student demonstrations in December 1986, the journalism reform movement in China was sharply curtailed. Party leaders reasserted control over the press, even closing some newspapers for political "errors." News media published an increasing amount of propaganda against "bourgeois liberalization."[32] During this period of ideological retrenchment, therefore, more conservative values and more manipulation of photographs would be expected.

Although a month's worth of newspapers was collected, a subsample of a "constructed week" was created for an in-depth analysis of photographs. The month was divided into seven strata. All Mondays were grouped together, as were all Tuesdays, and so on. One issue was randomly selected from each stratum. The final sample consists of newspapers published on February 1, 5, 11, 14, 23, 24, and 27.

The agenda of photographic coverage was measured by determining the frequencies of photographs that fell into ten subject matter categories. Seven of the subject categories were developed based upon the study of newspaper photographs described in the literature review. An eighth category, "violence," was developed to account for photographs that frequently appear in Western newspapers, but seldom appear in Chinese newspapers. A ninth category, "education and indoctrination," was developed to account for photographs that preach to readers or that show "model" workers who set positive examples. A tenth category, "other," was developed to account for any photographs that could not fit the other categories. For these subject categories, the recording unit was the photograph, and the context unit was the photograph with its caption.

A **"world news"** category includes all photographs taken outside of the People's Republic of China other than photos of Chinese people who have temporarily traveled abroad. If a photograph was coded as "world news," then coders were asked to stop coding and to proceed to the next photograph. Photographs taken outside of China were not further analyzed because this investigation concerns photographs made by Chinese photographers about China.

An **"economic news"** category includes all photographs showing production, distribution and sale of goods to consumers as well as the people and infrastructure involved in routine economic activity. A **"science and animals"** category includes all photographs showing advances in science and medicine. It also includes photos of animals.[33] A **"violence"** category includes all photographs showing social and political conflicts, or armed conflicts, or disasters and accidents. These three "hard news" categories were later collapsed into a category called **cognitive news** because these pictures increase readers' knowledge about China.

A **"political affairs"** category includes all photographs related to the public activities of government leaders and Chinese Communist Party leaders, including government meetings, negotiations, and elections. An **"education and indoctrination"** category includes all photographs that show military or civilian people studying in school or training in an organized manner or that indoctrinate readers about proper behavior. These two subject categories were later collapsed into a category called **political-educational news** because these pictures serve a political or educational function.

A **"travel and culture and art"** category includes all photographs showing popular tourist destinations in China, or of nature. It includes pictures of operas, movies, plays or any other organized forms of social or cultural entertainment. It also includes pictures of the various minority nationalities of China emphasizing the literature, culture, religion, or dress of minorities. A **"sports news"** category includes all photographs of competitive sports, recreational sports, or popular exercise. A **"life and people"** category includes all photographs showing regular people relaxing, pursuing hobbies, or doing other typical activities of daily life. These three "soft news" categories were later collapsed into a category called **entertainment news** because these pictures are meant to be enjoyed by readers.

The agenda of photographic coverage was also measured by determining the frequencies of photographs that fall into two direction categories. A **"negative"** category includes all photographs concerning problems in China. A **"non-negative"** category includes all photographs showing neutral or positive news. The recording unit was the photograph, and the context unit was the photograph and its caption.

The depiction of coverage was measured by assessing the balance of photographic coverage of the different genders, ages and occupations of people, and by determining if journalists' treatment of the main actors(s) is favorable, neutral or unfavorable. **Main actor(s)** are either the people who are performing the activity, or the people who are most prominent in the photograph. If there are no people in the photograph, or they are irrelevant to the meaning, then coders were asked to stop coding and to proceed to the next photograph.

Four **gender** categories were developed for this study. If the main actor(s) are males, then code **"male."** If they are females, then code **"female."** If the photograph has two or more people who are considered main actors, and if the main actors include males and females, then code **"both genders."** If the gender of any of the main actors cannot be recognized by viewing the photograph, and the genders cannot be determined by reading the caption, then code **"unrecognized gender."**

Six **age** categories were developed for this study. If the main actor(s) appear to be 1-12 years old, then code as **"children."** If the main actor(s) appear to be 13-25 years old, then code as **"youth."** If they appear to be 26-60, then code as **"adults."** If they appear to be older than 60, then code as **"elderly."** If the ages of the main actors cannot fit one of these four categories, then code **"mixed age groups."** If the approximate ages cannot be determined, then code **"unrecognized ages."**

Nine **occupation** categories were developed for this study: **"Public officials"** include government leaders or Party employees at all levels. **"Soldiers and police"** include military troops and officers. **"Professionals"** include biologists, chemists, physicists, engineers, mathematicians, computer scientists, doctors, nurses, and other white-collar workers employed by the state. **"Laborers"** include factory workers, machine operators, foremen, mine workers, and other blue-collar workers employed by the state in rural or urban industry. **"Entrepreneurs"** include all people who are self-employed except farmers. **"Intellectuals"** include educators, students and social scientists who work in the fields of anthropology, economics, history, psychology, and sociology. **"Farmers"** include people who live and work in the countryside unless they are involved in rural industry. **"Entertainers"** include artists, sports figures, singers, actors, and acrobats. **"No occupation"** include children, youth and elderly who are too young or too old to have an occupation. It also includes people with unrecognized occupations or occupations that do not fit the above categories.

After the person's gender, age and occupation had been coded, journalists' **treatment** of the main actor(s) in the photographs was coded on a three-point nominal scale of **"favorable," "neutral,"** or **"unfavorable."** Such a scale is commonly used when measuring direction of attitudes. The recording unit was the photograph, and the context unit was the photograph with its caption.

In order to code the treatment of main actors, coders were asked to consider many aspects of the subject, form and context of the photograph. They examined the main actor(s) to see if their **facial expressions, gestures, and bodily posture** had positive, neutral or negative connotations. Coders also examined the main actor(s) to see if their **behavior** had positive, neutral or negative connotations. **Objects** in a photograph and the **setting** of a photograph may also express positive, neutral or negative connotations about the main actor(s). In addition, coders examined the **form of the content** to see if it conveyed positive, neutral or negative connotations about the main actor(s). For example, light can be used to flatter people or make them look ominous. In addition, people photographed from a high camera angle appear less important than people photographed from a low angle. Finally, coders read the **captions** to learn if the **verbal context** created positive, neutral or negative connotations about the main actor(s).[34]

After considering these various aspect of a photograph, coders decided whether the overall treatment of the main actor(s) was favorable, neutral or unfavorable. The subject, form and context elements were weighted equally. Each coder was sensitive to the meaning of a photograph and used his or her judgment to code it on a three-point nominal scale.

Although it is probably a safe assumption that people of any culture would be able to code the subject and direction of photographs, as well as the gender, age and occupation of main actors appearing in photographs, it is less safe to assume they could code the treatment of actors. The author is unaware of nonverbal communication research in China and realizes that objects and settings may have different symbolic values in China than in the United States. Studying the connotative meanings of the form of photographs is especially troublesome because so little is known about production of photographs in China. One cannot assume, therefore, that the researcher and all Chinese readers will interpret the photographs the same way. A test of this assumption was beyond the scope of this investigation.

Since many different values may appear in photographs, it was difficult to conceptualize a manageable number for this study. The criterion adopted for selecting the value dimensions was their relevance to distinct groups in Chinese society. Conservative Party leaders generally have orthodox socialist values about economics, society, and politics. A group of moderate reformers, who seek to develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to embrace a hybridization of socialist and capitalist values. A group of radical reformers, who seek the rapid transformation of China, seem to reject orthodox socialist values and to embrace Western capitalist values. Differing concepts of the good society obviously will bring these groups into conflict and cause strain. The value categories and positions described below come from the literature review, an article about social values of Soviet and American elites[35], and considerable trial and error with the sample of photographs. The recording unit was the value, and the context unit was the photograph with its caption.

A value may not be expressed in every photograph. The most important value expressed in a photograph and its caption was coded. Coders were instructed to code a value position if it could be inferred by viewing the image, AND the inference was confirmed in the accompanying caption. A value position was also coded if it is explicitly stated in a caption.

The category **"ownership of property"** has three different positions: (a) public ownership of the means of production is encouraged; (b) a mixed system of private and public ownership is encouraged, although public ownership should remain dominant; and (c) private ownership and the sanctity of private property rights is encouraged. Individual and private enterprises should be allowed to flourish, and experiments with the sale of stocks should be conducted.

The category **"role of the market"** has three different positions: (a) central planning in all sectors of the economy is necessary; (b) the market is an important, if limited, supplementary mechanism to state planning; (c) the market should be the most important mechanism for the allocation of goods and services, and the determination of prices.

The category **"incentive to work"** has three different positions: (a) no material reward is needed when serving society--helping others and suppression of selfish inclinations are most important; (b) some wage differentiation is needed as reflected in the slogan "to each according to his labor;" (c) big bonuses and big spending will stimulate worker enthusiasm--"to get rich is good."

The category **"criteria for social status"** has three different positions: (a) political achievement or military distinction is emphasized; (b) individual intellectual, artistic or athletic achievement is emphasized; (c) productive output or accumulation of wealth in the private sector is emphasized.

The category **"degree of reliance"** has three different positions: (a) government will take care of people who cannot care for themselves; (b) people rely upon others in their community, rather than government or family; (c) people rely on their family for help--they use their own initiative and capacities to accomplish tasks.

The category **"culture"** has three different positions: (a) Chinese culture should serve socialism and avoid bourgeois ideas and values; (b) some ideological constraints on culture should be relaxed, but general guidelines must remain; (c) Chinese culture must be allowed to flourish without ideological considerations, and cultural contacts with capitalist countries should be encouraged.

The category of **"indoctrination of youth"** has three different positions: (a) Political or military leaders should be responsible for transmitting China's ideals to young people; (b) Nonpolitical institutions should take chief responsibility for transmitting ideals to youth; (c) there is a danger that indoctrination of young people will be overdone and limit independent and creative thinking.

The category **"freedom of thought"** has three different positions: (a) there is only one truth, political in character, needed to shape public opinion; (b) freedom of thought should be limited to literary, scientific and technical questions; (c) even political matters and previously forbidden subjects should be discussed freely.

The category **"political power"** has three different positions: (a) everyone should uphold the "four cardinal principles" and not challenge Party authority; (b) the power of the Party must be reduced--Party leaders should consult more with others and interfere less in day-to-day operations; (c) political pluralization is needed--multiple parties and direct, contested elections are needed so that political legitimacy is derived from consent of the governed.

For the purpose of analysis, these nine value categories were collapsed into four **type of value** categories. **"Conservative"** photographs included pictures expressing (a) value positions representing economic, social and political values of conservative government and Party leaders. **"Moderate"** photographs included pictures expressing (b) value positions representing the values of moderate reformers in the government and Party. **"Radical"** photographs included pictures expressing (c) value positions representing the values of radical reformers who wish to develop a more capitalistic society. **"No value"** photographs included pictures that were coded (d) and that did not reflect any value positions.

An assumption of this study is that the values appearing in photographs represent the values of those who determine news content. This assumption is supported by corroborating evidence in the review of the literature. Another assumption is that the values perceived by the researcher will be the values perceived by Chinese readers. As stated before, a test of such an assumption is beyond the scope of this investigation.

Four **style** categories were developed based upon the author's experience as a working photojournalist. In Western societies, when photojournalists take pictures of people, the images may be candid or posed portraits. When photojournalists take pictures of news events or feature situations, they do so in a candid manner. When photojournalists take pictures to clarify or dramatize a preconceived idea, they pose the pictures and call them illustrations. Based upon interviews with Chinese photojournalists,[36] it is expected that Chinese photojournalists follow similar guidelines when taking pictures. For this study, therefore, "candid photos" are indicators of photographs free from interference, and "posed action photos" are indicators of photographs controlled in order to make a point. The recording unit was the photograph, and the context unit was the photograph.

Coders were instructed to examine all photographs to determine whether the style of presentation is posed or candid. If the photograph shows a person or a group of people staring directly into the camera, and if there is no pretense about posing for the camera, then the style of presentation is **"posed portrait."** If the photograph shows people who are not staring into the camera, but they seem engaged in an activity arranged by the photographer or the main actor(s), then it is a **"posed action"** photograph. Activities are likely to have been posed if the people are smiling, if arrangement of people is "perfect," and if the lighting, composition and camera angle appear "perfect." If the photograph shows people who appear completely unaware of the camera, and if the lighting, composition and camera angle do not appear "perfect," then it is a **"candid photo."** If the coder cannot determine which of the above categories best applies, then it is an **"ambiguous photo."**

A coding sheet and instructions for coders were developed. Two lengthy training sessions were held with potential coders in order to explain the coding instructions. All of the coders were graduate students who could read Chinese. Some issues of newspapers not included in the sample were used for practice coding. Several improvements in the coding sheet and instructions were made based upon these training sessions.

For the pre-test, two people independently coded one issue of each of the nine newspapers included in this investigation. Reliability was calculated by dividing the number of times two coders agreed upon a classification by the total number of coding decisions for each variable. In general, reliability was above 90 percent.

One Chinese-speaking graduate student who was had participated in the training and pre-tests was selected to code the sample of photographs. The author of this study also independently coded one issue of each of the nine newspapers. Scott's pi index of reliability was then used to calculate the reliability of coding for the sample. This formula corrects not only for the number of categories in the category set, but also for the probable frequency with which each category is used.[37] Reliability of coding was consistently high for all categories.[38]

Findings

In the randomly constructed week's worth of nine newspapers, 394 photographs were published. Table 1 shows that Xinmin Evening News published 19 percent of the photos, more than any other newspaper. At the other extreme, China Youth News published only 7 percent of the photos in the sample.

Although Xinmin Evening News published the most photographs, the images were smaller than in other newspapers. The average size of its front page photographs was only 4.6 square inches. The other tabloid, Beijing Evening News, also published tiny photographs on its front page. Inside photographs were a similar size for both newspapers. Such small images, reproduced by the letterpress printing process on coarse yellow news print, yielded images that were difficult to read. In contrast, China Daily published one large photograph (44.7 square inches) on its front page each day. China Youth News also published a large photograph daily on its front page, and its average size was 29 square inches. Images in these newspapers had enough impact to attract readers' attention.

Most newspapers ran only one photograph on their front pages. Workers' Daily published more photographs on its front page than other newspapers, almost two each day, and the photos were moderate in size--19 square inches. Xinmin Evening News published the second most photographs on its front page--an average of 1.5 per day. Three of the broadsheets--People's Daily, China Daily and Workers' Daily consistently published front-page photographs above the fold.

Only 40 percent of the photographs were accompanied by a story. Photographs accompanied by a story were most likely to concern "travel, culture and art." Stand-alone photographs were about economics or "education and indoctrination."

Table 1
Quantity and Size of Photographs in Nine Newspapers

	Percentage of photos in sample	Average Number of Page 1 photos	Average Size of Page 1 photos
#People's Daily	13.5%	1.00	20.5 sq. in.
Fujian Daily	7.9	1.07	19.6
Xiamen Daily	7.9	1.14	14.6
Liberation Army Daily	9.4	1.18	22.7
Workers' Daily	14.0	1.96	19.4
China Youth News	6.9	1.00	28.7
*Beijing Evening News	8.5	1.00	5.9
*Xinmin Evening News	19.0	1.46	4.6
#China Daily	12.9	1.08	44.6
	100% = (394)		

NOTES: * = tabloids; all others are broadsheets
# = eight-page newspapers; all others are four-page newspapers

In order to determine the agenda of photographic news at different newspapers, photographs were assigned to one of ten subject categories. Table 2 shows that pictures of "travel and culture and art" and "economic news" were most frequent; they each made up 20.6 percent of the total. The next largest category was "education and indoctrination" with 18.8 percent of the total.

Table 2
Subject and Direction of Photographs in Nine Newspapers

Subject:	
Travel & culture & art	20.6%
Economic news	20.6
Education & indoctrination	18.8
World news	13.2
Sport news	7.1
Life & people	6.9
Science & animals	6.0
Other	3.5
Political affairs	2.3
Violence	1.0
100% = (394)	
Subject Type:	
Cognitive	32.2%
Political-educational	24.8
Entertainment	43.0
100% = (394)	
Direction:	
Negative	3.2
Non-negative	96.8
100% = (342)	

Few "violence" pictures were published. One picture, however, showed a local road that collapsed when waves from a typhoon eroded China's coast line.[39] Another showed some minor damage from a tornado.[40] China Daily published a picture in its Candid Camera section of people selling cigarettes on the black market.[41] Beijing Evening News published a picture of a bus driver and two other men who were honored for capturing a man armed with ten grenades.[42]

Only 2.3 percent of the pictures directly concerned political affairs. A few of the nine pictures showed ministers in meetings or making inspections. Others were just head shots of officials. One picture showed police officers talking to Tibetans in order to maintain order in the rural villages.[43] Another picture showed officials and police patrolling the streets of Fuzhou, the capitol of Fujian province, on motorcycles in order "to make sure people have a happy new year."[44]

When the subject categories are collapsed into three "type of subject" categories, it is easy to see the importance of entertainment photographs in Chinese newspapers. They account for 43 percent of the total. "Political-educational" photographs accounted for 25 percent of the total, and the other 32 percent were "cognitive."

Of the 342 photographs assigned to a direction category, only 11, or 3.2 percent, were negative. The subject of these pictures was either "violence" or "education and indoctrination," with the exception of one photograph of a statue on the streets of Shanghai, which seemed obscene to some people.[45] One "education and indoctrination" picture showed Buddhist disciples. The caption criticized people who were getting rich and spending their money on "unhealthy" things such as religious ceremonies, funerals and weddings.[46] Fujian Daily ran a picture showing how people were disrespectful to an ancient wall that is an important historical site. The caption asked people to stop putting garbage behind the memorial marker and to stop producing bricks in kilns at the foot of the wall.[47] A Xiamen Daily picture showed boxes of broken brandy bottles. According to the caption, about 10 percent of the shipment was destroyed, and the receiving company hopes railroad companies will improve the way they load and unload goods.[48] Xinmin Evening News called upon the department in charge to remove a tree that had been blown onto a street. The picture shows a side street and uprooted tree.[49]

Differences among newspapers are apparent in terms of the type of subjects that appear in photographs. Table 3 shows that Fujian Daily and China Daily and People's Daily, for example, publish a greater percentage of "cognitive" photographs than other newspapers. Liberation Army Daily, Workers' Daily, and China Youth News publish a greater percentage of "political-educational" photographs. Beijing Evening News and Xinmin Evening News publish a greater percentage of "entertainment" photographs. The relationship between newspapers and type of subjects is not strong.

Table 3
Relationship Between Newspapers and Type of Subject, in Percent

	PD	FD	XD	LAD	WD	CYN	BEN	XEN	CD
Cognitive	41.7	69.2	37.9	10.0	22.2	12.5	24.2	29.8	46.5
Polit-educat	38.9	7.7	20.7	46.7	46.3	45.8	9.1	6.0	14.0
Entertain-aesth	19.4	23.1	41.4	43.3	31.5	41.7	66.7	64.2	39.5
100% =	(36)	(26)	(29)	(30)	(54)	(24)	(33)	(67)	(43)

Chi-square < .001
Lambda asymmetric = .076

NOTE: PD = People's Daily; FD = Fujian Daily; XD = Xiamen Daily; LAD = Liberation Army Daily; WD = Workers' Daily; CYN = China Youth News; BEN = Beijing Evening News; XEN = Xinmin Evening News; and CD = China Daily.

In order to determine whether the depiction of people appearing in photographs was biased at different newspapers, the "main actors" of photographs were coded according to gender, age group, occupation and the favorableness of their treatment. Table 4 shows that balance of coverage was best achieved in terms of the gender of people who appear in photographs; 35 percent of the main actors were men and 23 percent were women.

In terms of age groups appearing in photographs, coverage was less balanced. Adults appeared in 67 percent of the photographs. Children, youth and elderly each appeared in only about 5 percent of the photographs. One newspaper in the sample, China Youth News, is targeted at youth, yet its photos seldom showed youth as the main actors.

Photographic coverage also did not seem balanced in the sense that farmers were the main actors in only 6 percent of the photographs. Other groups that seemed under-represented include entrepreneurs and intellectuals (1.5 percent each). Pictures of entrepreneurs showed food and street vendors, the owner of a small company that distributes fruit to retailers, and the owner of a small company growing flowers for export. One picture showed a man identified as an entrepreneur who generously gave 20,000 yuan during the past seven years to charities for children's welfare and for families of soldiers fighting in Vietnam.[50] Pictures of intellectuals showed an historian, an author and school teachers. Entertainers appeared more frequently than any other occupational group.

Cross-tabulations of various groups and the treatment they received showed that no relationship was present. Of the 269 photographs showing people, 35 percent portrayed them favorably and 64 percent portrayed them in a neutral manner. Only three photographs treated a main actor unfavorably. A picture in People's Daily showed people waiting in the no-smoking section of the Beijing railroad station.obscured by dense cigarette smoke.[51] Workers Daily published a picture that juxtaposed a grim man with a smoke-spewing smokestack.[52] A Xinmin Evening News picture showed people tasting the results of a cooking competition.[53]

Table 4

Characteristics and Treatment of Main Actors of Photographs in Nine Newspapers

Gender:	
Male	34.6%
Female	23.4
Both genders	30.8
Unrecognized gender	11.2
Age Group:	
Children	4.8%
Youth	5.2
Adults	66.9
Elderly	6.3
Mixed age groups	10.5
Unrecognized ages	6.3
Occupation:	
Public officials	2.6%
Soldiers and police	11.9
Professionals	7.1
Laborers	25.3
Entrepreneurs	1.5
Intellectuals	1.5
Farmers	5.9
Entertainers	26.0
No occupation	18.2
Treatment:	
Favorable	35.3%
Neutral	63.6
Unfavorable	1.1
	100% = (269)

In order to determine whether photographic coverage was ideological, value positions expressed in photographs were coded. Although 41 percent of the photographs did not express a value, the other 59 percent did. Table 5 shows that of these 203 photographs, 17 percent expressed conservative values, 32 percent expressed moderate values and 10.5 percent expressed radical values. The most common radical value position was "private ownership and the sanctity of private rights is encouraged," and it appeared in 15 photographs. The radical value, "Chinese culture must be allowed to flourish without ideological considerations," appeared in 12 photographs.

Differences among newspapers are apparent in terms of the type of values expressed by photographs they publish. Table 6 shows, for example, that of the 36 photos published in People's Daily, 33 percent expressed a conservative value and 28 percent had no value. Liberation Army Daily was even more conservative. Of the 30 photos, 57 percent expressed a conservative value and 37 percent had no value. Beijing Evening News, on the other hand, was more likely to publish photographs expressing moderate values. Of the 33 photos, 48.5 percent expressed moderate values and 24 percent had no value. Workers' Daily and Xinmin Evening News also published a relatively high percentage of photographs with moderate values. China Daily published a greater percentage of photographs expressing radical values than any other newspaper (23 percent of 43 photographs). Fujian Daily and Xinmin Evening News published the greatest percentage of photographs without values. The relationship between newspapers and type of values is relatively weak.

Photojournalists know that posed action photographs are not as desirable as candid photographs, yet in this sample of 269 pictures, 44 percent were posed action and another 10 percent were posed portraits. Table 7 shows that only 41 percent of the pictures were candids.

Table 5

Values and Type of Values in Photographs in Nine Newspapers

Ownership of Property:

Conservative	0.0%
Moderate	1.2
Radical	4.4
No value	94.4

Incentive to Work:

Conservative	4.1%
Moderate	0.3
Radical	0.0
No value	95.6

Degree of Reliance:

Conservative	2.0%
Moderate	1.8
Radical	1.2
No value	95.0

Indoctrination of Youth:

Conservative	1.8%
Moderate	2.6
Radical	0.3
No value	95.3

Political Power:

Conservative	0.6%
Moderate	0.3
Radical	0.0
No value	99.1

100% = (342)

Role of the Market:

Conservative	0.6%
Moderate	3.8
Radical	0.0
No value	95.6

Criteria for Social Status:

Conservative	7.6%
Moderate	17.3
Radical	0.9
No value	74.2

Culture:

Conservative	0.6%
Moderate	5.0
Radical	3.5
No value	90.9

Freedom of Thought:

Conservative	0.0%
Moderate	0.6
Radical	0.9
No value	98.5

Type of Values:

Conservative	17.3%
Moderate	31.6
Radical	10.5
No value	40.6

100% = (342)

Table 6

Relationship Between Newspapers and Type of Values, in Percent

	PD	FD	XD	LAD	WD	CYN	BEN	XEN	CD
Conservative	33.3	11.6	10.3	56.7	9.3	29.2	15.1	3.0	11.6
Moderate	27.8	15.4	37.9	6.7	44.4	25.0	48.5	38.8	20.9
Radical	11.1	2.8	29.2	0.0	3.7	12.5	12.1	7.5	23.3
No values	27.8	69.2	27.6	36.6	42.6	33.3	2.3	50.7	44.2
100% =	(36)	(26)	(29)	(30)	(54)	(24)	(33)	(67)	(43)

Chi-square < .001
Lambda asymmetric = .073

NOTE: PD = People's Daily; FD = Fujian Daily; XD = Xiamen Daily; LAD = Liberation Army Daily; WD = Workers' Daily; CYN = China Youth News; BEN = Beijing Evening News; XEN = Xinmin Evening News; and CD = China Daily.

Table 7

Style of Photographs in Nine Newspapers

Style:	
Posed portrait	9.7%
Posed action	44.0
Candid	40.7
Ambiguous	5.6
100% =	(268)

Differences between newspapers are also apparent in their style of photographing. Table 8 shows that Fujian Daily and China Daily are more likely to make candid photographs than other newspapers. Workers' Daily and Beijing Evening News are more likely to publish "posed action" photographs than other newspapers. China Youth News published more "posed portrait" photographs than other newspapers.

A stronger relationship, however, exists between the subject and the style of photographs. If the photograph concerns "violence," "sports news," or "life and people," then it is likely to be a candid. If the photograph concerns "political affairs," "travel and culture and art," or "education and indoctrination," then it is probably a posed action picture.

Table 8

Relationship Between Newspapers and Style, in Percent

	PD	FD	XD	LAD	WD	CYN	BEN	XEN	CD
Posed portrait	6.3	0.0	8.7	11.1	12.0	18.2	14.8	9.5	3.2
Posed action	46.9	28.6	47.8	25.9	58.0	36.4	51.9	42.2	35.5
Candid	43.7	64.3	30.4	48.2	24.0	36.4	33.3	42.9	61.3
Ambiguous	3.1	7.1	13.1	14.8	6.0	9.0	0.0	2.4	0.0
100% =	(32)	(14)	(23)	(27)	(50)	(22)	(27)	(42)	(31)

Chi-square < .001
Lambda asymmetric = .037

NOTE: PD = People's Daily; FD = Fujian Daily; XD = Xiamen Daily; LAD = Liberation Army Daily; WD = Workers' Daily; CYN = China Youth News; BEN = Beijing Evening News; XEN = Xinmin Evening News; and CD = China Daily.

Conclusions

According to results from the content analysis, American newspapers publish more photographs on their front pages than Chinese newspapers. A study of six American newspapers during a 40-year period found that 2.4 photographs appeared on page one,[54] while fewer than half that number appeared on front pages of Chinese papers. The best explanation for this difference is that photojournalism is valued less among Chinese editors than American editors.

The same study found that 92 percent of page-one photographs in American newspapers accompanied news articles,[55] whereas this study found that 40 percent of all photographs in Chinese newspapers accompanied news articles. A possible explanation is that Chinese newspapers use pictures with extended captions in lieu of a brief story. At Xinmin Evening News, which frequently published 15 stories and a photograph on page one, there is little difference between an extended caption and a brief story. Chinese broadsheets frequently publish a dozen stories without jumps and a photo on their front pages. Beijing Evening News, a tabloid, might run eight stories and a photograph. American newspapers, on the other hand, use pictures to supplement stories, to attract readers to a story, and to create a visual-verbal package of news.

A rationale for this study was to learn the agenda of photographic coverage because photographs can structure the public's perceptions of reality. Two of the most frequently appearing subjects of Chinese photographs are "economic news" and "education & indoctrination." The high frequency of economics photographs is understandable given China's drive for economic reform and modernization. The relatively high frequency of indoctrination photographs is also understandable because one of the functions of photojournalism is education. Low frequencies of violence photographs and of negative photographs are expected given China's system of news values. Although it was not formally investigated, coders noticed that articles and cartoons were much more likely than photographs to concern problems in China.

What is surprising is that human interest photographs, which would include "travel & culture & art," "sports news" and "life & people," together represent 43 percent of all photographs in the February newspapers. This number is similar to the frequency of human interest photographs found by researchers studying American newspapers.[55] Another surprise is that so few photographs directly concern political affairs. In China, 2.3 percent concern political affairs, while in the United States, the number is likely to be more than 30 percent.[56] This does not mean that Chinese newspapers are less political or less concerned about political matters. It indicates that pictures of political leaders appear less frequently than in American newspapers. After the death of Mao Zedong, in the summer of 1980, the Central Committee issued a directive requiring that less publicity be given leading cadres by the media. The directive was issued to inhibit the building of future personality cults. According to Mao, history is not created by individuals, but by the people, so commemoration of individuals foster incorrect views.[57] Perhaps as a reaction to this directive, Chinese publications avoid showing the faces of political leaders every day.

Agenda of photographic coverage was also studied to understand differences among Chinese newspapers. Results show that China Daily and People's Daily publish more "cognitive" photographs than other newspapers, probably because they are national-level newspapers of record. The two evening tabloids publish more "entertainment" photographs than other newspapers, probably because they make greater efforts to provide news desired by readers. Newspapers targeted to soldiers, workers and youth publish the greatest percentage of "political-educational" photographs. These newspapers are compelled to motivate their audience, to encourage "model" behavior and to discourage behavior that deviates from the interests of the group or the Party. The only surprise was the high frequency of "cognitive" photographs published in Fujian Daily. This finding is understandable, however, because the newspaper primarily serves rural areas of a poor province, where news of economic developments would be important.

Differences among newspapers were apparent not only for agenda of photographs, but also for values expressed in photographs. People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily were the most conservative. China Daily was the most likely to publish photographs expressing radical values. Fujian Daily and Xinmin Evening News published the most photographs without values.

The main actors who appear in photographs were studied to learn who makes the news and who is overlooked. Results show that male adults predominate in Chinese photographs. Chinese and American newspapers are similar in this regard, except that women are even less likely to appear in American newspaper photographs.[58] The predominance of adults in photographs is probably true of other press systems, although precise figures are lacking.

One surprise concerning main actors is that youth seldom appeared in photographs published by China Youth News. This finding might be different, however, if the definition of "youth" was expanded to include anyone between the ages of 10 and 35. Such a definition might be appropriate when studying the Chinese press.[59] Another surprise was that prominent people such as public officials only appeared in 2.6 percent of photographs. This is probably because the media is prohibited from giving much publicity to Party leaders. Another surprise was that the majority of the population are farmers, yet they appeared in only 6 percent of photographs. Farmers may be under-represented because newspapers are targeted to urban readers. The Beijing Audience Study found that twice as many newspapers readers live in urban areas than rural areas.[60]

Another rationale of this study was to learn if a photographic bias existed that could hurt the credibility of Chinese newspapers. Results indicated that no gender, age group or occupation group was treated better than another. Moreover, all newspapers treated people the same way. It appears, therefore, that newspapers are not biased in their coverage of people. On the other hand, demographic characteristics of people in photographs did not match demographic characteristics of the population. In addition, no group of people appeared in an unfavorable light. This lack of balance could hurt newspapers' credibility.

Photographic coverage in nine newspapers published in February 1987 also appeared somewhat ideological because it was framed to suit the needs of the Chinese Communist Party. A substantial number of "education and indoctrination" photographs, for example, were published to encourage people by showing a positive example, or, sometimes, to warn people by showing a negative example. Almost no photographs, on the other hand, showed "violence" or any problems. Although only 17 percent of photographs expressed a conservative value, another 42 percent expressed moderate or radical values. In addition, 44 percent of the photographs were posed, yet they were intended to appear natural. Another 10 percent were posed without pretense. Unfortunately, similar research about the values or style of photographs published in American newspapers has not been conducted, so it is difficult to know whether the Chinese percentages are high. It is possible, however, that more than 50 percent of the photographs were manipulated by photojournalists to educate readers or express a value.

When examining individual newspapers, Workers' Daily appears to be more ideological than the other newspapers. Of the 55 photographs published in Workers' Daily in February, 44 percent concerned "education and indoctrination." A majority of its photographs expressed a value, especially moderate values, and 70 percent of the photographs were posed action or posed portraits.

In contrast, China Daily seems the least ideological. The newspaper published more photographs of economic news and world news than other subjects. When values were expressed, they were as likely to be radical values as moderate or conservative values. More than 61 percent of the photographs were judged to be candids. China Daily, therefore, seems more intent upon showing events inside and outside China, and it has more leeway to publish photographs with radical values.

Another paper that avoids ideology is Xinmin Evening News. Almost two-thirds of its pictures served an entertainment function, and half were candid pictures. Although a substantial percentage of photographs expressed moderate values, they generally concerned one particular value position. Because the newspaper published many pictures of actresses and athletes, its pictures expressed the value, "individual intellectual or artistic achievement is emphasized." Only 10 percent of Xinmin Evening News photographs expressed conservative or radical value positions.

Endnotes

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[3] See Wayne Wanta, "The Effects of Dominant Photographs: An Agenda-Setting Experiment," Journalism Quarterly 65 (Spring 1988): 107-111; and Rita Wolf and Gerald L. Grotta, "Images: A Question of Readership," Newspaper Research Journal 6 (1984): 30-36.

[4] See Jennifer Brown, "News Photography and the Pornography of Grief," Journal of Mass Media Ethics 2 (Spring/Summer 1987): 75-81; and Gary Bryant, "10-51 P.I. Emotion and the Photographer," Journal of Mass Media Ethics 2 (Spring/Summer 1987): 32-39.

[5] Kenrick S. Thompson, Alfred C. Clarke and Simon Dinitz, "Reactions to My-Lai: A Visual-Verbal Comparison," Sociology and Social Research 58 (January 1974): 122-129.

[6] Keith Kenney, "A Method for Studying Bias and Ideology in Journalistic Photographs," paper presented at the AEJMC Convention, Minneapolis, MN, August 1990.

[7] Robert C. Angell, "Content Analysis of Elite Media: Social Values of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution 8 (December 1964): 330-385.

[8] This idea is based upon common sense, the author's personal experience as a photojournalist, and the literature on photojournalism in Western countries.

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[12] Wang Ningjun, "Photography at China Daily," (unpublished paper) 1985.

[13] See Alex S. Edelstein, and Alan P. L. Liu, "Anti-Americanism in Red China's People's Daily: A Functional Analysis," Journalism Quarterly 40 (Spring 1963): 187-195; Alan P. L. Liu, "Control of Public Information and its Effects on China's Foreign Affairs," Asian Survey 14 (October 1974): 936-51; Georgette Wang, "The People's Daily and

Nixon's Visit to China," in The News Media in National and International Conflict, edited by Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 133-145; and Chin-Chuan Lee, "The United States as Seen Through the People's Daily," Journal of Communication 31 (Autumn 1981): 92-101.

[14] See Paul J. Hinicker, Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Reality (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), pp. 229-247; Godwin C. Chu and Leonard L. Chu, "Parties in Conflict: Letters to the Editor of the People's Daily," Journal of Communication 31 (Autumn 1981): 74-91; Georgette Wang, "The People's Daily and Nixon's Visit to China;" Kai Wang and Kenneth Starck, "Red China's External Propaganda During Sino-U.S. Rapprochement," Journalism Quarterly 49 (Winter 1972): 674-678; and Lee, "The United States as Seen Through the People's Daily."

[15] James C. F. Wang, "Values of the Cultural Revolution," Journal of Communication 27 (Summer 1977): 41-46.

[16] William Mills, "Treatment of Foreign Policy Issues in the Regional Chinese Press," Asian Survey 21 (July 1981): 785-810.

[17] Lee, "The United States as Seen Through the People's Daily."

[18] James R. Townsend and Brantley Womack, Politics in China, 3rd. ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1986), pp. 198-199.

[19] Ibid., pp. 201-203.

[20] Ibid., pp. 199-200.

[21] Ibid., pp. 200-201.

[22] Xue-liang Ding, "The Disparity Between Idealistic and Instrumental Chinese Reformers," Asian Survey 28 (November 1988): 1117-1139.

[23] Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1987), pp. 80-83.

[24] Ibid., pp. 78-80.

[25] Ibid., pp. 84-86.

[26] Ibid., pp. 183-187; and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-86," China Quarterly 114 (June 1988): 198-220.

[27] See Sun Wanning, "Xinmin Evening Post: a Popular Newspaper in Shanghai," Asian Thought & Society 36 (November 1987): 264-266; Li Rong, "Beijingers Love the Evening News," in China's Changing Media: Perspectives by Graduate Journalism Students of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, ed Milton Hollstein (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah, 1989), pp. 9-13; and Tao Guangming, "On the Characteristics of Photo Reporting at Evening Papers," Journalism Photography 4 (1986): 8-9.

[28] See Wang Ningjun, "Photography at China Daily;" and Ding Qilin, "China Daily

Serves English-Language Readers," in China's Changing Media: Perspectives by Graduate Journalism Students of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, ed Milton Hollstein (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah, 1989), pp. 1-4.

[29] Harold W. Jacobson, Systems of Internal Communication in the People's Republic of China (Washington D.C.: Office of Research, United States Information Agency, 1983), pp. 269-270.

[30] Ibid., pp. 271-272.

[31] Ibid., pp. 273.

[32] Mark Hopkins, "China: A Door Closes," Columbia Journalism Review, July/August 1987, pp. 37-40.

[33] Science and animals were linked together in a content analysis study of newspaper photographs by a Chinese scholar, and the linkage has been maintained for this study. Although the category was not operationalized, it is possible that photographs of animals in the Chinese press are more likely to relate to science than to life and people. For example, animals may be shown as part of environmental concerns rather than as pets.

[34] Kenney, "A Method for Studying Bias and Ideology."

[35] Angell, "Content Analysis of Elite Media."

[36] See Keith Kenney, "Production and Selection of Chinese Newspaper Photographs," paper submitted to the International Division at AEJMC Convention, Boston, August 1991.

[37] Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 140-141. The formula is:

$$\text{pi} = \frac{\text{\% observed agreement - \% expected agreement}}{\text{1 - \% expected agreement}}$$

To find the percentage of expected agreement, find the proportion of items falling into each category of a category set and sum the square of those proportions.

[38] Four disagreements occurred when coding 76 photographs into ten subject categories, so according to Scott's pi, reliability for coding the subject of photographs was .94. The reliability for coding the gender of main actor(s) appearing in photographs was .86. The reliability for coding the age group of main actor(s) appearing in photographs was .89. The reliability for coding the occupation of main actor(s) was .89. The reliability for coding the style of photographs was .83. Six disagreements occurred when coding 51 photographs into three treatment categories, yielding a Scott's pi of .75. Only one disagreement occurred when coding 65 photographs into two direction categories. Despite consistent agreement between judges, the reliability for coding the direction of photographs was .67 because the likelihood of non-negative photographs was very high. The reliability for coding values expressed in photographs was difficult to determine. Nine disagreements occurred, but the number of possibilities was quite high. Most disagreements arose concerning values expressed about culture.

[39] Xiamen Daily, 23 February 1987, p. 2.

[40] Xinmin Evening News, 11 February 1987, p. 5.

[41] China Daily, 27 February 1987, p.4.

[42] Beijing Evening News, 27 February 1987, p. 2.

[43] People's Daily, 5 February 1987, p. 4.

[44] Fujian Daily, 1 February 1987, p. 1.

[45] Xinmin Evening News, 27 February 1987, p. 2.

[46] China Youth News, 27 February 1987, p. 4.

[47] Fujian Daily, 23 February 1987, p. 2.

[48] Xiamen Daily, 5 February 1987, p. 2.

[49] Xinmin Evening News, 11 February 1987, p. 5.

[50] Workers' Daily, 24 February 1987, p. 3.

[51] People's Daily, 5 February 1987, p. 5.

[52] Workers' Daily, 5 February 1987, p. 4.

[53] Xinmin Evening News, 24 February 1987, p. 4.

[54] Michael W. Singletary, "Newspaper Photographs: A Content Analysis, 1936-1976," Journalism Quarterly 55 (Autumn 1978): 585-589.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Jacobson, Systems of Internal Communication, p. 158.

[58] Singletary, "Newspaper Photographs."

[59] Conversation in February 1991 with Zhang Kangcong, a graduate student at The University of South Carolina who coded the photographs.

[60] Womack, "Media and the Chinese Public," pp. 32-36.

PRODUCTION AND SELECTION OF CHINESE NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPHS

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Presented to the International Communication Division
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Production and Selection of Chinese Newspaper Photographs

The purpose of this study is to learn what factors influence the production and selection of photographs in Chinese newspapers. To understand the determinants of news, some researchers directly observe the processes of gathering and reporting news. Such extended field research was not possible, however, in China. This study relies upon interviews with photojournalists and editors at Chinese newspapers and Xinhua news agency in late 1986 and early 1987 to learn why photographs appear the way they do.

The need for this investigation arose when the author received an offer to teach photojournalism for one year in the Department of Communication at Xiamen University. Established in 1981, the college attracts Chinese students who speak fluent English. They receive lectures and training from American as well as Chinese professors. Upon graduation, these students work for English-language media or for Chinese businesses that have frequent contact with foreign media.

Before teaching at Xiamen University, the author knew little about Chinese photojournalists or their published photographs. Newspaper photography in China is a relatively new and unstudied subject for Western researchers due in part to language difficulties, but even more to access problems to photojournalists and their employers. Although the author cannot speak more than rudimentary Chinese, his English-speaking students frequently volunteered to translate. Personal contacts developed from his teaching at Xiamen University frequently provided introductions to journalists who agreed to be interviewed.

In order to provide relevant instruction, the author needed to understand if Chinese photographers report the news in the same manner as American photographers. Journalists working within different press systems share certain imperatives and processes of news. Journalists everywhere are admired, paid and promoted for demonstrating mastery of writing, photographing or editing skills. At the same time, they are constrained by the bureaucratic settings in which they work, by the inexorable demands of scheduled production, and by the homogenizing tendencies of editing.[1] A comparison of photojournalism in China and the United States would improve our understanding of similarities among press systems.

On the other hand, several dissimilarities were expected because the Marxist press system in China and "market" press system in the United States are so different with respect to political and economic controls on the news.[2] In China, the news media are part of the state apparatus and openly beholden to the Chinese Communist Party. The journalistic ideal in the United States is that neither political manipulation nor commercial intent should shape the news. In theory, the U.S. news media are buffered from political manipulation by virtue of their structural independence from government as well as by legal protections. In addition, editorial pursuits are separated from business operations. Media critics, however, content that our "free press" is, in fact, hostage to many forms of unspoken and indirect political and economic controls.[3] A contrast of photojournalism in China and the United States should help illuminate future critiques of the "free press."

This study should add to the store of knowledge of scholars of China by providing an understanding of how newspaper photography departments operate. Results are also valuable to visual communication scholars who are interested in how routines of photojournalists and their editors affect the quantity and quality of photographs.

Literature Review

Photojournalism in China has four functions: political, educational, cognitive and aesthetic. Photographs are political in that they support Party policies and campaigns. They educate readers by explaining Party policies and by advocating proper behavior. Photographs serve a cognitive function because they increase readers' knowledge about China and they generally broaden readers' field of vision. They also provide readers aesthetic pleasure by visually communicating the news in a lively manner.[4]

Ideally, photographs are a combination of political propaganda, persuasion with facts, and artistic expression.[5] Usually, however, the political and educating functions of photographs are more important than the cognitive and aesthetic functions. Chinese photojournalists cannot be objective in the sense of remaining detached and presenting an impartial record of the news. They must consider the possible social effects of news on audiences. They must also cooperate with Party officials to carry out the Party's central tasks.[6] Photojournalists are political activists who are supposed to unambiguously show readers "what to love, what to hate, what to support and what to oppose."[7]

During the first 29 years of the People's Republic of China, when class struggle was considered the central task of both the Party and the media, photographs followed a rigid, socialist pattern. In an unmistakable manner, they had to "educate the new communist man" and to "contribute to the construction of communism." Many photographs showed Party leaders, or workers and farmers in the production processes, or machines and buildings. Others showed a meeting hall crowded with delegates. People in photographs always smiled and stood straight, with "sunshine" on their faces. Newspapers were supposed to report only nice and happy things that showed the "superiorities of socialism." Any negative news, such as crime and disaster, was not allowed.[8]

Political excesses frequently occurred during the Cultural Revolution, when "facts served politics." Newspapers only stressed the class character of photojournalism, and they denied reality. Photographs showed false deeds and false "advanced people." Events were staged for photographers, people were added to pictures (or deleted from pictures), and society was "beautified." A style of photography known as "heroic realism" was practiced. As a result of such distortions of the truth, photojournalism lost all credibility.[9]

Under Deng Xiaoping, economic development has replaced class struggle as the central task of the Party and media. Today's press serves as a bridge between the government and the people in the effort to develop a modern, socialist China. With the change in policy under

Deng, some photojournalists place a higher value on facts because they realize that "all that is not consistent with facts is meaningless."[10] As part of the campaign to promote economic development, newspapers in the 1980s were full of pictures showing new bridges, roads, and hotels as well as pictures of successful fish farmers, handicraft makers, and other entrepreneurs.

Political pressure upon photojournalists to create images with unambiguous educational value, however, remains strong in the 1980s. Rather than seek concrete, meaningful material, photojournalists frequently direct people and action in the pictures to suit political purposes. They prefer to photograph acceptable topics in a formulaic manner because such conventional images are more likely to be published.[11] For example, many pictures show people with crops (signifies bumper harvest) or people with machines (signifies industrial production).[12]

Such stereotyped images lack emotion and fail to have an impact on readers, who sometimes doubt their truth. The oversimplified images frequently appear "too perfect."[13] According to Wang Wenlan, director of the photography department of China Daily, readers do not like overly didactic photographs that always teach how to do this and how to do that. They prefer human interest photos.[14]

Some pictures are also arranged by photographers in order to create a more aesthetically pleasing image. Editors who think of photographs as art more than a form of reporting are likely to select images because of their composition and animation rather than their news value or information. Photojournalists are then tempted to fabricate images in order to please editors.[15] One unusually frank author writes that Chinese photojournalists are seldom able to unify news values with aesthetic values. Instead, one of the following is likely to occur: "The picture has news value but lacks visual appeal and impact, or the picture has visual appeal but lacks believability."[16]

In theory, the work of photojournalists and reporters is valued equally. Editors like to say that photographs and news stories are like two wings of an airplane, both being equally essential.[17]

In practice, however, photographs have been subordinated to news stories. Until recently, most newspaper space was occupied by lengthy news articles and government reports. Development of photojournalism was hindered because Chinese journalism followed the Marx-Lenin-Engels-Stalin pattern of journalism established in the Soviet Union, where newspapers did not use many photographs or large photographs. Small images were published to break up copy and fill blank areas. The most important locations in newspapers were occupied by stories.[18] In the 1960s, readers' perception of the value of photographs gradually declined until at one point they would not have been surprised had no photographs at all appeared in a newspaper.[19]

Recently, photojournalism has gained more respect. Editors realize that with life's quickening tempo, people want to receive information quickly, and photographs tell a story at a glance. With photographs, people simultaneously receive both the news and visual pleasure.[20] On the other hand, editors do not want photographs to be considered more important than stories. They believe Chinese newspapers should not indiscriminately absorb Western journalism practices, which display photographs too prominently. Instead, newspapers should equally stress photographs and words.[21]

Several newsroom practices have been responsible for limiting the development of photojournalism in Chinese newspapers. First, was newspaper editors' use of the "on-duty" system to ensure that journalists earned their pay. According to He Bibao, a Chinese author who seeks bold journalism reform, for more than 30 years, roll call was taken at the beginning of each day and a summary meeting was held at the end of the day. No one could go home until after the summary meeting. Unless editors sent photojournalists out to take pictures, they had to remain in the office; otherwise, people would suspect they were leaving for personal business. As a result, photojournalists would sit at their desks all day reading newspapers and drinking tea. Photojournalists became passive and lazy, only taking pictures when they were needed for the next day's newspaper.[22]

A second problem limiting development of photojournalism was newspaper editors' excessive frugality. Editors sometimes cancelled photography assignments of interesting topics and events because the assignments were too time consuming or expensive. For example, photographers who volunteered to travel to remote mountain areas or minority areas were not given leaders' support because the trips cost too much money. In fact, leaders would praise photojournalists who used less film, less paper and less money.[23] In some ways, photojournalists are limited because of the lack of transportation infrastructure in China. Rather than jump into a staff car and race to a spot news event, photographers ride the buses.[24]

A third practice that limited development of photojournalism was newspaper editors' reluctance to publish images that tarnished the image of socialism. According to He Bibao, reporters could expose some social problems and openly criticize harmful practices, but photojournalists could not. Crimes, disasters, traffic accidents, and harmful phenomena could not be photographed. When they tried to take such photographs, journalism inspection units would say they were trying to show the "dark side" of society and would prevent publication. As a result, "forbidden zones" were created for Chinese photojournalists. To make matters worse, sometimes foreign correspondents were permitted to expose the "dark side" of society, but not Chinese photojournalists.[25]

According to Jiang Qisheng, chair of the Chinese Photojournalism Society, Western newspapers frequently publish pictures of unexpected negative events, but the Chinese take a more "controlled attitude" toward such pictures. They decide whether to use such pictures based upon their usefulness to socialist construction. Photographs which show the "negative side of society" should also be limited, writes Jiang, because they may have harmful effects upon society. Reporting on crime may lead to more crime and reporting on disasters may make readers lose faith in socialism and the nation's future.[26]

A fourth practice that limited development of photojournalism was the policy of labelling foreign photojournalism "bourgeois." Before the reform movement, there was an indiscriminate rejection of foreign photojournalism, causing a deep gulf between Chinese and foreign photojournalists. According to He Bibao: "What was considered good abroad was not considered good by us. What we considered good was not considered good abroad."[27]

Because foreign photojournalism was bourgeois, there was a lack of both professional and academic exchange between China and Western countries. As a result, China was unaware of technological and professional advances abroad. According to Chen Xiaobo, photojournalism editor of Xinhua news agency, there is a large gap in techniques between China's press photos and those of other countries. He noted that some people believe China has lagged in press photography for at least 30 years.[28]

Finally, a factor limiting the development of photojournalism in China was the lack of adequate educational training. Many photojournalists lack a general education, and some have received only a primary school education.[29] Their photojournalism training is received on the job from older, more experienced newspaper photographers, who taught themselves the necessary technical skills. During this training period, trainees may have half as many photographs published as experienced staff photographers because many of their pictures are not suitable for publication. It takes three-to-five years before a trainee is entrusted with important photography assignments.[30]

Method

Unstructured interviews were conducted with photojournalists and editors at eleven Chinese newspapers and Xinhua News agency. Each interview followed a general plan of inquiry, yet a set of specific questions was not asked in particular words or in a particular order. Because the subject of photojournalism in China is relatively unstudied, a flexible format was required. Simply asking prepared questions would not permit the author to pursue specific topics raised by Chinese journalists. It seemed more fruitful to allow initial questions to shape subsequent ones. Through an interpreter, the author would ask a question, wait for the answer to be translated, and then frame another question either to dig into the earlier answer in more depth, or to redirect the person's attention to an area more relevant to the investigation.

Controlled probability sampling techniques are usually difficult in any type of field research.[31] Interviewing journalists at a random sample of Chinese newspapers was not attempted because it would be a logistical nightmare to visit newspapers throughout China, and because the author did not believe honest, fruitful interviews would be likely unless a Chinese "sponsor" provided an introduction.

Interviews were conducted at Xiamen Daily because it was easy to form connections with the local newspaper staff. Interviews were conducted with Xinmin Evening News, Liberation Daily, Wen Hui Daily, and Xinhua News Agency in Shanghai because a relationship was developed with Professor Shu Zongqiao of Fudan University, who helped make the arrangements. Interviews were conducted with Worker's Daily after its bureau chief in Xiamen helped arrange an interview with one of the paper's photojournalists in Beijing. Interviews with journalists from People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, China Youth News, Beijing Evening News and China Daily were all arranged by journalists at China Daily. Interviews with photojournalists and editors at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily were arranged by the author's employer, the chair of the communication department at Xiamen University. Interviews were also conducted with photojournalism professors from Fudan University and Jinan University, and with members from the Shenzhen News Photography Association and the Chinese Photography Association.

An assumption behind all interviews is that respondents will honestly answer the researcher's questions. When interviewing Chinese journalists about controversial subjects, however, the assumption of full, honest answers does not always hold. The author is aware that some journalists did not give their independent views on some questions, but rather answered with the standard Party line. Some journalists did not feel comfortable enough with the author to fully answer the questions, and they held back information that could potentially get them into trouble with editors or Party leaders. On the other hand, the author believes he was able to gain the trust of some journalists. Analysis of interview data that appear to have the greatest validity will be emphasized.

Findings

Journalists confirmed results from the literature review that **politics** strongly influences the type of pictures published by Chinese newspapers. Most photojournalists are members of the Chinese Communist Party, and all attend weekly meetings with other newspaper employees and Party secretaries at which important government and Party documents are discussed. Their sense of what is newsworthy and their attitudes towards people and events are shaped by long periods of political study and their experience as journalists. Rather than attempting to serve as a mirror of reality, they take an active role in supporting the policies of the Chinese Communist Party.

Shenzhen, for example, is a special economic zone with unusual latitude to experiment with forms of capitalism. Economic news of the newly built city is important to both Party leaders and foreign investors, yet publishing honest, objective reports in general circulation newspapers is not a priority. Instead, the news is slanted to serve political needs of local leaders, as well as moderate reformers at the national level, who wish to make the economic reforms successful. As the official newspaper of the Shenzhen city government, Shenzhen Special Zone Daily promotes the modern, booming city. When photographers go on assignments, they know they should take pictures of new buildings, new roads and high technology equipment.[32]

Chief photographer of the paper Jiang Shigao said photojournalists internalize Party policies and practice self-censorship when they take pictures. When a joint venture between China and foreign investors is successful, a picture is taken. If joint ventures fail, the newspaper will not report them. He said:

> We are not trying to hide our weak points so much as we are trying to attract new investors. If we reported the weak points every day, it would become difficult to establish our reputation as a good place. No one gives us orders to show progress. We have our own self-restrictions. We are used to this way of working.[33]

Sometimes a photojournalist must do more than simply aim his or her camera at appropriate subject matter in order to support Party policies. Pictures of a crowd of people celebrating at a large wedding party in the countryside, for example, may not be desirable. Such images go against the Party line, which discourages extravagant weddings. A photographer may have difficulty, however, showing the idea of "waste" without posing a large number of people. Cutlines are used, therefore, to shape the meaning of photographs and to educate readers about government and Party campaigns.[34]

What was not clear from the literature review is that photography staffs are frequently split between younger photojournalists who seek greater freedom to report news in an objective manner, and older photojournalists who continue to believe that political policies should shape the news. Younger photojournalists wanted to photograph major news events, good and bad, in order to document people and events of the time. Energetic and ambitious, they pushed the boundaries of acceptable subject matter. Some took great risks to photograph the student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square following the downfall of Hu Yaobang in December 1986. They also photographed spot news events such as major fires and accidents in order to compete in international photojournalism competitions. Unless they worked for editors who were brave enough to test the limits of political restrictions, however, such photographs were seldom published. Instead, photojournalists would display the images at exhibitions or hold them until the political winds changed.[35]

As younger, more professional journalists reach leadership positions, freedom of the press in China will increase, said He Yanguang, chief photographer at China Youth News. He said:

> Sometimes we can't publish very good photographs for political reasons. Younger photographers are really attempting to do a good job, but because of traditional views, they still meet some difficulties in their work. Under the open policy of recent years,

> the paper (China Youth News) has been able to raise questions and problems in society, and to publish several photographs. Although there has been some progress in recent years, in the minds of readers and photographers, the developments have been too slow.[36]

China Daily has led other newspapers in publishing spot news photographs, including pictures of floods, train derailments and airplane crashes. Former editor-in-chief Feng Xiliang said:

> Normally such pictures are taboo, but we introduced them to Chinese newspapers. We were the first paper; now other papers are carrying real news photos also.[37]

China Daily was able to publish such photographs because it primarily serves foreign readers. It does not fulfill the same propaganda tasks as other newspapers, and it has more flexibility to interpret the policies of the government and Party.

A few photographs that show problems in Chinese society are published in special columns such as "Letters from Readers." They may show trash that has not been picked up, vandalism at a memorial site, crowded buses, or trees chopped down for personal gain. In the captions, the appropriate governmental department is asked to look into the matter and take action. These pictures are generally taken by amateur "freelance" photographers rather than staff photographers. Both readers, and the people criticized, would take them more seriously, however, if they had been taken by staff photographers.[38] According to the chief photographer of Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, photographs that truly show the dark side of society cannot be published easily. There is a saying in China, said Jiang Shigao: "We just beat flies, not tigers. Sometimes we are even afraid of beating flies."[39]

Economics as well as politics influences the content and quality of newspaper photographs. In the 1980s, Chinese newspapers were generally printed on paper that had a yellow tone and readily absorbed ink because better quality paper stock was too expensive or unavailable. Because the paper was yellow, bright highlight areas in photographs were not possible. Because the paper was absorbent, a small dot of black ink became a blob of gray in a photograph and fine details were lost as ink dots spread into surrounding light-toned areas.

With yellow highlights and gray shadows, contrast was limited. As a result of poor quality newsprint, pictures sometimes appeared as masses of grey with unrecognizable subject matter.

At many regional or city-level newspapers, letterpress rather than offset printing was generally used. If other factors remain equal, offset printing will yield better reproduction of photographs than letterpress. The Beijing editions of national newspapers frequently used offset lithography equipment, but the same newspapers would be printed by letterpress at facilities outside of Beijing. Even with offset printing, quality results still depend upon the skill and motivation of press workers, which were not always high.[40] Letterpress reproduction and inadequately trained press workers frequently limited the quality of photographic reproduction at smaller newspapers.

Poor photographic reproduction directly affected the content of newspaper photographs. Photojournalists had to simplify their images to ensure their intended message would be visible to readers. They made sure that all editorially important information was in the foreground or middle ground of the image, with as few distractions as possible in the background. Photojournalists could not use back light to convey mood; instead, scenes had to be well lit so images would reproduce well.[41] In general, photojournalists could not trust that the subtle details of their photographs, especially details in shadows, would remain after their pictures were reproduced.

Ownership of a newspaper is another economic force that shapes the news. A journalist at Workers' Daily bluntly admitted that the "paper belongs to the National Trade Union, is controlled by the union, and cannot publish news against the opinions of the union." Because of demands by union leaders, the newspaper frequently publishes pictures of workers' efforts to modernize China rather than pictures of sports or theater, which photojournalists believe readers would prefer.[42]

Photojournalists would work harder if they believed in what they were doing, said a photojournalist at Workers' Daily. Rather than taking pictures of what they feel is important, they must follow the wishes of editors, and photograph factory machines and smiling workers. An apathetic work attitude results. "We cannot put our whole energy, time and ability into making such photographs successful," said Cai Jinhe.[43]

Another economic factor affecting the way photojournalists work is the lack of transmitters at many newspapers. At Xiamen Daily, for example, it takes three days to receive Xinhua news photographs by mail, so pictures of events in Beijing or overseas are not timely. National-level newspapers may receive wire photo transmissions, but the lack of portable transmitters limits photojournalists' ability to cover distant events in a timely manner. Photojournalists leaving a major city must spend many hours, if not days, traveling by trains, buses or ships to arrive at their destination, and then they must travel back to the newspaper in order to deliver their film. Even within a city, problems with transportation limit their news gathering potential. Journalists in China seldom have access to cars, and even when they do, they lack drivers' licenses, so they must also request a driver.

Despite the transportation obstacles, photojournalists at national-level newspapers such as People's Daily, China Daily, Workers' Daily and Liberation Army Daily are sent throughout China to cover a wide range of events. With fewer resources and less prestige, photojournalists at city-level newspapers primarily cover local events. At major political events, access may be restricted to the most important news organizations, such as Xinhua news agency, China Central Television, People's Daily and China Daily. Other newspapers must use Xinhua photos of these events.

Regardless of the size of the newspaper, photojournalists have state-of-the-art camera equipment. Many photojournalists carry two Nikon 35mm cameras with zoom lenses, filters, flash and tripod. A medium-format camera such as a Hasselblad, and a variety of wide-angle and telephoto lenses are available from newspapers' equipment rooms. When shooting color pictures, many photojournalists use film made by Kodak, but when shooting black-and-white, they use film made in China. Quality of darkrooms varies, and many photojournalists enlarge their images on a China-manufactured paper, which is less consistent in light sensitivity and color than printing papers made in the United States or Europe. In general, photographic equipment and supplies are not forces limiting the quality of photographic images. "We worry about not having very good photographs even though we have this excellent equipment," said a photographer at China Daily.[44]

Dissatisfactions with political constraints and with the medium of newspaper photography cause some photojournalists to devote more time creating artistic images than news images.[45] Photojournalists' preference for art photography is partially explained by their training--many studied in art or film departments rather than journalism programs.[46] Another explanation is that art photographs can earn photojournalists more money and fame than they receive at newspapers. A Shenzhen photojournalist won 4,000 yuan ($1,000) for a picture submitted to an art photography contest.[47] Even in photojournalism contests, pictures seem to win because they have good artistic characteristics or because they support Party policies, not because of their news value.[48] On newspaper assignments, therefore, photojournalists will shoot color film in a more creative manner, and these images are submitted to pictorial magazines or printed for exhibitions.[49]

In addition to politics and economics, the **routines of staff photographers** affect photographic content. The ways picture assignments are made, the quantity of film used to complete assignments, and the evaluation of staff photographers' work are routines that affect the type of pictures that appear in newspapers as well as their quality and quantity.

Many ideas for pictures come from amateur community correspondents, and photojournalists are expected to respond to these "assignments." Liberation Daily, for example, has nearly 100 amateur correspondents who work in factories and schools around Shanghai, and news tips from these people lead to 60-70 percent of the paper's pictures, said Zhao Lichun, a photographer for the Shanghai newspaper. Relying on local people for news tips follows the philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party, he said. "In China, journalists follow Mao's words: 'from the people, to the people.'"[50] Other local newspapers also wait for amateur correspondents or local businesses to call and suggest picture opportunities. Relying on such sources for picture assignments leads to a high frequency of positive, public-relations type photographs.

When photography assignments are made at weekly staff meetings, the type of pictures published in newspapers also is affected. At some newspapers, photojournalists decide who will cover what events at a weekly meeting. "Basically, all the photos for the week's papers are planned ahead of time," said Zhang Hong, a photographer for Wen Hui Daily.[51] Of course, some provisions are made to cover unexpected events, but the result of this routine is that most pictures show "planned" events. Chinese photojournalists generally are not mentally prepared to quickly respond to unanticipated news events

At some newspapers, photo assignments are made in a timely manner. At People's Daily and China Daily, the chief photographer makes daily photo assignments. At other papers, section editors make timely assignments. Editors may also assign photographers to a "beat," where photojournalists look for suitable pictures every day. Examples of photographic beats are: industry and trade, culture and education, political life and foreign affairs, agriculture, and suburbs. Yet assigning photojournalists to "beats" can cause problems, said the chief photographer at People's Daily, because photographers become jealous and tend to encroach on others' areas.[52]

Rather than rely upon amateur correspondents, staff meetings, or editors, some photojournalists seek greater independence. They talk to friends, read other newspapers and watch news on television in order to find good picture ideas. They believe photojournalists' status improves when their images stand alone, instead of simply being used to illustrate articles, so they go to work units and recreation areas to find newsworthy subjects.[53]

A second routine that affects picture content and quality is the amount of film photojournalists shoot when covering an assignment. At Xiamen Daily, for example, photojournalists shot seven or eight rolls of film per month.[54] Photojournalists, however, never complained about inadequate film supplies, and photography department budgets were generally considered more than adequate.

Photojournalists' shooting were responsible for low film consumption. For simple assignments, photojournalists need only five or six pictures because each photo is thought out carefully before photojournalists press the shutter, said the chief photographer at China Daily.[55] Wang Wenlan said that photographers at China Daily choose a good angle and then wait for the "decisive moment" to make sure each picture is perfect. Motordrives waste film and seem useless, he said. For events with great news value, or visually exciting events, or sporting events, photojournalists shoot one, two or three rolls of film.[56]

Photojournalists from other newspapers offered additional reasons for the low film consumption. One said few pictures are shot because editors cannot appreciate the difference between a good news photograph and a mediocre or bad one.[57] A second said photojournalists use only a little film because their editors discuss images before photographers leave for an assignment, and photographers plan their pictures well.[58] Although photojournalists say they do not like posed images, the practice continues except for news situations and sports.

A third routine that affects picture content and quality is the way photojournalists' work is evaluated. In China, photojournalists frequently work under a quota system--they must publish a minimum number of pictures each month. At Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, photographers were required to have 16 pictures published per month. At Workers' Daily and Liberation Army Daily, however, only four published pictures were required, and the quota at China Youth News was five pictures.[59] Because photojournalists want to meet their quotas, they must take pictures their editors will like and publish. People's Daily and Xiamen Daily were the only newspapers investigated without quota systems.

Adherents of the quota system say it guarantees a source of photographs for the newspaper, and it allows editors to measure how much photographers work.[60] Opponents say the system is unreasonable because news varies, and a photographer's output will vary with the news.[61]

In fact, the quota system seldom spurs great quantity of work. Because the quotas are low at some newspapers, staff photographers have little incentive to shoot many assignments. They may even try to abuse the system by submitting photos in 1987 that were actually taken in 1985, said Jiang Shigao, chief photographer at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily. Photographers also take advantage, he said, when they shoot many pictures at an assignment and then turn in a slightly different picture every few days.[62]

Nor does the quota system stimulate quality photojournalism. Photographers receive the same credit points whether the picture required great or little effort, so they lack incentive to take time-consuming or inconvenient pictures. "Our photographers take pictures of factory workshops all the time," said Jiang. "They don't want to go to other places because it is easier to shoot workshops and machines."[63]

Competition with other photojournalists for the best image is not necessary with the quota system. In fact, some Chinese photojournalists believe that photojournalists from other countries are too aggressive in pursuit of the best story-telling moment. Zhang Hong, a photographer at Wen Hui Daily, said foreign photojournalists are more likely to elbow their way to the front of a crowd to get good pictures. Zhang admires their spirit, but he believes that the public disapproves of such aggressive behavior. Chinese photojournalists, in contrast, care more about other photojournalists and work to ensure that everyone gets good pictures.[64]

Photographers receive bonus pay for exceeding the quota, but the amount is small compared to their salaries. At Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, the bonus for photojournalists equals one-third the amount paid to amateur correspondents.[65] Editors prefer staff photographers shoot more photographs because then they can use fewer photos from amateurs, and therefore, they can save money. Some photojournalists, however, prefer to shoot the minimum. They may work for the paper 16-20 hours per week and work for themselves the rest of the time.[66] A combination of the quota system with the long-standing practice of guaranteed lifetime employment means that chief photographers have few carrots or sticks to motivate their staffs.

In addition to the routines of staff photographers, **the routines of amateur correspondents** affect photographic content. Amateurs generally send newspapers three types of photographs: news, art and pictures that show problems in society. Submission of news pictures is generally encouraged as a means of supplementing reporting by staff photojournalists. Pictures that show problems are probably submitted because people are angry and want local government offices to take action. Amateurs submit art photographs because they enjoy taking art pictures and take pride when then appear in newspapers.

Of course, payment for the pictures in another incentive. At Xiamen Daily, amateur correspondents are paid 4-8 yuan per picture (4 yuan=$1), depending upon its quality and size when published. National-level newspapers may pay 10-20 yuan for pictures, and China Daily pays the best: 25-60 yuan. The pay for freelance pictures is generally equivalent to the pay for a 1,000-character article from correspondents, and is probably generous compared to people's salaries.[67]

Finally, the **routines of editors** also affect photographic content. There are no photo editors at Chinese newspapers. Instead of having one person handle all the pictures in a newspaper, many editors are responsible for selecting, sizing and placing photographs.

Newspaper editors can select photographs from amateur community correspondents, staff photojournalists or Xinhua news agency. Editors frequently choose amateurs' photographs because they reflect the spirit of the community in a way that readers understand. According to the chief photographer at China Youth News, "Without the amateurs, there would not be so many readers; the amateurs know more about readers' lives."[68]

Of the newspapers investigated, People's Daily used the greatest percentage of photographs from amateur correspondents. They provided 80 percent of the pictures in the eight-page daily newspaper, and the 16 staff photographers provided only 2-3 percent of the pictures published. Chief photographer Jiang Duo said:

> People's Daily has many correspondents, and it relies on them. It doesn't have to force its staff photographers to produce what may be dull photographs. Some days there is little news in society. News must have great influence and a great impact to appear in People's Daily.[69]

Shenzhen Special Zone Daily editors used the largest proportion of staff-generated pictures. The paper only began publication in 1981 and has not yet built up a pool of correspondents, so the staff provides 70 percent of the pictures (see Table 1). The seven-member photography staff is under a heavy burden, said Jiang Shigao, because so few good pictures are received from amateur correspondents.[70] He wants to encourage regular contributions by correspondents, but is unhappy about the quality of images submitted. "Most photographs from amateurs can't be used because they lack news value," he said, "yet if we don't use such pictures, then amateurs won't send any more."[71]

Editors seldom selected pictures from Xinhua news agency. Xinhua photographs earn little respect from journalists and are only published when pictures from other sources are not available. An example is pictures of international events, where the agency has a monopoly on news, or of important domestic events with restricted access. Local papers won't use Xinhua pictures because they lack variety and spirit, said Jiang Shigao.[72]

Wang Wenlan, chief photographer at China Daily, said: "Xinhua ideas and photos are too old and moldy, like something stored in a house for a long time. No one will buy such moldy things."[73]

Before the Cultural Revolution, editors used a much higher percentage of Xinhua photographs. Newspapers had fewer staff photographers, and Xinhua provided most of the photographs. As newspapers began to pay more attention to local people and events, they wanted local photographs by staff photographers and amateur community correspondents.[74]

Table 1
Source of News Photographs

Newspaper	Staff	Amateurs	Xinhua
Shenzhen Special Zone Daily	70%	25%	`5%
Beijing Evening News	65	30	5
Xinmin Evening News	60	30	10
Xiamen Daily	50	40	10
Wenhui News	50	40	10
China Youth News	30	60	10
Liberation Army Daily	30	50	20
Workers' Daily	25	70	5
China Daily	10	80	10
People's Daily	3	80	17

NOTE: Data are based upon reports by staff photographers.

A Xinhua editor admitted that the agency's photographs are more serious and formal than pictures produced by staff or amateur photographers. In the past Xinhua photographs were not as vivid or fresh, he said, yet since the 1980s, the news agency has tried to tailor photographs to the needs of each newspaper. Evening newspapers, for example, receive more entertaining, human interest photographs.[75]

Even though good photographs may be available, editors frequently lack sufficient expertise to select the best images. With the exception of Feng Xiliang at China Daily, editors rose to their position because of their skill with words or because of their strict allegiance to Party ideology. "In China, few editors-in-chief know about photography," said Jiang Shigao.[76]

Because they do not understand the potential power of photojournalism, some editors view pictures as decoration, a means to break up type and improve the appearance of a page. They encourage photographers to take beautiful pictures even though the pictures may not communicate anything important. The line between art and news photography becomes blurred.

Given dramatic news photographs, editors may balk at publishing them. For example, a picture was taken of an accident in which a crane was lifting long steel rods, when one fell and pierced a worker's back like a needle, said Jiang Shigao. With the rod in place, other workers took him to the hospital. The wounded man looked like a cross and couldn't enter the hospital doors, so the rod was cut. Although the man lived, Jiang said editors at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily wouldn't use the picture because they said it showed too much blood, was too cruel, and was not good to see. Jiang argued that if the photo was not used, then photographers would be discouraged from ever again taking photographs of news value. It was not published, but it later won first place in the Guangdong photography contest. Although of low technical quality, the photo won because it had great news value. Photographers fear that readers will lose respect for pictures when the ones published in newspapers lack news value, Jiang said.[77]

The editor-in-chief of the Shenzhen paper said editors must consider a picture's influence upon readers. If a picture reflects real life and will not have a bad influence, then it can be published. He said selection of photographs by editors rather than the chief photographer is necessary because the entire newspaper must be coordinated by the editorial staff. Pictures are just part of the paper, and editors must consider the paper in its entirety.[78]

In addition to selecting pictures, editors size photographs for their page. Photographers sometimes complain their pictures are run too small, but they admit that the size of Chinese newspapers is a limiting factor. Xinmin Evening News, an eight-page tabloid, rarely publishes pictures larger than 3 square inches. Reproduction is letterpress and of poor quality. A photographer at the newspaper explained that pictures are run small because the paper has poor reproduction. "Beijing papers have good reproduction, so photos can attract people," said Zhang Zulin. "In Shanghai, reproduction is not as good, so there is no sense in running photos large."[79]

Photographers also justify small pictures because they suit the design of Chinese newspapers. "China Daily should have large photographs," said Zhang Hong, "because it has long articles in English, and without large photos, the design would appear bad. Wen Hui Daily's design is different. Articles are not long, so photos should not be big."[80]

China Daily publishes a large photograph at the top half of the front page because its former editor-in-chief believes photographs are important. While studying at the University of Missouri in Columbia, Feng Xiliang learned that photographs attract readers, and that large photos have great emotional impact. Later, he consciously adopted the Western practice of using large photographs in order to attract foreign readers to China Daily.[81]

To use such large photographs, however, was a bold move that broke with socialist traditions. He said:

> Especially in the first few issues, there was a lot of discussion about the innovations at China Daily. People were always complaining about 'bourgeois liberal' ideas. 'It is scary the pictures are so big,' they said. Today other papers, such as People's Daily, China Youth News, and Workers' Daily regularly use large pictures on their front pages.[82]

Editors are also responsible for placing photographs on a page, but they do not generally crop photographs because they respect the judgment of photographers in this area.[83] When designing a page, editors generally start with articles, not pictures. It is only later in the afternoon or evening that editors choose pictures and add them to the page, said Xue Yifeng, editor-in-chief of Shenzhen Special Zone Daily. If Xinhua sends a long and important story or speech, there may be no room for pictures, he added.[84]

Photographers at Beijing Evening New cringe when they think of editors' handling of pictures. Hu Qi said:

> Photographers try to talk with editors if the picture is very important. Sometimes

> photographers will assume responsibility for the makeup of an entire page to ensure proper treatment of a good picture. Editors always want to put more information into a page, not more photos. Photojournalists are embarrassed about the pictures appearing in newspapers, but no one can override editors.[85]

China Daily is the only paper investigated that decides on placement of photographs before articles. "The photo-priority layout at China Daily was an innovation," said Feng Xiliang.[86] The former editor was awarded a prestigious award, the Perceptive Eye Prize, by the National News Photography Society for the newspaper's selection and handling of pictures. Some newspapers have been influenced by its example and are now using bigger pictures in more prominent locations.

Although the situation was improving in early 1987, photojournalists at most newspapers still complained that editors valued stories more than photographs. Photo-journalists were less likely than reporters to receive passes to photograph sports or entertainment events. Their best images were not selected, or if selected, they ran small. Photojournalists seldom became senior editors. As the chief photographer at People's Daily said, "The wing of reporting is much stronger than the wing of photography unless there is an important event where pictures are clearer than words."[87]

Conclusions

This study sought to provide an understanding of the determinants of newspaper photography in China. From translations of articles published in the People's Republic of China, it was established that politics still has a strong influence upon photojournalism, but not as strong as in the past, when class struggle was considered the central task. Photojournalists still cooperate with Party officials to carry out the Party's tasks. Photojournalists sometimes pose people to create images with either unambiguous educational value or high aesthetic value. In the 1980s, however, economic development was emphasized more than ideology, and some photojournalists placed a higher value on facts. Opposing the tendency to serve politics and art, they stressed the "newsworthy" and "truthful" qualities of photographs. They preferred to take candid, "lifelike" pictures to posed pictures, which frequently appear stereotyped.

Interviews with journalists confirmed the importance of politics as a determinant of photographic content, yet the pressure is indirect, not direct. Photojournalists said they internalize Party policies and practice self-censorship when taking pictures. A generation gap exists on photojournalism staffs, however, concerning the strictness of advocating Party policies in photographic content. Older photojournalists are political conformists, yet younger ones are seeking greater freedom to report in a professional, objective manner. Younger photojournalists want to photograph all the news--good and bad--but most pictures that show problems in Chinese society are still taken by amateur correspondents, who are insulated from potential retribution.

Dissatisfactions with political and economic constraints contribute to apathy among some photojournalists. They see no reason to work hard if photography assignments call for stereotyped images, or editors will not publish their pictures, or a combination of small size and poor reproduction yields unreadable pictures. In order to receive personal satisfaction, these people frequently create art photographs. When published in magazines or shown in exhibitions, art photographs bring extra money and prestige.

In addition to their common dissatisfaction with inadequate picture display, several similarities between Chinese and American photojournalists are worth noting. Both groups use similar equipment and similar films. They both face the challenge of making deadlines. If Chinese photojournalists enjoy their work, then it is because they share with American photojournalists such joys as communicating with others, reporting the news, meeting new people, and traveling to new places. If Chinese photojournalists could be detached from politics, then they would share similar criteria of photographic excellence with Americans.

Differences between the groups, however, outweigh similarities. The influence of politics was always mentioned as the most important difference between photojournalism in China and Western countries. Chinese photojournalists said that politics affects every aspect of their work.

Several other factors help explain dissimilarities in content and quality of photographs published in China and the United States. Both the source of photography assignments and the source of photographs are more likely to be amateur community correspondents in China than the United States. Chinese photojournalists collaborate with and help amateur correspondents as a means to "serve the people." Following a tradition established by Mao Zedong, editors sacrifice some professionalism in order to ensure close ties with the "masses."

In the United States, photography assignments are generally made by reporters or editors and funneled through a photo editor, or they are initiated by photojournalists. In addition, American newspapers almost always use photographs provided by their staff or a news service such as Associated Press or United Press International. In 1976, for example, 31 percent of page-one photographs were by staff photographers, 39 percent were from news services, 23 percent were mug shots without a source, and only 7 percent could have been from other sources.[88] Chinese newspapers probably use fewer news service photographs than American newspapers because the quality of Xinhua photographers is considered low.

Another difference is that Chinese photojournalists use less film than Americans when photographing assignments. This is probably because Chinese photojournalists are more cooperative and Americans are more competitive when they photograph. Chinese photojournalists are generally "invited" by people to take pictures and are willing to go along with people in order to take pictures desired by editors. Although some competition between newspaper photojournalism staffs occurs in large Chinese cities, individual photojournalists are not pushing themselves in order to get stronger portfolios that can be used to obtain better jobs. American photojournalists, however, are accustomed to shooting a lot of film as they anticipate a story-telling moment or the peak action of an event. Because of competition with themselves, other staff photographers and other photojournalists, they are unlikely to stop shooting until they run out of time or they have the best possible image. Moreover, posed news or feature images have long been considered unethical, and more film is exposed when the elements of a picture are beyond a photojournalists' control.

Another difference is that Chinese photojournalists work under a quota system, which provides little incentive to improve the quantity or quality of a staff's work. Many Chinese photojournalists are proud of their work and strive for excellence within political and economic constraints. Like their American counterparts, they attend seminars, read trade journals and enter contests. Others, however, never liked the profession. Assigned to a photojournalism job and given some minimal training, they may not believe in their work, yet they have no place else to go. It is difficult to motivate these unhappy individuals with the quota system.

Finally, the lack of photography editors in China accounts for some dissimilarities in the content and quality of photographs. Photojournalists in both countries may complain that their pictures are sized too small, or that not enough pictures are published, or that the wrong pictures are published. In the United States, however, a photo editor attends news budget meetings and argues for display and selection of pictures based upon his or her experience in photography. A lack of knowledgeable picture editors in China hurts the morale of photojournalists and development of the field of photojournalism.

Endnotes

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[73] Interview with Wang Wenlan, chief photographer at China Daily, Beijing China, 27 January 1987.

[74] Interview with Chang Zuling.

[75] Interview with Xia Daoling, Xinhua news agency editor, Shanghai, China, 20 January 1987.

[76] Interview with Jiang Shigao.

[77] Ibid

[78] Interview with Xue Yifeng, editor-in-chief at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, Shenzhen, China, 5 February 1987.

[79] Interview with Zhang Zulin.

[80] Interview with Zhang Hong.

[81] Interview with Feng Xiliang.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Xu Yifeng.

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Chinese Students' American Television Uses and their Acceptance of American Values: A Correlational Analysis

a paper presented to
The Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
Convention (International Division) in Boston, August 7, 1991

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Chinese Students' American Television Uses and their Acceptance of American Values: A Correlational Analysis

Few people would doubt that television has become one of the most important socializing agents in today's society (Gerbner et al., 1976, 1980; Tan, 1981). And Bandura's *social learning theory* is often employed by researchers to explain (Tan, 1981; DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989; Bandura, 1977) how people could be socialized by television through the process of *modeling*. Because of the international flow, mostly one-way, of television programs, imported programs might also become part of television's socialization function for the receiving countries.

Many critical scholars appear to agree with the idea that imported foreign media might have significant impact on the receiving countries' culture and value systems (McPhail, 1987; Lee, 1980; Nordenstreng & Schiller, 1979; Masmoudi, 1979; Schiller, 1979, 1976 & 1969; Beltran, 1978; Tunstall, 1977; Nordenstreng & Varies, 1974). This theory is also supported by some empirical evidence provided by several cross-cultural studies. Tsai (1970) found some evidence which suggested that Chinese children in Taiwan were more likely to identify with American values when they were American program viewers. Payne and Peake (1977) concluded in another study that Icelandic children's exposure to American television programs was associated with their positive attitudes toward the U.S.. Barnett and McPhail (1980) found that the more Canadian college students viewed American television, the less they tended to identify themselves as Canadians; the more they considered themselves Americans. Granzberg (1982) found that the viewing of American television actually disrupted many aspects of the Algonkians' native culture in central Canada. Tan et al. (1987) concluded that heavy viewers of American programs were more likely than infrequent viewers to consider American values more important than their traditional values in the Philippines. Kang and Morgan (1988) found that female student viewers of American programs were more likely to endorse American values than their male counterparts in Korea.

The literature permits several observations: (1) All of these cross-cultural studies investigated how people of the receiving countries were impacted by imported foreign media, American television in most cases; they all suggested the possibility of television effects; (2) Some scholars tended to perceive these television effects as a sign of cultural imperialism; (3) In their research designs, most of these studies did not include the step of content analysis which would reveal how American culture and value systems were depicted on these imported American programs; (4) Since television was seldom the only socialization agent for its viewers, other possible socialization agents or intermediating variables should also be taken into account in this kind of studies; and (5) Viewers' amount of exposure to the imported American television programs might not be the best predictor variable in such studies, while their degree of dependency on such programs might be another alternative.

However, few studies to date have investigated how people of the receiving countries' culture and value systems are impacted by American television when they stay for a longer period of time in the U.S. where they are exposed to almost hundred percent American television programs. If the television effect hypothesis suggested by the literature holds true, television effect should also be found in this hypothetical situation. The present study did this by examining the association between Chinese students' acceptance of American values and their American television uses--television dependency and exposure. Based on the assumption that if Chinese students' acceptance of American values was impacted by American television, a positive association between these criterion (degree of acceptance of American values) and predictor (television uses) variables should be found. A content analysis was first employed to identify the portrayals of American values on television. Chinese students' degree of acceptance of these portrayals embodied the criterion of the present research. Both Chinese students' television dependency and exposure were used as predictor variables and other possible socialization agents or intermediating variables, such as gender and degree of interaction with Americans, were under control simultaneously. In order to achieve all these, Gerbner's *cultivation analysis* approach (Signorielli & Morgan, 1990) was adopted.

Cultivation Analysis Approach

Being developed by Gerbner et al., the idea of this approach (Signorielli & Morgan, 1990; Gerbner et al., 1986) is that the selected dominant features portrayed on television are identified through a content analysis. Then, cultivation analysis is employed to investigate the association between these identified features and television viewers' perceptions or attitudes toward them through correlational analyses. The premise of this approach is that television viewers' perceptions and possibly attitudes and values are cultivated over a longer period of time by television's dominant features to which they are exposed.

Even though Gerbner's series cultivation projects have been criticized by some few researchers (Bryant, 1986; Hirsch, 1980 & 1981; Hughes, 1980; Newcomb, 1978; Coffin & Tuchman, 1972-73a & b) in terms of their theoretical basis, methodology, focus and conclusions, some other researchers modified Gerbner's approach by refining the methodology and looking into the impact of other television features, such as social values (Kang & Morgan, 1988; Tan, 1983 & 1987; Barnett & McPhail, 1980; Payne & Peake, 1977; Tsai 1970). The major difference between these modified research projects and the Gerbner approach was that Gerbner's approach mostly focused on the negative features of television, while others tended to investigate television's cultivation effects without a negative tone. Just as Hughes (1980) has suggested that *positive hypothesis* might be a better alternative for cultivation analysis approach, and possibly more theoretical support could be found when the cultivation analysis approach is hypothesized in light of individuals' socialization process.

Television Dependency versus Exposure

Researchers who followed this research framework often found and suggested that the only predictor variable--viewers' amount of television exposure--employed by the Gerbner team might not be the best choice. Bryant (1986) criticized that the examination of the cultivation impact of amount of television consumed, light versus heavy users, was non-theoretical. Former Gerbner team members Morgan and Signorielli (1990) employed viewers' degree of relying on television rather than their amount of exposure as the predictor variable in their recent research project. Some other studies (Rothschild & Morgan, 1987; Potter, 1986; Gross & Morgan, 1985) suggested that viewers' television viewing patterns or their living environments played intermediating roles in television's cultivation effects. And other researchers (Rubin et al., 1988; Perse, 1986; Carveth & Alexander, 1985; Adoni et al., 1984; Rouner, 1984) also suggested that a measure of the dynamics between viewers and television might be a stronger predictor variable of television's cultivation effects than television exposure.

Ball-Rokeach et al. (1984) developed a measurement which was employed successfully to predict the impact of an information campaign on television viewers' value changes. Being a crucial part of their *dependency theory*, this instrument was comprised of 11 dependency questions which were used to determine an individual's degree of television dependency. Ball-Rokeach et al. concluded that television viewers' values were impacted in the expected direction by the campaign message. Compared to the amount of viewers' television exposure, their television dependency was a more powerful predictor variable of value changes. For the purpose of the present study, both television viewers' television dependency and exposure were employed as predictor variables. And they were compared in terms of their predicting power.

Research Question and Hypothesis

Chinese students from mainland China provided an opportunity to further this positive hypothesis approach. The reasons are: (1) Coming from a very different social background, China, it is likely that there is some discrepancy between Chinese and Americans in terms of their interpretations of values; (2) There is a Chinese saying that people should follow the new customs when they come to a new country; it suggests that Chinese people are subject to changes; (3) These Chinese students are sent to this country to learn Western technologies, it is quite impossible for them not to learn any Western ideologies at the same time; (4) The majority of the Chinese students in the U.S. are not going back to China after their graduation, so they have to be socialized, more or less, to survive in this society; and (5) Research findings (Kapoor & Williams, 1979) suggested that Chinese students do not interact with Americans frequently, so mass media might become important socialization agents for them.

Given these reasonings and the findings of other studies discussed earlier, the researcher was interested in finding out the relationship between Chinese students' degree of dependency on or amount of exposure to American network television and their degree of acceptance of American values presented on television. If positive relationships were found, then it could be suggested that these Chinese students' acceptance of American values might be cultivated by American television.

The general hypothesis for the present study was: Chinese students' degree of dependency on or amount of exposure to television were positively correlated to their degree of acceptance of the portrayals of American values presented on American broadcast television. However, Chinese students' television dependency was a stronger predictor variable than their television exposure. And these relationships would still hold when other factors, such as gender, age, length of stay in this country and degree of interaction with Americans, were taken into account.

Research Design

In order to fulfill the purpose of the present study, the following research design was employed. It was decided that the portrayals of American values on television should be identified first through a content analysis. According to the results of the content analysis, a questionnaire was generated which was used to measure a random sample of Chinese students' degree of acceptance of the portrayals of these dominant American values. In the same survey, Chinese students' degree of dependency on television, amount of exposure to television, degree of interaction with Americans and other demographic data were also gathered. The proposed hypothesis was tested by a set of zero-order and partial correlation analyses and the significance level was set at .05.

Content Analysis and Operationalization

A solid week, from November 26 through December 2, 1989, of television prime time program from the three major commercial networks, ABC, CBS and NBC were selected and taped to be analyzed. Among these programs, only weekly series, sitcoms, drama and news magazines were included in the final sample. Programs without a clear story line, such as sports, were excluded. And made-for TV movies were also excluded because sometimes they were allowed to deviate more from the mainstream values (Gitlin, 1983). The final sample included 66 episodes of 65 different regular programs which comprised 51 viewing hours.

The unit of analysis for the content analysis was each individual program. The fifteen dominant American values identified by Williams (1970) were used as the value categories in the analysis.[1] The researcher reviewed each episode of these programs and identified how the value categories were portrayed on prime time television.

The results of this analysis were transformed into 43 value statements which were utilized in the questionnaire to measure Chinese students' degree of acceptance of American values on prime time network television.[2] Two of the statements were: *Money is a good measurement of a person's success.* and *Everyone should watch one's cholesterol level.* (see Appendix) A five-point Likert Scale was adopted to measure respondents' degree of acceptance of these value statements (Alreck & Settle, 1985); one point would stand for *strongly agree* with the statement, two points for *agree*, three points for *undecided*, four points for *disagree* and five points for *strongly disagree*. Each respondent's total scores on these 43 statements was counted as his/her degree of acceptance of the selected dominant values; the higher the total score, the more a person accepted these portrayals of American values on network television.

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[1] Williams' 15 dominant American value categories were: (1) achievement and success; (2) activity and work; (3) moral orientation; (4) humanitarian mores; (5) efficiency and practicality; (6) progress; (7) material comfort; (8) equality; (9) freedom; (10) external conformity; (11) science and secular rationality; (12) nationalism-patriotism; (13) democracy; (14) individual rationality, and (15) racism.

[2] Forty five value statements were generated first, however, two of them were dropped after the first pre-test.

Questionnaire and Sampling

In addition to these value statements, other information, such as respondents' degree of dependency on television, was also gathered through the same questionnaire. In order to measure respondents' degree of dependency on television, 11 questions (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach & Grube, 1984) were adopted. However, because the original questions were designed for American respondents, some minor changes were made for the present study. Respondents answered each question according to three given categories, a *1* stood for *often*, a *2* stood for *sometimes*, and a *3* stood for *never*. Their total scores on all the questions were tabulated again; the higher the score, the more a respondent depended on television. Two of the questions were: *How often do you use television to find out what is happening in the world?* and *How often do you use television to decide what to buy and where to buy it?* (see Appendix)

Chinese students' degree of interaction with Americans might also be another important socialization agent, so another 12 questions were designed to measure this variable. Two of the questions were: *In a regular semester, about how many times do you visit Americans at their homes, including parties hosted by Americans?* and *In a regular semester, about how many times do you go out with Americans, e.g., going to a movie, the park, shopping or a bar?* (see Appendix) In answering each of these questions, respondents picked one number out of the four given categories, with a *1* meaning *0 times*, a *2* meaning *1-2 times*, a *3* meaning *3-4 times* or a *4* meaning *5 times or more.* Each respondent's total scores on these 12 questions was used as the indicator of one's degree of interaction with Americans.

A one week time chart was used to measure respondents' weekly amount of television exposure. And respondents' length of stay, age, gender, amount of exposure to rental movies, radio and print media were also measured in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to give numerical answers to these questions. Two examples were: *Do you listen to the radio? (1) yes:____ (2) no:____ . If yes, about how many hours per day?* _____. and *Do you read American magazines? (1) yes:____ (2) no:____. If yes, about how many times per week?* ____.

In addition to these variables discussed above, respondents' length of stay in this country, age, gender and whether or not they had American roommates, whether or not they taught classes in English, whether or not they still spoke Chinese everyday and whether or not they still associated mainly with Chinese people were also asked in the questionnaire, and all these variables were used as control variables in the final analysis.

First pre-test was conducted to assure the validity of the questionnaire. In order to assure the validity of the value statements, fifteen graduate students from Bowling Green State University were asked to identify if these statements represented the most prevalent American values in a pre-test. Ten pre-test questionnaires were completed and returned on time. Two statements were dropped after the pre-test because none of them was endorsed by the majority of the respondents. After dropping these two statements, the total correct rate was over 80%.

Another pre-test was conducted to assure the reliability of these statements. A sub-sample of five hours of programs was randomly selected from the program pool, five American college students were hired to watch these selected programs. After watching these five hours of programs, each of them was given all these 43 value statements and asked to identify those which were generated from the programs they just watched. According to the answers given by them, an average of 77% correct rate was achieved. No changes were made on the instrument.

Before the questionnaire was sent out, a third pre-test was conducted; four Chinese students from mainland China were interviewed personally by the researcher with the questionnaire to assure the validity of the instrument. Based on these Chinese students' feedback, some minor changes were made.

The target population for the present study was Chinese students who were currently studying in universities in the U.S.. The accessible population was a total of 1472 Chinese students from all major state universities in Ohio and two major universities in Michigan, University of Michigan and Michigan State University. A systematic random sample of 472 Chinese students were asked either by mail or in person to participate in this study during the period of March 4 through March 25, 1990. Each of these selected Chinese students received a package containing a cover letter, a copy of the questionnaire and a return stamped/addressed envelope and they were asked to return the completed questionnaire directly to the researcher by mail.

Results

One hundred and sixty four questionnaires were completed and returned before the May 15 deadline; the return rate was 35%.

Among the 164 completed questionnaires, 117 were male and 47 were female. The youngest respondent was 20 years old and the oldest was 66, the total average age was 30. Respondents' average length of stay in this country was three years and four months (3.3 years); their length of stay in this country ranged from two months (.17 years) to fifteen years and three months (15.25 years) (see Table 1). The majority of them, 84%, did not have American roommates and 75% of them did not teach classes in English as part of their teaching assistantship. Eighty eight percent of them still spoke Chinese almost everyday and 83% of the respondents still mainly associated with Chinese people.

Table 1. Distributions of Criterion and Predictor Variables

Names of Variables	N	Score Range	Mean	Median	Mode	S.D.
Value Scores	164	66- 211	149	149	152	15
Age	164	20 - 66	30.08	30.00	30.00	5.45
Length of Stay in the U.S. (years)	164	.17 - 15.25	3.33	3.00	4.00	2.26
TV Dependency	163	11 - 31	19.52	19.00	17.00	3.68
TV Exposure (hours/week)	164	1 - 67	18.04	15.00	7.00	11.84
Interaction with Americans	164	13 - 39	22.56	22.00	21.00	4.56
School Newspaper Reading (times/week)	145	1 - 7	3.58	3.50	5.00	1.49
Radio Listening (hours/day)	106	1 - 8	1.69	1.00	1.00	1.35
American Newspaper Reading (times/week)	120	1 - 12	3.58	3.00	2.00	2.24
American Magazine Reading (times/week)	131	1 - 10	2.46	2.00	1.00	1.69
Chinese Newspaper or Magazine Reading (times/week)	132	1 - 15	4.08	4.00	5.00	2.19
VCR Using for Time Shifting (hours/week)	85	1 - 10	1.73	1.00	1.00	1.90
Movie Rental (times/week)	91	1 - 12	2.23	2.00	1.00	2.16

In terms of respondents' degree of acceptance of American values presented on television (value scores), they averaged a 149 points on the scale of 43 to 215 points. A reliability test showed that a .85 Alpha level was found among these 43 value statements (see Table 1 and Appendix).

On the scale of 12 to 48 points, respondents' average degree of interaction with Americans were 23 points. A .70 Alpha level was found among these 12 questions regarding the respondents' degree of interaction with Americans in a reliability test (see Table 1 and Appendix).

In terms of their television exposure and dependency, the data showed that respondents viewed a weekly average of 18 hours of television. On the scale of 11 to 33 points, respondents' average TV dependency was 20 points. A reliability test showed that a .77 Alpha level was found among these 11 dependency questions (see Table 1 and Appendix).

A series of correlational analyses were conducted among the variables. The first set of correlational analyses were conducted among the criterion--respondents' degree of acceptance of American values (value scores) and four other predictor variables which included respondents' television dependency, television exposure, degree of interaction with Americans and length of stay in this country. Respondents' value scores were significantly correlated ($p \leq .01$) with both of their television dependency and exposure with .38 and .28 degrees of correlation respectively. However, the criterion was not significantly correlated with any of the other two predictor variables (see Table 2).

When respondents' age, gender, interaction with Americans and length of stay were under control, a higher significant correlation (.41 when $p \leq .01$) was found between respondents' value scores and television dependency. A significant .27 correlation was found between respondents' value scores and television exposure (see Table 2).

Table 2. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations between Respondents' Value Scores and Four Predictor Variables

	TV Dependency	TV Exposure	Interaction	Length of Stay
	.38**	.28**	- .05	- .14
Value Scores	.41**†	.27*†		
	.34**††	.10†††		

**: significant when $p \leq .01$.
*: significant when $p \leq .05$.
†: controlling for age, gender, interaction and length of stay.
††: controlling for age, gender, interaction, length of stay and TV exposure.
†††: controlling for age, gender, interaction, length of stay and TV dependency.

When respondents' television exposure was added as the fifth control variable, a weaker but still significant .34 correlation was found between respondents' value scores and television dependency. However, when respondents' television dependency was added as the fifth control variable, a .10 non-significant correlation was found between their value scores and television exposure (see Table 2).

Only non-significant zero-order correlations were found between respondents' value scores and other media uses (see Table 3).

When male respondents were isolated for analysis, significant zero-order correlations were found between respondents' value scores and their television dependency and exposure, .33 and .23 respectively. When respondents' age, gender, interaction with Americans and length of stay in the U.S. were under control, significant correlation was only found between male respondents' value scores and television dependency. Only non-significant correlations were found between respondents' value scores and television exposure in partial correlation analyses (see Table 4).

Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations between Respondents' Value Scores and Other Media Uses

	Radio	U.S. Newspaper	U.S. Magazine	School Newspaper
Value Scores	.03	-.13	.13	.03
	VCR	Chinese Newspaper or Magazine	Movie Rental	
Value Scores	-.18	-.12	-.13	

(All correlations are non-significant)

When female respondents were isolated for analysis, both zero-order and partial correlations found between respondents' value scores and television dependency were significant, .51, .63 and .51 respectively. However, the zero-order correlation was the only significant correlation found between respondents' value scores and television exposure (see Table 4).

When respondents who taught classes in English and those who had American roommates were isolated as two sub-groups for analysis, only non-significant correlations were found between the criterion and predictor variables (see Table 4).

When respondents who did not teach classes in English were isolated for analysis, significant zero-order and partial correlations were found between respondents' value scores and television dependency and exposure. However, the correlation found between respondents' value scores and TV exposure was non-significant when

Table 4. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations between Respondents' Value Scores and TV Dependency and Exposure when controlled by Five Nominal Variables

	Dependency	Exposure		Dependency	Exposure
Male (N=117)			Female (N=47)		
	.33**	.23*		.51**	.45**
Value Scores	.34**†	.21†		.63**†	.30†
	.31**††	.09†††		.51**††	.02†††
Teach Classes in English (N=41)			Not Teach Classes in English (N=123)		
	.23	.10		.42**	.32**
Value Scores	.29†	.11†		.44**†	.33**†
	.26††	.01†††		.34**††	.14†††
With American Roommates (N=25)			Without American Roommates (N=138)		
	.08	.29		.42**	.30**
Value Scores	.05†	.35†		.46**†	.28**†
	.00††	.33†††		.38**††	.07†††
Speak Chinese Everyday (N=144)			Not Speak Chinese Everyday (N=18)		
	.38**	.28**		.48*	.30
Value Scores	.38**†	.27**†		.67**†	.23†
	.28**††	.12†††		.84**††	- .21†††
Associate with Chinese (N=135)			Not Associate with Chinese (N=24)		
	.38**	.30**		.38	.46*
Value Scores	.41**†	.28**†		.38†	.39†
	.33**††	.12†††		.12††	.27†††

*: significant when $p \leq .05$.
**: significant when $p \leq .01$.
† : controlling for age, gender (when applicable), interaction with Americans and length of stay.

††: controlling for age, gender (when applicable), interaction with Americans, length of stay and TV exposure.
†††: controlling for age, gender (when applicable), interaction with Americans, length of stay and TV dependency.

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their television dependency and four other variables were under control (see Table 4).

When respondents without American roommates were isolated for analysis, a set of significant and non-significant correlations which were similar to those found among respondents who did not teach classes in English were produced by the same set of zero-order and partial correlation analyses (see Table 4). Correlations with the same significant and non-significant pattern were also found among respondents who still spoke Chinese almost everyday and those who still associated mainly with Chinese people (see Table 4).

Among respondents who did not speak Chinese almost everyday, significant zero-order and partial correlations were only found between respondents' value scores and television dependency. Among these significant correlations, a .84 correlation was found in the fifth-order partial correlation. A .64 correlation was found in the fourth-order partial correlation. Only non-significant correlations were found between respondents' value scores and television exposure (see Table 4).

When respondents' who did not associate mainly with Chinese were isolated for analysis, the only significant correlation was found between respondents' value scores and television exposure in a zero-order correlation analysis (see Table 4).

Discussion

It was hypothesized that Chinese students' degree of dependency on or amount of exposure to television were positively correlated to their degree of acceptance of the portrayals of American values presented on American broadcast television. The results of the zero-order correlation correlation analyses suggested that this hypothesis was supported; among all respondents and six out of the ten sub-groups, significant correlations were found between the criterion and respondents' television dependency and exposure.

It was also hypothesized that Chinese students' television dependency was a stronger predictor variable than their television exposure. And these relationships would still hold when other factors, such as gender, age, length of stay in this country and degree of interaction with Americans, were taken into account. The results of fifth-order correlation analyses showed that significant correlations were still found between the criterion and television dependency among all respondents and seven out of the ten sub-groups. However, all correlations found between the criterion and television exposure among all respondents and across all sub-groups were non-significant. These hypotheses were also confirmed by the data.

If Chinese students' acceptance of American values was indeed cultivated by American television, the data suggested that American television might have a mild impact on respondents' values. Respondents' television dependency was a stronger indicator of this impact than their television exposure. The data suggested that a pseudo relationship between respondents' acceptance of American values and American television was often reflected by respondents' television exposure; when respondents' television dependency was controlled in the fifth-order partial correlation analysis, no relationship was found between their acceptance of American values and television exposure. However, respondents' television dependency still reflected a significant correlation in the reverse situation.

The data also suggested that television was playing a more important role than other media in impacting Chinese students' acceptance of American values.

The data also suggested that gender did make a difference in terms of television's impact on Chinese students' acceptance of American values; female respondents' were more subject to television's impact on their acceptance of American values.

Among respondents' who taught classes in English and those who had American roommates, the data suggested that television did not have impact on their acceptance of American values. Two explanations could be considered: first, too few respondents were included in these two sub-groups, and second, the impact of television was overridden by respondents' *meaningful* interaction with Americans produced by these situations. If the second explanation was accepted, it could be concluded that frequent interaction with Americans would mediate television's impact on respondents' values. However, another question was raised here.

If respondents who interacted meaningfully with Americans were less subject to television's impact on their acceptance of American values, negative correlations should be produced between respondents' value scores and degree of interaction with Americans. However, no relationships were found between these two variables. The question remained unanswered was how respondents' degree of interaction with Americans functioned in this cultivation process. The explanation appeared to be that respondents' degree of interaction with Americans measured in the present study tended to be *superficial* when compared to the kind of meaningful interaction produced by situations such as teaching classes in English or living with American roommates. since respondents with American roommates maintained a higher average interaction score than those without American roommates only by less than two points, 24.16 and 22.24 points respectively, on a scale of 12 to 48 points, it was again confirmed that the interaction scores measured in the present study did not discriminate between respondents' superficial and meaningful interaction with Americans.; if it did, a bigger difference between these two average scores would be expected. However, because most respondents' did not interact frequently with Americans, their interaction scores did not pose major concern to the present study.

Even though the data suggested that television might have an impact on Chinese students' acceptance of American values, a *hypodermic model* was too simple to explain this relationship. Other variables, such as gender and meaningful interaction with Americans, would mediate this impact. And this impact was better reflected by respondents' television dependency rather than their television exposure. It should also be noted that causal relationships between respondents' television uses and values could not be established by the present study, experimental studies are suggested for future projects.

Appendix. Indices Used to Measure Respondents' Parent-Child Relationship, TV Dependency, and Interaction with Americans

Names of Scales	Score Range	Reliability Analysis Cronbach Alpha
Value Scores	66 - 211	.85

Variables Loading on the Scale:

(1) It is natural for people to be crazy about movie, singing or sports stars.
(2) Money is a good measurement of a person's success.
(3) People should work whole heartedly, no matter how they might feel about their jobs.
(4) Everyone needs to exercise regularly to maintain one's physical fitness.
(5) Everyone should watch one's cholesterol level.
(6) There is nothing wrong with people smoking cigarettes .
(7) There is nothing wrong with making fun of national leaders on television.
(8) Compared to being obedient to parents, being honest is a more important human characteristic.
(9) Religion is important in people's lives.
(10) Animals, such as dogs or cats, have rights just as people do.
(11) It is NOT the society's responsibility to help the homeless and other less fortunate people, because people should help themselves.
(12) Criminals' human rights should also be fully protected by the law.
(13) Death penalty can be used to lower crime rates.
(14) Spending money is as important as saving money.
(15) Married couple should stay together for their social and family responsibilities, even though they do not love each other anymore.
(16) There is nothing wrong with adults having sex before getting married.
(17) Single parent families will NOT necessarily have more negative side effects than families with both parents.
(18) There is nothing wrong with children borrowing money from their parents.
(19) A person's physical appearance is important.
(20) Seeking as much material comfort as possible is an important purpose in life.
(21) It is better for girls NOT to approach boys for dates.
(22) Playboys are more acceptable than playgirls.
(23) There should NOT be limits on press freedom.
(24) People's right to free speech should NOT be regulated/limited by law.
(25) People's right to free speech should NOT be regulated/limited by the government.
(26) Parents should be their children's friends rather than their authoritarian figures.
(27) Most of the time, a free press is the most powerful/efficient watchdog of the government.
(28) The American way to dress, such as blue jeans or sneakers, is the most favorable fashion trend to follow.
(29) The political system with two major political parties is the most desirable.
(30) Technological and scientific advances are more important than a long history for a country.
(31) The drug problem is the number one social problem facing the U.S..
(32) Parents should apologize to their children, if they make mistakes.
(33) People should be able to show their affection, such as kissing or hugging, in public.
(34) If children do not want to, parents should NOT make decisions, such as going to college or taking piano lessons, for them.
(35) Sex is a subject which should be talked about/discussed openly between family members.
(36) Pursuing pleasure is one of the most important purposes in life.
(37)Usually, money can bring happiness into people's lives.
(38) Compared to people from other countries, most Americans can be considered lucky.
(39) If people can have only one child and are able to decide the sex of that child, there is nothing wrong if most people would pick a boy over a girl.

(40) Even parents do NOT have the right to go through their children's belongings.
(41) There is nothing wrong with men wearing earrings.
(42) Sports is an important part in people's lives.
(43) There is nothing wrong with teenagers dating.

TV Dependency 3 - 33 .77

Variables Loading on the Scale:
How often do you use television to:
(1) decide what to buy and where to buy it?
(2) find out what is happening in the world?
(3) decide where to go for evening and weekend recreation?
(4) stay on what is happening in your community?
(5) learn new skills or improve old skills, e.g., gardening, sports or language?
(6) have something to do when nobody else is around?
(7) learn more about yourself?
(8) understand group conflicts in your community?
(9) decide who is more favorable in political campaigns?
(10) express your opinion, e.g. call/write to a TV station?
(11) stay on top of developments in health and medicine?

Interaction with Americans 12 - 48 .70

Variables Loading on the Scale:
In a regular week, about how many times:
(1) do you go grocery shopping (shopping mainly for food) at American supermarkets?
(2) do you go to your bank, banking machine not included?
(3)do you visit your department office and engage in a conversation which can be either casual or class related in nature, with the secretary, greeting exchange not included?
(4) do you raise a question or engage in a discussion in class?
(5) do you engage in a class related discussion with Americans outside of classes?
(6) do you engage in a casual conversation with Americans outside of classes?
(7) do you visit the recreational facilities on your campus with Americans?
In a regular month, about how many times:
(8) do you go shopping or window shopping at department stores or malls?
(9) do you visit any administrative offices in your school, such as the Registration Office or the Bursar's office, please do not include your own department office or recreational facilities?
In a regular semester, about how many times:
(10) do you visit Americans at their homes, including parties hosted by Americans?
(11) do you invite Americans to visit your home?
(12) do you go out with Americans, e.g., going to a movie, the park, shopping or a bar?

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Third Place Markham Award Paper

FACTORS INFLUENCING CROSS-NATIONAL NEWS TREATMENT OF A CRITICAL NATIONAL EVENT:

A comparative study of six countries' media coverage of the 1989 Chinese student demonstrations

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Presented to the International Communication Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention in Boston, Aug. 7 - 10, 1991

The author would like to thank Dr. Ray E. Hiebert, Professor of the College of Journalism at the University of Maryland, for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

FACTORS INFLUENCING CROSS-NATIONAL NEWS TREATMENT OF A CRITICAL NATIONAL EVENT:

A comparative study of six countries' media coverage of the 1989 Chinese student demonstrations

I. Research Problem

Many factors influence the news treatment of international events. This study attempts to see how four factors influence, by comparing and contrasting, the news coverage of a single event by six countries' media. Each of these media exemplifies a different facet of these factors, and by grouping them together into related categories, we can begin to see some commonalities of their coverage.

Basically, this study examines six countries' news treatment of the 1989 Chinese student pro-democracy movement by focusing on four news factors. Drawing on previous news factors research findings, this study proposes that political ideology, diplomatic sensitivity/government interest, cultural affinity, and geographical proximity are four possible factors affecting the news treatment of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement by media from different countries. Media from the following six countries were chosen to do this cross-system and cross-national comparative study: the United States, France, and Hong Kong[1] from the capitalist world, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the socialist/communist world. The rationale for the selection of these six countries will be stated later.

Explanations for foreign news coverage patterns have been sought by some researchers. The view emerging from these studies is that ideology represents a strong force in shaping the news (Graber, 1989; Bennett, 1988; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Hallin, 1987; Herman, 1986; Skurnik, 1981; Gerbner, 1964). Other important factors influencing foreign news coverage are national interest (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Chomsky, 1987; Herman, 1986; Shoar-Ghaffari, 1985; Mowlana, 1984; Curry, 1982; Skurnik, 1981; Ostgaard, 1965), and cultural/geographical proximity (Graber, 1989; Kariel & Rosenvall, 1983; Lent, 1977; Ostgaard, 1965; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; MacLean & Pinna, 1958). Given the political nature of the pro-democracy movement and the fact that China is one of the largest socialist countries in the world, political ideology is expected to be one of the important factors affecting these media's coverage of the event. Also it needs to be taken into account that although China is a third world country and does not have the superpower status, it does have powerful regional influence, diplomatic considerations would therefore be a likely factor not to be overlooked. The six countries' cultural affinity with, and geographical proximity to China are two other factors to be tested and pursued since these factors have been studied and shown as important.

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[1] One thing noteworthy is that Hong Kong is part of China and is currently a colony of the United Kingdom, therefore cannot be considered as a "country." This study will not make this distinction when referring to these six countries collectively, but will differentiate Hong Kong as a territory when referring to it separately.

II. Research Objectives and Significance of the Study

This study seeks to answer two questions by looking at how, and how much, political ideology, diplomatic sensitivity/government interest, cultural affinity, and geographical proximity influence the American, Soviet, French, Vietnamese, Hong Kong, and Chinese media coverage of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement. First, this study attempts to describe the news treatment of the pro-democracy movement by media of different socialist and capitalist countries. Second, it tests for the four aforementioned factors in an effort to decide the most important factors affecting the coverage of this event.

This study tests the prevailing and simplified assumption of press systems and may advance the study of comparative political/international communication. In order to advance the comparative research, it is important for researchers to engage in cross-national, and even cross-system studies. Unfortunately there have been few cross-system studies on press performance and international news treatment; most of the existing literature on international flow of news is either limited to studies of a single country's news coverage of a certain event, or to comparisons between countries with similar systems. The present study therefore should contribute to the field of comparative communication studies. Considering what is known about the different political systems in general, communist and capitalist systems in particular, each effort to utilize available data more fully may help either to improve existing theoretical explanations or to create new ones.

III. Rationale for the Selection of the Six Countries

The six countries were chosen because of their unique and special relations with China. In this section, their relations with China will be discussed briefly from the perspective of each country's diplomatic, cultural, geographical, and ideological relations with China.

China and the Soviet Union ended a 30-year hostility and normalized their relations at the peak of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement. These two countries share not only a long national border and historical ties; they were close ideological allies in the 1950s (against the United States). Sino-Soviet relations started to deteriorate in the early 1960s when there was the historic split between the two countries due to the conflict of national interests. Since then, ideology ceased to be the major factor in shaping the two countries' foreign policy toward each other.

As the 1980s approached, both countries started domestic reforms and had major shifts in their relations with the world, and with each other. The talks of normalizing their relationships were underway. Given the fact that the two nations were in the process of normalizing their diplomatic relationship during the pro-democracy movement, diplomatic sensitivity was prone to be high in both the Soviet government and the Soviet press' reactions to this event and handling of the news.

Unlike the Sino-Soviet relations, the United States is geographically far away, and ideologically different, from China. The Sino-American relations are nevertheless no less complicated than those between the Soviet Union and the PRC. China and the United States were bitter enemies in the 1950s and the 1960s. The 1970s saw the improvement and rapprochement of Sino-American relations. The two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1979. A commitment to economic reforms and modernization in China led the country closer to the United States and increased the level of trade and investment. By Spring 1989 (and for the most part of the 1980s), the two countries were on friendly terms and the relationship between them was stable, as shown by Presidents Reagan and Bush's visits to China in 1984 and 1989 respectively.

Vietnam shares close cultural, geographical, historical, as well as ideological ties with neighboring China. From the closest allies in the 1950s and 1960s, to the border conflicts and harsh rhetoric against each other in the 1970s and 1980s, and to the beginning of normalization talks in the late 1980s, these two neighboring countries went through a rather dramatic and complicated love-hate relationship.

Hong Kong, on the other hand, should not be considered a foreign territory to China. Always part of China, Hong Kong was ceded to the United Kingdom after the First Opium War in 1842. The lease will expire in 1997 when Hong Kong will be returned to PRC's sovereignty. Hong Kong shares close cultural, historical, and geographical ties with China, but ideologically it is very different from China. As a colony of the UK for over 100 years, Hong Kong has a capitalist, free market system.

The Chinese student demonstrations deeply concerned people in Hong Kong, because its results inevitably would implicate strongly the kind of regime or political atmosphere the Hong Kong public would likely be dealing with. Furthermore, because of Hong Kong's special relations with the Communist regime in China and the Nationalist regime in Taiwan, its press has always been partisan, with political views ranging from ultraleftist to ultrarightist. Due to these complicated situations, Hong Kong media presented researchers with an interesting case study.

It seems that among the six countries studied, France shares the least complicated relations with China. France and China are geographically far away and culturally different from each other. Even though a good Sino-French relationship would be beneficial to both countries economically and strategically, Sino-French relations are limited and secondary compared with China's relations with the two superpowers (Hsueh, 1982). But since France was the first European country to ever recognize the PRC in 1964, the Sino-French relation is significant.

Because of these countries/territories' special, unique, and sometimes complicated relations with China, it will be interesting and valuable to learn how the media in each state/territory covered the student demonstrations, and what factors contribute to the differences in their coverage.

Table 1 summarizes and demonstrates these countries' relations with China in terms of their political ideology, cultural affinity with, and diplomatic sensitivity and geographical proximity to China. Four groups of dichotomies were developed under which these six countries can be categorized.

In terms of political ideology, these countries can be categorized as either capitalist (the United States, France, and Hong Kong) or socialist/communist (USSR, Vietnam, China) countries; in terms of diplomatic sensitivity, they either have higher diplomatic sensitivity to China (US-VOA, USSR, Vietnam) or lower diplomatic sensitivity to China (US-the *New York Times*, France) in handling this news event. In terms of cultural affinity, these countries are either culturally similar (Hong Kong, Vietnam) or dissimilar (US, USSR, France) to China; and in terms of geographical proximity, they are either far away from

TABLE 1

Five countries' relationships with China

	Political Ideology	Diplomatic Sensitivity	Cultural Affinity	Geographical Proximity
US - *NYT*	capitalist	low	dissimilar	far
US - VOA[2]	capitalist	high	dissimilar	far
USSR	socialist/ communist	high	dissimilar	close
France	capitalist	low	dissimilar	far
Vietnam	socialist/ communist	high	similar	close
HK	capitalist	high	similar	close

China (US, France) or close to China (Hong Kong, Vietnam, USSR).

Four hypothetical expectations were developed based on previous research findings, and on information collected about the event of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement and the six countries' relations with China: (1) political ideology plays an important role in the direction of coverage but not necessarily the extent; (2) diplomatic sensitivity plays an important role in the direction of coverage, especially for official or government media and may even ameliorate differences in political ideology; (3) cultural affinity does not necessarily produce positive news coverage; and (4) geographical proximity may affect the extent of coverage but does not necessarily affect the direction.

IV. Research Design

A. Content Analysis

Content analysis has been the classical methodological approach used to investigate media messages. According to Berelson (1952, p. 18), content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. This quantitative methodological approach has been criticized for seldom addressing questions of meaning because of its emphasis on enumeration and on quantitative descriptions of the discrete data, since meaning resides in phrases, kernels, and collections of symbols within a context, and rarely within isolated terms (Starosta, 1984). The debate between the quantitative and qualitative researchers on which approach is theoretically sounder has been going on for quite a while and is not the focus of this study. This researcher, however, tends to agree with the comments made by Webb et al. (1981) that the principal objection to the quantitative research methods is that they are used alone. No research method is without bias. Any research method should be supplemented by methods that have different methodological weaknesses. Nordenstreng (1984, p.141) has also remarked, "an understanding of foreign countries as reflected in news coverage requires a much more delicate methodology than the simple question of counting how much attention is devoted to such categories as politics, natural catastrophes, etc., and how frequent is the use of such words as 'imperialism' and 'terrorism.'" Therefore, a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis is considered to be a more appropriate research tool to be used in conducting this study. As for the possible lower reliability problem caused by the greater subjective error in qualitative studies, it is believed that there is much to be gained by giving up a certain amount of reliability to reach the more subtle and theoretically interesting features of media messages as suggested by Kobland et al.(1990).

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[2] The American media sources used in this study are those of the *New York Times* (independent) and VOA (government). Due to the different government-press relations these two news organizations hold, their stands on reporting certain issues may be different. A detailed explanation of the data sources used will be discussed in the research design section.

B. Data Source

Coverage by the Soviet, French, Vietnamese, Hong Kong, and Chinese media of the movement were coded from the *Daily Reports* of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). These daily publications are published Monday through Friday by the National Technical Information service of the United States Department of Commerce. They contain transcriptions as well as translations of current news and commentary monitored by FBIS from foreign broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers and periodicals. Although FBIS does not provide exhaustive reports of all published daily news articles from the countries studied, the overall reliability of the *Daily Reports* is said to be good and is considered the purest form of primary data available for all countries (Linden, 1979, p. 58). FBIS *Daily Reports* also cover a variety of media from these countries.

On the other hand, the sampling method of FBIS does present the researcher with some problems. Because FBIS does not select its material on a random basis, most statistical analysis would be inappropriate. Furthermore, one has to acknowledge the fact that some FBIS materials are selected on the basis of the American government's varying concerns and interests, therefore, the selection process might not be as objective as it could be. Some caution must be taken when using the FBIS material.

As its name indicates, FBIS does not provide transcriptions of news and commentary from American news media. Because FBIS is a reproducer of direct verbatim party/government, as well as independent/private radio, television, and journal statements and articles, Voice of America's (VOA) 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement related reports from their *Central News File* were used as the data source for the American government news coverage of the event. The VOA *Central New File* contains all the news transcriptions broadcast by the VOA. The *New York Times* coverage was used as the data source for the American non-government news coverage of the movement.

It is not the most ideal situation to use data from two different sources. However, given that the VOA is the United States government broadcast system and the *New York Times* is one of the most influential independent newspapers in the country which has agenda-setting power (Herman, 1986), news transcriptions of the event from these two media should be a proper substitute for those of the *Daily Reports*.

C. The Samples

All 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement related news items in the FBIS *Daily Reports*, the VOA *Central News File*, and the *New York Times* from April 15 to June 15, 1989 constitute the universe of the current study. Items include straight news, news features, commentaries, analyses, and editorials.

D. Quantitative Analysis

1. Frequency Analysis

The quantitative analysis begins with a frequency analysis of each country's media use of official Chinese news sources. These sources include the Chinese government statements (written and oral), Chinese officials' statements and opinions, and government-owned media reports (e.g., Xinhua News Agency wire services, *Renmin Ribao,* Radio Beijing reports, etc.). The percentage of the Chinese official sources used in each country's reports was calculated. This variable is instrumental in revealing the journalist's or the media's political/ideological stands in the issue. According to Blumler and Gurevitch (1986), journalists' relations with their contacts are sometimes shaped by their political and ideological inclinations.

2. Assessment of the Appearance of Descriptive Terminology

Political events, especially those of international scale, are often distant and permit little direct involvement of the readers or viewers. The public's reactions to different news events, therefore, often depend a great deal on how they are symbolized. As Bennett (1980) has observed, the simple act of labeling or naming something can affect human behavior toward that thing and even transform the nature of the thing itself. For example, calling the student demonstration a "pro-democracy movement" would most likely create different reactions from the public to the event than calling it a "counterrevolutionary riot."[3]

Words can produce images that arouse emotional as well as physical sensations. "These words," observed Taylor (1986, p 212), "can be an aid to understanding or a distortion of it." The use of different words by the journalists not only reflect their perception of a particular situation but condition the way their reports are received. Because of the importance of the use of different symbols, this study conducts a quantitative assessment of the appearance of each explanation or descriptive term on the final military crackdown on June 4 1989. Only terms used by the reporters on the scene and terms found in the editorials/commentaries were recorded and discussed. This distinction is important, because a significant part of the news content is a function of what newsmakers say (e.g., the world leaders' reactions to the crackdown), therefore it cannot be viewed as the media's own explanations of the event.

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[3] Cobb and Elder (1972, p.131) also pointed out that although not every citizen interprets a symbol the same way, within a particular time context certain symbols will be salient to most people and will provoke either positive or negative reactions. The authors gave the example of the word communism: "Of concern is the general emotive response that such a symbol will evoke from most citizens. In this instance, the symbol is related, for most Americans, to oppression, totalitarianism, or other negative terms. The symbol has retained its emotive content with little alternative over the past two decades.

Some might argue that only the editorials of a newspaper can be regarded as representing or expressing the newspaper's own stands or opinions towards certain news events, straight news or other sections of the newspaper should not be considered as representing the news medium's views or opinions of any sort. According to Gerbner (1964), however, the basic editorial function of news media is not performed through editorials solely, but through the selection and treatment of all that is published. He put it this way:

> The subject of the present inquiry is the related proposition that, in fact, all news are views; that all editorial choice patterns in what and what not to make public (and in what proportion, with what emphasis, etc.) have an ideological basis and a political dimension rooted in the structural characteristics of the medium.... (p. 495)

3. Intercoder Reliability

The materials were examined by two coders for the quantitative analysis. An intercoder reliability test was conducted on 96 randomly selected news items. Holsti's formula for the intercoder reliability test was used (Budd et al., 1967, p.68):

$$R = \frac{2\,(C1,2)}{C1+C2}$$

where C1,2 is the number of category assignments both coders agree on, and C1+C2 is the total of category assignments examined by the coders. The intercoder reliability coefficient for the frequency analysis is 0.84; while for the terminology assessment analysis a coefficient of 0.93 was found.

E. Qualitative Analysis

This researcher has also pursued a qualitative analysis in addition to the quantitative ones. Major continuing coverage patterns were identified. These are the range of emphases, explanations, or descriptions which exist on a specific issue provided by different reporters or commentators. Substantial segments of the original texts were quoted to illustrate the themes and coverage patterns discussed. The qualitative analysis was conducted under the four foci of the study, the political ideology, diplomatic sensitivity/government interest, cultural affinity, and geographical proximity.

V. Results

A. Frequency Analysis

Table 2 compares the total number of the pro-democracy movement related news items reported by the American, Soviet, French, Vietnamese, Hong Kong, and Chinese media, as well as the frequency and percentage of these stories' using or quoting the official Chinese sources.

As mentioned earlier, because FBIS does not select its material on a random basis, the total number of news items reported by these media, and the total number of these news items' use of Chinese

TABLE 2

Percentage of reports using Chinese official sources

Country/territory	Total # of related news items*	Total # of news items using Chinese official sources	% of the use of Chinese official sources
USSR	107	63	59
Vietnam	07	04	57
PRC	662	231	35
US - VOA	489	164	34
France	206	49	24
US - *NYT*	239	21	09
Hong Kong	603	45	07

* This analysis covers the period of April 15 through June 15, 1989

official sources, are not strictly comparable. This analysis, therefore, focuses on the "percentage" of their use of the Chinese official sources.

It can readily be seen from the quantitative evidence that political ideology is clearly the most important factor influencing these media's use of the official Chinese sources. Media from the three communist countries, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and PRC, were shown to be leading in their use of the official Chinese sources. Almost 60% of the Soviet media reports of the events depended on the Chinese government sources. By quoting more of the Chinese official sources, the Soviet media show that it was the Chinese official version of the story they had used and relayed to their audiences and readers.

The Vietnamese media carried very few pro-democracy movement-related news items. They seemed to have shied away from reporting this event. Only seven related stories were found in the *Daily Reports* throughout the two month period. Out of the seven stories, four (57%) used the Chinese government sources.

Media from the three capitalist countries, on the other hand, were shown to have based their reports mainly on non-Chinese government sources. The *New York Times* and the Hong Kong media seem to have discredited the Chinese government sources totally. Less than 10% of their stories used the official Chinese sources (7% of the Hong Kong media and 9% of the *New York Times*).

One of the most surprising results is the significant difference found between the VOA's and the *New York Times*' use of the official Chinese sources. As mentioned above, while the *New York Times* seems to have discredited the Chinese government sources altogether, about one third (34%) of the VOA stories quoted or used the official Chinese sources. This difference might be attributed to the fact that the VOA is the American government news medium and, as a result, it demonstrated higher diplomatic sensitivity towards the Chinese government in dealing with this news.

Hong Kong, the territory that shares a close cultural, geographical, and historical tie with China, used the least official Chinese sources when reporting the pro-democracy movement. Only seven percent of the overall news items used the official Chinese sources. There are two likely explanations for this phenomenon. First, it may be that the Hong Kong media sided with the student demonstrators in reporting the pro-democracy movement, and discredited what the government had to say. Second, due to their close cultural and geographical ties with China, the Hong Kong media have language and cultural advantages over the other media in the study. It is likely that they had easier access to other sources of information, and did not need to depend on the Chinese official sources as much as media from other areas might have needed to.

Diplomatic sensitivity seems to be another important factor influencing the media's use of official Chinese sources. The countries and media that were shown to have higher diplomatic sensitivity towards the Chinese government also scored high in their use of the Chinese government sources (USSR, Vietnam, PRC, and the VOA).

Cultural affinity and geographical proximity do not seem to have major effects on these media's use of the Chinese official sources.

B. Quantitative Assessment of Terminology

The seven-week long Chinese pro-democracy movement was put to an end when the Chinese government ordered troops to retake Tiananmen Square from the student demonstrators on the night of June 3 and early morning of June 4, 1989. Many people were killed. The death toll estimates ranged from 300 (the Chinese official figure) to 5,000 (some Hong Kong media estimates). The first part of this analysis is a quantitative assessment of the appearance of differential language used by the six countries' media in describing the nature and effects of the military crackdown. The second part of this analysis deals with the quantitative assessment of different descriptive terminology used by these media in describing their, and the people's, reactions to the military crackdown.

1. Descriptive Terminology of the Crackdown

In this section, different descriptive words used by media in reporting the effects and nature of the final crackdown are recorded and discussed. The period of analysis covers the dates from June 3 to June 7, 1989.

Tables 3 to 8 represent words used by each country's media when referring to the military crackdown. Again, because the FBIS does not select its samples on a random basis, the emphasis of this analysis is not so much on the frequency of the appearance of each word as on the direction and nature of the words used.

The variation in word usage is illuminating. It is strikingly evident that political ideology is again the major indicator of these media's perceptions of the final crackdown. No invidious words were used by the socialist/communist media in reference to the military crackdown; whereas extreme language was used by media from the three capitalist countries. This dichotomous difference found in these countries' news treatment of this event clearly reflects their different political ideologies.

As Table 8 shows, the Hong Kong media used the strongest and most emotional words when referring to the crackdown. The most frequently used words were massacre, bloody suppression,

TABLE 3

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the *NYT*

Term	Total
crackdown	09
violence (violent)	07
massacre	06
bloodshed	04
barbarism	02
brutal (brutality)	02
tragedy	02
army assault	01
bloody	01
brutal repression	01
butchery	01
monumental tragedy	01
murderous	01
repression	01
stern savagery	01
violent attacks	01
violent suppression	01

TABLE 4

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the VOA

Term	Total
crackdown	17
clashes	08
violence (violent)	08
assault	07
bloody	06
bloodshed	05
bloody assault	04
massacre	03
bloody siege	02
suppression	02
carnage	01
military repression	01
military suppression	01
violent clashes	01

TABLE 5

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the Soviet media

Term	Total
clashes	05
tragic	05
tragedy	04
dramatic events	03
the operation	03
bloodshed	02
the events	02
incident	02
the army operation	01
calamity	01
the dramatic incident	01

TABLE 6

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the French media

Term	Total
crackdown	08
brutal	04
bloodbath	03
bloodshed	03
bloody	03
bloody repression	02
carnage	02
assault	01
massacre	01
military intervention	01
ruthless	01

TABLE 7

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the Vietnamese media

Term	Total
clashes	02

TABLE 8

Descriptive terminology on the crackdown used by the Hong Kong media

Term	Total	Term	Total
massacre	26	bloody operation	01
bloody suppression	13	bloody & vicious crackdown	01
bloodshed	10	cold blooded	01
crackdown	09	cruel	01
tragedy (tragic)	08	devastating	01
brutal	07	dreadful	01
carnage	07	fascist massacre	01
bloodbath	06	frightening	01
bloody crackdown	06	genocide	01
suppression	06	heartless	01
bloody	05	horrifying	01
assault	04	inhuman atrocity	01
atrocity	03	major tragedy	01
disastrous (disaster)	03	mass slaughter	01
savage act	03	military invasion	01
appalling	02	military suppression	01
bloody attack	02	monstrous	01
armed suppression	01	murder	01
bloodcurdling atrocity	01	onslaught	01
bloody actions	01	relentless	01
bloody army assault	01	ruthless	01
bloody battle	01	trauma	01
bloody confrontation	01	unbelievable suppression	01
bloody invasion	01	vicious	01

bloodshed, crackdown, and tragedy. Other terms with strong emotional implications were carnage, bloodbath, atrocity, and genocide.

Contrary to Hong Kong media reports of the incident, the Vietnamese media were mute about the military crackdown. In the four related stories that were carried by the *Daily Reports* during the period of June 3 through June 7, 1989, the Vietnamese media twice described the incident as merely "clashes between armymen and demonstrators" (June 5, 1989, Hanoi International Service in English). A Vietnamese foreign Ministry spokesman did express "regrets" for the "bloodshed" in China (June 7, 1989, Hanoi VNA in English). This was not recorded because it was not the medium's own comments.

The nature and direction of the words used by American and French media are similar, but the extent is different. Negative words such as "massacre," "carnage," "brutal," and "bloody" were used by these media when referring to the event (Tables 3, 4, 6). The *New York Times*, however, is shown to have used the strongest and the most invidious words in reference to the crackdown (Table 3). It described the crackdown as "massacre" six times, two times than did the VOA. It also described the Chinese government as "barbarism" and "butchery."

The Soviet media seem to have agreed with the Vietnamese media in regarding the event as merely "clashes." They used neutral terms such as "the operation," or "the army operation" when referring to the crackdown. The word "crackdown" was never found in their coverage of this event. In so doing, the Soviet media suggested legitimacy of the Chinese government's decision to use force.

2. Reaction terminology[4] of the crackdown

The statistics below (Tables 9 to 13) show the terminology used by the six countries' media when reporting on different reactions to the crackdown.

What stands out in these references is the fact that political ideology is again the determinant factor influencing these media's reactions to the event. As shown by these tables, the Soviet and Vietnamese media's use (or non-use) of reaction terms was very different from those used by media from the three capitalist countries. While the American, French, and Hong Kong media were all "angry," "outraged," or "shocked" by the incident, the Soviet media showed "compassion," "grief," and "regret" over the crackdown. Certainly, one needs to see how these words were used in context (this will be addressed in the following section) before making any conclusions or judgments. These words can nevertheless serve as a road map to show the general reactions expressed by these media.

Even though the American, French, and Hong Kong media were all "angry" at the military crackdown, the degree of their reactions was different. Hong Kong media once again showed the strongest reactions to the military crackdown. The *New York Times* used the second strongest reaction terms and the second greatest (25) number of these terms when reporting the crackdown. The emotions and reactions the *New York Times* demonstrated towards the event were well captured in two of their headlines: "In the Streets, Anguish, Fury and Tears" (June 4, 1989, p.A20) and "In Beijing, Rage and Despair Over the Soldiers' Brutality" (June 5, 1989, front page).

C. Qualitative Analysis

1. The New York Times Coverage

As mentioned earlier, political ideology was shown to be one of the most important factors influencing the media's perceptions of the final military crackdown. Here, in the case of the *New York Times* coverage of the 1989 Chinese student demonstrations, political ideology is again shown to be the dominant factor influencing the *Times* coverage of the events. Diplomatic sensitivity, cultural affinity, and geographical proximity did not affect the general content of the *Times* coverage as much.

The *New York Times'* response to the Chinese student pro-democracy movement was extraordinary in volume and passion. The *New York Times* had 236 news items on these events in the two month period (see Table 2), and for 31 consecutive days (May 16 to June 15, 1989), a special section of the newspaper was devoted to the story[5]. The following two examples illustrate and summarize some of

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[4] The words used to describe these reactions are called "reaction terminology" in this analysis.

[5] The volume and extent of the *New York Times'* coverage of the movement did not guarantee its accuracy. After the military crackdown, the *Times* carried some unconfirmed stories on the prospect of a civil war (June 5, 1989, p. A17; June 6, 1989, front page and p. A 16), and also the story that Li Peng was shot in the leg by a police officer (June 6, p. A 14). This incident was later confirmed as a rumor.

TABLE 9

Reaction terminology on the crackdown used by the NYT

Term	Total
angry (anger)	09
outrage(d)	08
bitterness	05
furious (fury)	04
grief	04
fear	03
indignant	03
despair	02
horror	02
rage	02
stunned	02
anguish	01
antagonism	01
apprehensive	01
anxiety	01
deeply upset	01
desperate	01
defiance	01
disbelief	01
enraged	01
frustration	01
shaken	01
sorrow	01
tears	01
traumatized	01

TABLE 10

Reaction terminology on the crackdown used by the VOA

Term	Total
angry (anger)	17
outrage	04
shock(ed)	02
deplore	01
disbelief	01
grief	01
horror	01

TABLE 11
Reaction terminology on the crackdown used by the Soviet media

Term	Total
compassion	02
grieve (grief)	02
regret	02
anguish	01
deplore	01
distressed	01

TABLE 12
Reaction terminology on the crackdown used by the French media

Term	Total
angry	10
shock(ed)	02
enraged	01
fury	01
horror	01
terror	01

TABLE 13
Reaction terminology on the crackdown used by the Hong Kong media

Term	Total	Term	Total
angry (anger)	25	appalling shock	01
shock(ed)	16	(feeling) betrayed	01
condemn	11	complete disbelief	01
horror (horrified)	09	deeply regretted	01
indignation (indignant)	09	deeply shocked	01
disbelief	05	deplored	01
grieved (grief)	04	disgusted	01
outrage(d)	04	disheartened	01
denounce	03	extremely distressing	01
enraged	03	frustration	01
fury (furious)	03	irate	01
utter shock	03	panic	01
deep sadness	02	rage	01
dismay	02	sorrow	01
revulsion	02	stunned horror	01
sad (saddened)	02	surprise	01
stunned	02	uncomprehending	01
alarm	01		

the recurring themes found in the *New York Times*' overall coverage of the movement.

> Now 84 years old, and said to be in failing health, [Deng Xiaoping] is neither too old nor too ill to order the army massacre of hundreds of unarmed, idealistic Chinese students in Beijing central square.... America's conscience cries out. President Bush, who has not hesitated to rebuke the Soviet Union and Nicaragua for lesser crimes, has so far failed adequately to express the revulsion Americans now feel.
>
> -(Editorial, June 5, 1989)
>
> No outsider wants to sound incendiary, but the sad truth is that the tree of liberty is indeed nourished by patriot blood, the thousands of brave young Chinese who were killed this weekend did not, in Lincoln's phrase, die in vain; their sacrifice will lead their people out of Communist bondage.
>
> (June 5 1989, p. A 17)

The cold war ideology dominated the *Times*' coverage. Looking through the lenses of anti-communism, the *New York Times* presented a picture of the good and innocent (the Chinese Students) versus the bad and evil (the Chinese government). The Chinese students in these stories were shown as idealistic, peaceful, rational, and brave "martyrs" (May 22, p. A17; June 6 1989 editorial) with "noble beliefs;" whereas the Chinese communist regime was portrayed as unreasonable, "disabled," and brutal "criminals" (June 6 1989 editorial) who rule "only by force and fear" (June 5 1989 editorial). The newspaper had clearly taken the side of the students. The main source of fact and interpretation for the *New York Times* was the demonstrating students and Beijing residents; the Chinese government's stand was rarely covered. Continuous attention was paid to the painful details of the sufferings of the hunger strikers during the hunger striking period, and the relatives and friends of the victims after the crackdown.

One of the most prevalent themes in the *New York Times*' coverage throughout the movement, particularly obvious during and after the period of the military crackdown, was that (Chinese) communism is in its final days. The talk of "the days of the Chinese Communist are numbered" was found in many news stories, analyses, and columns. Even though the Chinese students used the socialist anthem "Internationale" as their theme song, and never in their movements chanted any anti-communism slogans, nor did they ever demand the government be overthrown, the *New York Times* nevertheless portrayed their movement as anti-communist in nature. As early as May 22 , the *New York Times* had declared that "the emperor of Communism has lost the Mandate of Heaven," and it is the nature of "tyranny" to "deride the will of the people as the voice of the mob, and to denounce the cry for freedom as the roar of anarchy"(p. A17). The students "fight to the death for [the political and economic freedoms] against Communism" (June 6 1989, p. A31), and "their sacrifice will lead their people out of Communist bondage (June 5, 1989, p.A17). The final military crackdown served as a proof and reason for some of the articles to suggest that communism was "in its vicious death agonies in China" (June 6, column "On My Mind," p. A31).

From the outset of the pro-democracy movement, the Chinese government had been portrayed by the *New York Times* as "impotent" (April 27, 1989). After the crackdown, the vivid scene of a Chinese young man trying to stop a convoy of moving tanks was used as an analogy to describe the "fragility" of the Chinese government:

> The man stood only half as tall as the lead tank. But his body language made it clear. He wanted the slow moving column halted and halt it did, the huge treads on the lead grinding to a stop just a few feet from his face. It was a close call -- the tank came perhaps a second or two of killing him -- and it seemed to encapsulate many of the confrontations in recent days between the citizens and the army: the touch-and-go maneuvering, with soldiers not sure when to press on and when to retreat; the determination of the demonstrators, brave and unyielding in ways that might have been unthinkable a few weeks ago. In its quiet way, this little confrontation seemed to symbolize the fragility of the [Chinese] Government's position. (June 6, 1989, front page)

Another example of political ideology as a dominant factor influencing the *New York Times* coverage of the pro-democracy movement is manifested by the fact that it was the American style of democracy the Chinese students were asking for. Unlike the South Korean student demonstrations, not only anti-American but anti-imperialism themes were absent from the Chinese student pro-democracy movement, demonstrating an admiration for the American political and cultural values. The following two examples illustrate the ideological proximity the Chinese students demonstrated towards American political values:

> Many students are still vague about the kind of democratic system they want, but when they speak about democracy, most students think of the American system of government. (April 27 1989)
>
> "Everyone thinks the nation has no hope, the Communist Party has no hope," a disheveled young man shown on national television told his visitors. "We should do things the way they do them in the United States, and thus restore people's confidence." (May 18, p.A10)

Nothing is more illuminating in showing the students' ideological proximity to the United States than their use of an American symbol to represent the democracy they were seeking. On May 30, 1989, the Chinese students erected a "goddess of democracy," modeled after the Statue of Liberty, to symbolize the ideals and goals of their democracy. Among all media studied, the *New York Times* devoted the most space and gave this event the most importance when reporting it. In several interviews conducted by the *New York Times*, this statue with Caucasian features was portrayed as the symbol of hopes for democracy in China (May 30, front page; May 31, p.A12). The erection of the statue was regarded as a "public relations coup" for the students. Because this statue will either "remain and symbolize the democracy movement and official weakness; or the authorities will be in the embarrassing position of sending the police to attack the Goddess of Democracy and Freedom with sledgehammers" (May 30, front page).

Diplomatic sensitivity apparently was not an important factor in influencing the *New York Times*' reports of the events. This was demonstrated by the fact that the *Times* had been critical of the Bush Administration's mild reactions to the Chinese government since the outset of the pro-democracy movement. The *New York Times* had more than once criticized the Bush Administration's double standards in dealing with China and other countries. One story asked "Why is the United States so scrupulous in respecting the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one country, while it disregards the principle in another case?" questioning the Administration's different treatment and reactions to China and Panama respectively. The headline of this story tells it all: "The Utmost Caution: President Counsels

Restraint in China While Pushing Rebellion in Panama" (May 22, 1989, p.A11). The June 5 editorial cited earlier also shows the *Times'* critique of Bush, who "has not hesitated to rebuke the Soviet Union and Nicaragua for lesser crimes" but has failed to express the "revulsion Americans now feel." Not until President Bush announced on June 5, 1989 an immediate suspension of military sales and visits to China, as well as other sanctions, did the *Times* editorial praise his Chinese policies as doing "justice both to American values and to American interests and deserve the widest support" (June 6 1989).

2. The Soviet Media Coverage

As noted earlier, the general patterns of the Soviet media coverage of the pro-democracy movement seem to be shaped by both the political ideology and diplomatic sensitivity factors. After examined closely the content of their coverage, however, one can reach the conclusion that diplomatic sensitivity plays a more critical role in determining the actual content of the Soviet news treatment of the events. Four observations support this conclusion: (a) the overall trend of the Soviet coverage matches the schedule of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting developments; (b) the Soviet media's emphasis on the common experiences shared by the two countries; (c) the Soviet press demonstrated understanding towards the Chinese students, but expressed more sympathy towards the Chinese government; and (d) the uniformity shown between the Soviet press coverage of the movement and the official Soviet reactions to the event. Following is a presentation of these observations:

a. The overall trend of coverage: The major trend of the Soviet media coverage of the pro-democracy movement corresponds to the schedule of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting that took place on May 15, 1989, in Beijing. During the early stages of the demonstrations, the pre-summit preparation period, most of the Soviet media were quiet about the student movement. Not a word was mentioned about the first two large-scaled April 27 and May 4th demonstrations. As the summit dates approached, many articles were seen discussing the significance and meanings of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, along with several commentaries on the demonstration situations. More stories on the movement were found after the summit meeting concluded and after the crackdown. Diplomatic sensitivity seems to explain this trend well.

The historical Sino-Soviet summit meeting, the first one in 30 years, was the product of several years of talks and much effort, especially on the side of the Soviet Union. It is crucial to maintain a friendly relationship and atmosphere before and during the summit. This period of time, therefore, is extremely sensitive and important for both the Chinese and Soviet governments. Hence, we see a restrained Chinese government and a quiet Soviet press in handling the case of student demonstrations before the Sino-Soviet summit. More commentaries and analysis of the movement emerged with the closing of the summit. May 20, 1989, saw the declaration of martial law by Premier Li Peng two days after Gorbachev left Beijing.

An example of the early Soviet media report illustrates vividly the untrue scene of "free and easy atmosphere" in Tiananmen Square presented by some of the Soviet media presented to their readers. Note that this story was written on May 4, 1989, when more than 200,000 demonstrators reportedly gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest for more democracy and press freedom. But in this story, there were no demonstrators in the square, only people enjoying themselves, and "kids" talking philosophically.

> Kites in the shape of dragons, huge butterflies, and mythical birds were flying overhead [in the Tiananmen Square]. A kid in a blue denim jacket launched his "dragon" -- it seemed to fly highest of all, and he found it hard to hold on. "This is how many of our administrators during the reform want to hang on the threads of economic power which should rightly pass to the enterprises," the kid smiled. There was a free and easy atmosphere in the square, hushed voices, the click of camera shutters, children's laughter.... The square looked quite different during April, when students were demonstrating their support for democracy against corruption.
>
> (May 4 1989, *Izvestiya* in Russian, p.5)

b. The emphasis of common experiences shared by the two countries: Even though China and the Soviet Union are the two largest socialist countries in the world, the focus of most of the Tiananmen related Soviet media reports was rarely on their common ideology. The emphasis was rather on the several common experiences, as well as mutual advantages, these two countries shared. Even the similarity of domestic reform mistakes these two governments made were discussed and shown as reasons to reinforce their new friendship.

On May 15, 1989, the day Gorbachev arrived in Beijing, Moscow Television Service broadcast a commentary acknowledging the fact that the first Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in 30 years "began in days that were not at all easy for Beijing." But this commentary continued and emphasized that "mutual understanding" was the main thing they were entitled to expect, because it is the "step toward cooperation between two great peoples on the basis of mutual advantage and profound respect to each other." Not only the color of their flags is common, the commentator observed, the main directions and the basic processes of restructuring in both countries are similar too.

After the military crackdown, similar focus was found in Soviet media coverage. In the following commentary, broadcast by Moscow World Service one day after the crackdown, the Soviet commentator cited instances of several Soviet ethnic unrest to show their friend that the Soviet Union was experiencing similar problems, and understood the Chinese government's position well. "Compassion" was expressed by the Soviet government and media towards China, while most other countries condemned its use of force.

> It so happened that last Sunday was unfortunately dramatic for this country and China. The railway disaster in the Urals and ethnic unrest in a number of Soviet areas coincided with the tragic events on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. That was what brought feelings of regret and compassion that we Soviet people had for the reports about the events in that neighboring state.... Currently, following a visit to Beijing by Mikhail Gorbachev and normalization of bilateral ties, this neighboring country has become even closer to us, and not just geographically. We could speak of a spiritual proximity. The Soviet Union and China are the two largest socialist countries, and they're also common in that both are going through a period of renewal. We can see all the time as we move ahead that the period is difficult and carries all sorts of excesses within it.
>
> (June 5 1989, Moscow World Service in English)

c. Some understanding was demonstrated by the Soviet press toward the cause and demands of the students, but more sympathy was expressed towards the Chinese government: It is unfair to suggest that the Soviet press was totally on the Chinese government side while ignoring or criticizing the students. The effect of "glasnost" cannot, and should not, be overlooked. The fact that the Soviet Union was ahead of China in its political reform offered them more insights to the nature and effects of the Chinese students' demands. As a result, the causes and demands of the Chinese students were fairly presented. The Chinese students were described as "society's most sensitive barometer," because they were "the first to react to the country's socioeconomic ills:"

> As Chinese history has shown, students have always served as society's most sensitive barometer. They are the first to react to the country's socioeconomic ills. Let us remember the "May 4th" movement of 1919 and the 1935 "9 December" anti-Japanese movement, which served as a spur to the national liberation movement.... The "seismic activity" in society is the outward manifestation of its real problems, inflation and rising prices and unemployment. Around 40 million Chinese are currently busy looking for work. There are sounds of dissatisfaction in all strata of society. The peasants are complaining about the rising price of fertilizer and tools and the low prices being offered for grain. Workers are complaining about the declining standard of living. The intelligentsia is concerned about low pay. And they are all angry about corrupt officials, nicknamed "guandao" - "speculators in official uniforms."
>
> (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 13, 1989)

This example, however, shows that the Soviet media focused only on the economic part of the student demands; very few addressed their calls for more democracy and press freedom. It also indicates that the Soviet media's sympathy and understanding of the student movement went only as far as it did not conflict with the Chinese government's interests or policy. Once the government policy or orders are involved, like the cases of martial law or the military crackdown, the Soviet media would stop their analyses of the causes of the student movement and show more sympathy and support to the Chinese government. For example, after the military crackdown, most of the media reports were sympathetic to the Chinese government and reiterated the point that what happened in Tiananmen Square was an internal affair of China, no outside power should interfere. *Pravda* carried this story:

> I think the use of force to maintain public order is a measure as extreme as amputating a patient's leg. It is always painful, always undesirable but sometimes necessary to save a man's life. The question of how necessary this measure is rests on the conscience of the surgeon. The Chinese people themselves must pass judgment on what happened in Tiananmen Square.
>
> (June 8 1989, Moscow *Pravda* in Russian)

By comparing the use of force to a "necessary" surgery to save life, *Pravda* showed not only understanding, but also a sense of approval of Chinese government's decision to use force.

d. Uniformity of the Soviet media coverage of the pro-democracy movement and official Soviet reactions to it: The Soviet government kept a low profile towards the student movement throughout the two month period. Since the outset of the movement, the Soviet government made it clear that the movement was the internal affair of China, the Soviet Union would not comment on it. The same idea was expressed by President Gorbachev in China during the summit meeting. After the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, Moscow "[deplored] that the events in Beijing took such a dramatic turn, and [grieved] for those killed and injured - both soldiers and demonstrators," and reiterated its non-interference policy. As discussed earlier, the Soviet media held similar attitudes advocating non-interference policy while keeping a low profile. There is a uniformity found in their coverage of the Tiananmen events and the Soviet government's reactions to these events.

Judging from these four observations, diplomatic sensitivity appears to be the primary concern in the Soviet media's news treatment of the Chinese pro-democracy movement. Political ideology may have certain effects on the direction of their reports, but proved to be secondary in determining the actual content of their coverage.

3. The VOA Coverage

The VOA's coverage of the Chinese pro-democracy movement was very different from that of the *New York Times*. The volume of VOA reports was impressive; altogether 486 stories were broadcast during the two month period. However, volume is not what makes VOA's reports different; the *New York Times* itself devoted a quite impressive volume to the reporting of this event as well. What makes it different and more interesting than its volume is the objective tone and complete absence of indignation demonstrated in the VOA reports. As a government news medium, VOA's coverage of the movement was seen to be influenced greatly by the diplomatic considerations it took with regard to Sino-American relations. Political ideology did not seem to have any effects on the VOA's coverage of the events. Neither did the factors of cultural affinity and geographical proximity.

Unlike the *New York Times*' coverage, the anti-communist theme was never found in the VOA's coverage of the events. This approach seems to be in step with the general American foreign policy toward China. Ever since the beginning of the Sino-American rapprochement, ideology ceased to be a barrier in these two countries' normalization of relationship. The establishment of the Sino-American diplomatic relations in 1979 indicated strongly that ideology no longer had a role in the making of America's Chinese policy. Government interest has instead been the primary concern in the Sino-American relations for both governments.

Two days after the military crackdown in Tiananmen Square, the United States Agriculture Department announced the sale of nearly two million metric tons of wheat to China. This story was broadcast by the VOA on June 6, 1989. The fact that the sale of wheat to China was announced right after President Bush's announcement of several sanctions taken against China on June 5, shows the importance of American government interest in the making of the Bush Administration's policies toward China. It also implies the United States did not want to offend its Chinese friend too much. In this VOA story, the United States government's diplomatic consideration was stated clearly: "Nations with ties to China avoided drastic responses. President Bush said the US will continue its diplomatic relations." Judging from the VOA's coverage of the movement throughout the two month period, it seems that similar considerations were taken by the VOA in processing their coverage of these events. Diplomatic sensitivity appears to be a critical factor influencing the VOA's reports of the pro-democracy movement.

In the early stage of the demonstrations, while other media portrayed the Chinese government as either weak, impotent (e.g. the *New York Times*), or a "loser" that was stubborn and unwilling to listen to students (e.g. the Hong Kong media), the VOA presented the Chinese government as restrained, reasonable, and willing to talk to students. The following two examples illustrate this point:

> The demonstration brought the capital to a standstill and was followed by a government offer to meet with the students to discuss their demands for democratic reform. (April 27 1989)

> Outnumbered Chinese police briefly tried to block the students' path. However, in keeping with the government's promise to avoid violent confrontation, the police fell back. (May 4 1989)

Throughout the seven-week long movement, the VOA's coverage of the events was always balanced and steered clear of comments. The Chinese government views were covered with no added comments or opinions. Even after the military crackdown, the Chinese government's views were still presented fairly.

4. The French Media Coverage

> Shock, terror and anger filled the city after units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), firing at random, blasted their way into Tiananmen Square to crush a seven-week-old peaceful pro-democracy movement. (June 4 1989, AFP in English)

> Indignation, consternation, and anxiety in the world. You can hear Foreign Minister Roland Dumas who has reacted just now to the events in China... (direct quotation follows).
> (June 4 1989, Paris Domestic Service in French)

Like the *New York Times*, the French media were very critical of the Chinese government and had taken sides with the students in the seven-week long demonstrations. The movement had been presented positively by these media. Unlike the *New York Times*, however, the French media usually balanced their reports by presenting the Chinese government's views to their audience/readers.

One AFP story in the early days of the movement reveals the message of the "triumph of capitalism" in the student movement:

> History was overturned here Thursday as capitalists invited by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) invaded the Great Hall of the People as thousands of protesting students descended on the square outside.... Officials attending the ADB meeting in Beijing, including both Americans and Japanese, particularly noted the absence of any sentiments against foreigners from the Chinese students. Hostility towards "Yankee imperialism" and Japanese influence have been a major force behind student protests in South Korea. (May 4 1989)

As indicated by this report, all the ministers and government officials attended the ADB meeting were described as "invading capitalists," and the fact that the students did not show any sentiment against foreigners explained partly why the Western journalists were so favorable and positive to the students. Again, the Chinese students' admiration of Western values was an important factor influencing some Western media's perception of their movement.

As mentioned above, the French media's reports of the movement appear to be more balanced, because the Chinese government's views were often presented. These Chinese government views, however, were usually cited in a sequence in which the students' or other parties' views were vindicated. Sometimes the correspondents' negative comments or criticism were presented at the same time, which indirectly lowered the credibility of the government statements or views. The example cited below shows that even though the AFP correspondent (in this case) was citing the Chinese government source, by describing the military crackdown as brutal, the correspondent had stated his or her own opinions on the issue:

> Troops moved into the centre of the Capital overnight to brutally suppress the pro-democracy movement leaving hundreds dead.... CCTV said the ruffians killed, beat up, and kidnapped soldiers. At least two injured soldiers had been kidnapped as rioters attacked them with bricks, stones and "murderous weapons," it said. (June 4 1989, AFP in English)

Because the French media usually presented the views of the Chinese government and seldom criticized the communist "system" explicitly, the messages conveyed by them were much more subtle than those conveyed by the *New York Times*. By examining their reports carefully, however, one finds similar themes in both. More importantly, the ideological affinity for the West, which the students demonstrated, was shown to be a major factor influencing both the *New York Times* and the French media's perception of the demonstrations.

As noted before, although a good Sino-French relationship would be beneficial to both countries economically and strategically, Sino-French relations have been limited and secondary compared with China's relations with the two superpowers and its Asian neighbors. Consequently, France showed lower diplomatic sensitivity in handling the 1989 Chinese student protests, as demonstrated by its harsh criticism of the Chinese government's crackdown on the students and its taking in several student leaders in exile after the crackdown. Lower diplomatic sensitivity might explain the French media's negative portrayal of the Chinese government position in their coverage.

5. The Vietnamese Media Coverage

> According to Beijing Radio, on 3 June, the Beijing Martial Law Headquarters issued an emergency message saying that the situation in Beijing was very serious. A number of hooligans and ruffians insulted or beat up soldiers, injuring many of them. They even robbed soldiers of their weapons and destroyed military vehicles.
>
> (June 4 1989, Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese)

> On 5 June, President Bush said the United States sides with the demonstrating students, will send humanitarian aid to them, and has discontinued the sales of military equipment and the exporting of weapons to China. FRG Prime Minister Kohl has stopped indefinitely all official relations with the Chinese authority. (June 6 1989, Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese)

As noted before, only seven pro-democracy movement related stories carried by Vietnamese media were found in the *Daily Reports* as a result of the low profile the Vietnamese government kept during the pro-democracy movement period. The Vietnamese media did not mention the movement until mid to late May. When they finally did report the demonstration situation, the sources quoted were predominantly those of the Chinese government.

Among the four stories on the military crackdown, three used foreign sources, and mostly the Chinese government sources. Hanoi International Service described the crackdown as "clashes between armymen and demonstrators" (June 5, 89), and when quoting Xinhua, Radio Beijing, and the (Chinese) Liberation Army Daily, one Vietnamese news organization (Domestic Service in Vietnamese, June 6) reported that "facts" have indicated that the student movement was a "counterrevolutionary riot aimed at usurping and overthrowing the regime." The station also said that the "camouflage of the so-called democracy, freedom, and patriotism of some rioters has been removed." In the same report, the Western reactions to the crackdown were covered (see the second example cited above) without any comments from the station. The only story which had covered the Vietnamese view of the event was the one filed by the Vietnam News Agency (June 7 1989) on a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements of the event. When answering questions from the VNA, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the Chinese government's actions against the demonstrations in Beijing was "an internal question of China" and the "bloodshed" was "regrettable." The Vietnamese officials held similar positions and views as their counterparts in the Soviet Union did in regarding the event as a Chinese domestic affair.

Surveying these observations and facts, one reaches essentially the same conclusion as in the cases of the Soviet media and VOA, that diplomatic sensitivity was an important factor in shaping Vietnamese media coverage of the event. Vietnam's close cultural and geographical proximities to China and the same political ideology were seen to be secondary in affecting its media coverage of the events.

6. The Hong Kong Media Coverage

Of the three capitalist countries studied, Hong Kong is very different from the other two, not only geographically but also culturally. All three countries, however, share a similar free market capitalist system. Despite their apparent national and cultural differences, the general directions of their coverage of the Tiananmen events were shown to be similar.

Hong Kong media's coverage presented a very interesting case study of the news treatment of the Tiananmen events. Because of the fact that Hong Kong will return to China's sovereignty in 1997 and because of Hong Kong residents' deep concerns for the future well-being of Hong Kong under the Chinese government rule, its media coverage of the events was the most sensational, emotional, and negative. Political ideology and government/national interest were two important factors affected their coverage of the events.

Although the Sino-Britain Joint Declaration guaranteed that current social and economic systems, as well as lifestyle, will remain unchanged for 50 years after 1997, most Hong Kong residents were still deeply worried about the territory's stability and prosperity and their own future under the Chinese government rule. In spite of the Chinese government's open door policy and economic reform efforts, the memories of several big political movements were still fresh in Hong Kong people's minds. How the communist rule would affect the great economic achievements in Hong Kong was another concern of the Hong Kong public. The impressive passions and emotions demonstrated in Hong Kong media's coverage of the pro-democracy movement revealed these deep concerns.

Because of the special political environment in Hong Kong (i.e., its close relations with both the communist regime in China and the Nationalist regime in Taiwan), it has traditionally had a partisan and plural press system. However, the usually partisan Hong Kong media reacted uniformly to the student demonstrations. As Lee and Chan (1990, p.159) observed that at the outset of the student movement, the rightist press applied its old anti-communist rhetoric to criticize the communist dictatorship while the rest of the press reacted more cautiously. But when the situation worsened, the press as whole "regressed to the anti-Communist canon."

The most striking examples are those of the two ultraleftist newspapers', *Wen Wei Po* and *Ta Kung Pao,* coverage of the events. These two newspapers are China's propaganda mouthpieces supervised by the Xinhua Hong Kong branch. Both newspapers condemned the killing in Tiananmen Square and harshly criticized the Chinese leaders who took the actions to "slaughter" students. "Those who have committed this error," said *Ta Kung Pao*, "will come under the judgment of history."

In one of *Wen Wei Po*' s editorials after the military crackdown, the newspaper questioned the communist system and asked "What has gone wrong with our system?" and "When the leadership of our country is controlled by a group of butchers, what should we do?":

> The good and honest people never expected the [Li-Yang] clique to be so cold-blooded.... It is a pity that the kind-hearted admonitions of the people cannot prevent the atrocity of a handful of people. This cannot but set people thinking: What has gone wrong with our system? We should also ponder this question: When the leadership of our country is controlled by a group of butchers, what should we do? (June 5, 1989, editorial)

The chief of the *Wen Wei Po* office, Li Tzu-Sung, called the incident "barbaric atrocities," and he "vehemently denounced some CPC leaders, who are descendants of revolutionary martyrs but are making democracy martyrs of others, creating disturbances by a contemptible means, and butchering young students" (*Wen Wei Po* in Chinese, June 5 1989).[6]

As for the rest of the press, most of its criticisms were directed to the few communist leaders responsible for the crackdown, especially to Premier Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun. The "Li-Yang

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[6] Lee and Chan (1990, pp 148-149) ascribed the deviation of the ultraleftist press from the communist party line to four causes: (1) the student movement's avowed goals to end official corruption by peaceful means earned sweeping admiration; (2) Beijing's struggle for press freedom was another source of inspiration; (3) public enthusiasm further justified the communist press' pull away from the official line; and (4) the thriving student movement sharpened the power division within the communist party and temporarily paralyzed the regular control mechanisms.

Clique" were viewed by many Hong Kong media as the "villains" who were responsible for the "wholesale massacre" in Beijing (e.g. *Wen Wei Po, South China Morning Post, Ming Pao, Cheng Ming).* They were said to have personally plotted the "bloody massacre" and ordered the firing on people (*Ming Pao,* June 5, 1989, front page). Furthermore, Li and Yang were described as having the emperor (Deng) in their power, and ordering the dukes about in his name (*Ming Pao*, June 7, 1989; *Wen Wei Po,* June 7, 1989, editorial). Deng Xiaoping was viewed as being manipulated by these two people and was under their control.

Because whatever China did in Beijing had strong implications to Hong Kong's well-being, Tiananmen events became a principal obsession of the Hong Kong people. This situation resulted in their demand of more Tiananmen events related news. The following example demonstrated the sensational, emotional, and indignant coverage of the events by the Hong Kong media:

> The butchers finally have laid their murderous hands on the bare-handed students and residents. I simply could not believe that the tragic deaths of so many compatriots was true because they died in front of the guns of the "People's Liberation Army" and the atrocity of this unparalleled savagery took place in the "People's Republic." Why has the Li-Yang clique, which repeatedly promised it would not open fire against the students, plunged Beijing into a bloodbath? Is it for suppressing the counterrevolutionary rebellion and defending the peaceful life of the people in the capital? Apparently not. Li and Yang instigated the bloodshed for the sake of usurping power. Li and Yang are slaughtering people for the sake of paving the way to supreme power with the dead bodies of our compatriots and regarding the lives of the people as their counters on which to contend for power. (June 5 1989, *Ming Pao* in Chinese, front page)

The fact that Hong Kong will return to the Chinese government rule did not prevent the Hong Kong press from covering the Chinese government positions negatively. Diplomatic sensitivity therefore was not seen as an important factor influencing the Hong Kong media's coverage of the events. Rather, it was the national interest concerns(in terms of the wellbeing of the Hong Kong public) that influenced their coverage. The concern of the future of Hong Kong was covered by the Hong Kong media. They not only questioned China's ability to live up to its promise of "one country, two systems" for Hong Kong (*South China Morning Post* in English), but also called for Britain to "reassess the status of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong following the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square."

Hongkong Standard carried an emotional editorial titled "The Standard Says: Save Us from These Murderers, Mrs. Thatcher" to appeal to the then British Prime Minister to reconsider the Joint Declaration concerning the future of Hong Kong. Part of this editorial illustrated vividly some of the fears of the Hong Kong people:

> Will the future safety of this industrious and wealthy territory be left to the luck of a spin of the political wheel?... It would be a sad and regrettable situation if Margaret Thatcher was prepared to let the people of Hong Kong go to bed each night and to settle their children to sleep, not knowing what the future hold for them. Should they suffer the fear and pain of pondering each and

> every day of their lives whether some old politician who has grown senile and out of touch with the people, will wake up in the morning and decide that he is to have one last showdown before the sun settles on his life? We wonder if [Margaret Thatcher] would like her new grandchild to grow up in Hong Kong...

The close historical, cultural ties may have positively affected the extent of Hong Kong media's coverage of the pro-democracy movement, but certainly did not guarantee the accuracy of their coverage. After the military crackdown, the Hong Kong media carried many unconfirmed reports speculating about Dent's death, Li Peng's being shot, and the possibility of a civil war. Hong Kong Commercial Radio (in English), *Ming Pao* (in Chinese), and *Hongkong Standard* (in English) all carried reports that Deng had died of cancer, and Beijing was "bracing itself for the outbreak of virtual civil war" (Commercial Radio, June 5 1989). *Ming Pao* in one of its reports even suggested that Deng had been poisoned by the Li-Yang Clique (June 7 1989, front page). Judging from these false reports, it is fair to say that these stories showed the Hong Kong public's, or the Hong Kong Media's, hatred for Li and Yang, the two responsible persons who ordered the crackdown. On June 6 1989, *Ming Pao* carried another rumor in its front page of a failed assassination attempt against Li Peng. The newspaper called it a "pity" that Li Peng was only shot in the leg, and not other fatal parts of his body:

> According to news from Beijing: the inhuman atrocity of Li Peng and Yang Shangkun in Beijing City has aroused the scorn of people having the slightest conscience. On the afternoon of the day before yesterday, a young People's Armed Police officer fired at Li Peng at the Great Hall of the People. It is a pity that because of the distance was too great, Li was only wounded in his leg. The brave officer was killed then and there and gave his life for the country.

This supposed assassin was called by the newspaper as a "modern Jing Ke." Jing Ke was a noted patriotic assassin during the Qin Dynasty who was killed before he succeeded in assassinating the notoriously cruel "First Emperor."

7. The Chinese Media Coverage

The seven-week long student pro-democracy movement was not only politically significant, it was also an important media event. For the first time in 40 years of the PRC history, Chinese journalists staged their own protests and demanded freedom of the press. Before the student movement, the Chinese media had always been the mouthpiece of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party. Had the student protests and the journalists' participation of the movement affected their coverage of the events in any way? If so, how was it affected? What did the press tell its readers/viewers of the student movements?

The following is a presentation of the Chinese media coverage of the pro-democracy movement. It serves as a background to the analysis of the American, Soviet, French, Vietnamese, and Hong Kong media's coverage of the Tiananmen Events.

> However, after the memorial meeting, an extremely small number of people with ulterior purposes continued to take advantage of the young students' feelings of grief for Comrade Hu Yoabang to spread all kinds of rumors to poison and confuse people's minds. Using both big- and small-character posters, they vilified, hurled invectives at, and attacked party and state leaders. Blatantly violating the Constitution, they called for opposition to the leadership by the Communist Party and the socialist system.... Flaunting the banner of democracy, they undermined democracy and the legal system. Their purpose was to sow dissension among the people, plunge the whole country into chaos and sabotage the political situation of stability and unity. This is a planned conspiracy and a disturbance.
>
> (April 26, 1989, *Renmin Ribao* editorial)

> Since the death of comrade Yaobang, your patriotic act and your democratic spirit have been abundantly clear to all throughout the country. No matter how the government comments on, or when it will make a fair comments on it is, I believe, unimportant. The people have made a comment on it, and history will make a further comment on it.... History will never go back. The important historical task has fallen to the younger generation. You have done much, very much. (May 17, 1989, *Renmin Ribao*, p.2)

> The extremely few rioters have incited some people who do not understand the truth of the matter to commit all kinds of violence. They stopped the martial law troops from entering the downtown area and Tiananmen Square to enforce martial law. They smashed and burned more than 100 military trucks and public transportation vehicles. They insulted, beat up, and kidnapped cadres and fighters, officers and men of the armed police, and public security cadres and police. They looted rifles, ammunition, and other military equipment.... The purpose of their riots is to negate the party's leadership and socialist system, and to subvert the PRC. They have openly called for taking up arms to overthrow the government, and publicly clamored to kill all 47 million Communist Party members.
>
> (June 4 1989, Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin)

These three stories cited above represent three stages of the Chinese media coverage of the Tiananmen events: a. the extremely harsh and negative treatment of news of the early demonstration; b. the short period of press freedom exercised by the Chinese press from May 4th to the end of the hunger strike; and c. back to the tight media control after the declaration of martial law.

a. The early demonstrations: The early stage of the student pro-democracy movement was not covered by most of the Chinese press. The very few stories found on the demonstration were extremely critical and negative of the students. They were in line with the overall Chinese government's policy in dealing with the protests. The first example cited above was one of the most famous documents in the early stage of the movement, the April 26 *Renmin Ribao* (the Chinese Communist Party newspaper) editorial which caused the first large-scale student demonstration on April 27. In the editorial the student demonstration was described as a "planned conspiracy" to "plunge the whole country into chaos." This editorial was reportedly based on a speech given by Deng Xiaoping two days earlier. In this early stage of the student movement, the Chinese media were under strict government control, the demonstrating students were described as being used by an extremely small number of people who "attempt to stir up turmoil" (April 27, 1989, Xinhua).

b. From May 4th to the hunger strike, the very short period of the press freedom enjoyed by the Chinese: the period of May 4th through the end of the hunger strike and the beginning of the declaration of martial law witnessed the short-lived freedom of the press in China. It started with the first journalist demonstration in four decades of the PRC history. On May 4th, 1989, more than 300 journalists from 15 state controlled media outlets staged a demonstration to protest against government control of the media.

The 3,000-student hunger strike saw the peak of this press freedom. During this period of time, many media carried stories that were sympathetic and supportive of the students and their demands. The official newspapers carried dozens of petition letters from organizations all over the country urging the Beijing government to hold dialogues with students. Students were presented as patriotic and as the hope of China. The same Communist Party paper *Renmin Ribao* that carried the harsh editorial, carried this emotional article addressing the students as seen in the second story cited above. The students were no longer seen as trying to "spread all kinds of rumors to poison and confuse people's minds." They were now portrayed as "patriotic" and carrying out the "historical task." The following story broadcast by Shanghai City Service (May 18, 1989, in Mandarin) followed the same pattern in presenting the students as patriotic, and the "torch of patriotism...will be passed on from one generation to the next, and will forever radiate:"

> ...all Chinese people with a conscience feel deeply shocked and worried. College students have always been the elite of society and the hope of the Chinese nation. The patriotic student movement for democracy, which began in Beijing has once again shown the world that the college students in China are worthy of the people's nurture and their teachers' teachings. They have already used their own actions to proudly indicate that the torch of patriotism, held high by forerunners of the May 4th Movement, will be passed on from one generation to the next, and will forever radiate. The support given by millions of people to the students is a just appraisal of the students' great pioneering undertaking. The spring of 1989 will be recorded in our history as something unforgettable.

Two situations contributed to these PRC media's unprecedented performance. First of all, it was a coincidence that the Sino-Soviet summit meeting held for the first time in 30 years took place at the peak of the student movement (the 3,000 people hunger strike). Gorbachev brought with him a large number of foreign journalists into the center of the student demonstration. The Chinese students became the center of world attention. Aware of the importance and significance of the summit, the Chinese government restrained itself and started several dialogues with the student leaders in an effort to bring the student movement under control and maintain a better atmosphere for the summit. Second, the result of a fierce power struggle in the Communist Party between the hardliners and the moderate reformers was not yet clear. This confusing situation created a temporary power vacuum in the leadership. For a short period of time, the reformers headed by Zhao Ziyang seemed to have gotten an upper hand in the power struggle, and as a result, the press seized the opportunity and spoke out.

c. The tight media control period starting from the martial law declaration and on: The freedom of press the Chinese press expressed and practiced at the peak of the student pro-democracy movement was short-lived. After the military crackdown in Tiananmen Square, the government tightened control of the media. There was actually no such thing as media "coverage" of the military crackdown. The Chinese media carried whatever the Chinese government had to announce. The third example quoted above was part of a letter issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council to all Communist Party members and the people of the nation. The same letter was carried by many other media as well. Another "popular" source of information for the Chinese media during this period of time was information from the "Headquarters of the Chinese PLA Martial Law Unit." No matter from which official outlets the media received their information, the messages stayed the same. The several points reiterated by the media (or people who issued the statements) were that "extremely few people" had instigated a "counterrevolutionary riot," that violence was used by a handful of "thugs" and "ruffians" against the soldiers and police officers. One Xinhua report carried a comment from the Martial Law Enforcement Troops Headquarters criticizing the "ruffians" and said that "they have totally exposed their pretenses about their so-called patriotic feelings, promoting democracy, cherishing freedom, safeguarding human rights, and voicing their petitions peacefully."

Another kind of "reports" found during this period of time were the many letters sent from different provinces and organizations to show support of the government suppression of the "counterrevolutionary rebellion" in the capital. These letters were sometimes filed by Xinhua News Agency to other media.

VI. Discussions and Implications

This study set out to test some hypothetical expectations regarding news treatment of the 1989 Chinese student pro-democracy movement in the media of six countries. Four dimensions of these countries' (three capitalist and three communist) media coverage of the events have been described in the previous sections, and relationships among these dimensions and the news treatment have been analyzed.

Based on previous news factor research findings and the information collected on the pro-democracy movement and the six countries' relations with China, four hypothetical expectations were developed. These hypothetical expectations stated that (1) political ideology plays an important role in the direction of coverage but not necessarily the extent; (2) diplomatic sensitivity plays an important role in the direction of coverage, especially for official or government media, and may even ameliorate differences in political ideology; (3) cultural affinity does not necessarily produce positive news coverage; and (4) geographical proximity may affect the extent of coverage but does not necessarily affect its direction. Overall, the first three hypothetical expectations were supported by the findings; the last one was partly supported.

A. Political Ideology

The first hypothetical expectation predicted that political ideology plays an important role in the direction of coverage but not necessarily the extent. This expectation was supported by the findings.

This study found political ideology to be a very strong indicator and factor in determining the overall "direction" of foreign news coverage. The quantitative analysis shows clearly that media from the three communist countries not only used more of the official Chinese sources in reporting the pro-democracy movement, but were also more favorable to the Chinese government in their coverage. Media from the three capitalist countries, on the other hand, used mainly non-Chinese government sources and presented rather negative news treatment of the final military crackdown and covered the Chinese government's position negatively. When the American, Hong Kong, and French media were "angry," "outraged," and "shocked" by the "bloody massacre," the Soviet media expressed "compassion," "regret," and "grief" to the "operation;" the Vietnamese media remained, most of the time, quiet about the "clashes."

Political ideology was also shown to be a dominant factor in influencing the actual content and themes of the Western capitalist countries' media coverage of the events. The *New York Times* coverage of the pro-democracy movement was found full of anti-communist implications and messages. When viewed through the lenses of cold war ideology, the complexities of the democracy movement and its historical context were reduced to a simple good guys (the young idealist Chinese students) versus bad guys (the old and evil Communist leaders) melodrama.

The Chinese students' ideological proximity to the Western (political) values also contributed to the French media and the *New York Times*' positive and even emotional coverage of the movement. The students demanded American style democracy and used English language slogans such as "of the people, for the people, by the people," and "give me liberty or give me death" in their movement; but nothing is more illuminating than their use of an American symbol, the "goddess of democracy" modeled after the Statue of Liberty, to represent the ideals and goals of their movement.[7] This finding supports Gerbner's (1964) claims that "ideological perspectives and political tendencies will be expressed and cultivated...in the commercial press as well as in the 'party press'" and that "the basic ideological and political choices are inherent not in party-partisanship but in the total operation of 'news values' and of standards of reporting" (p. 495).

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[7] Two of the eight "enduring values in the news" suggested by Gans (1979, pp. 42-52) are deemed proper to explain this pattern. In his study "Deciding What's News," Gans grouped some underlying assumptions that animate a variety of news stories to eight groupings: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and national leadership. The first two values are said to be obvious in the foreign news coverage, and are supported by the findings of this study. As Gans has explained, ethnocentrism comes through most explicitly in foreign news, which "judges other countries by the extent to which they live up to or imitate American practices and values" (p. 42). This seems to correspond to what Kenneth Shewmaker (cited by Thomson, 1989, pp. 95-96) has suggested, "American reporters of nearly all persuasions discovered people who looked and acted and sounded like us." In the coverage of the Tiananmen Square events, the students showed their admiration of Western values, and as a result received favorable coverage from the Western media. A good example illustrating this point is the different and rather negative treatment the similar South Korean student protests received from Western media due to their anti-Americanism" and "anti-imperialism" protest themes. Another value that could explain the pro-democracy movement coverage pattern of the French and American media is the "altruistic democracy" in foreign news, which "suggests quite explicitly that democracy is superior to dictatorship, and the more so if it follows American forms." The fact that the student movement was depicted as "pro-democracy" by the Western media implied its ideological proximity to the Western values.

B. Diplomatic Sensitivity

The second hypothetical expectation of this study predicted that diplomatic sensitivity plays an important role in the direction of coverage, especially for official or government media and may ameliorate differences in political ideology. This hypothesis was also supported by the findings.

The first part of this hypothesis, that diplomatic sensitivity influences the direction of coverage, was supported by the fact that media shown to have high diplomatic sensitivity toward China (see Table 1) also used more of the official Chinese sources when reporting the events. The Soviet, Vietnamese, Chinese, and the VOA ranked the highest in their use of the official Chinese sources (in that order), all of which have higher diplomatic sensitivity towards China.

Diplomatic sensitivity was also found to have dictated the actual content and themes of the Soviet and Vietnamese coverage of the movement.

The Soviet Union was in the process of normalizing its diplomatic relations with China at the time of the protests. Its news treatment of the events was found to correspond to the Sino-Soviet summit meeting developments. The Soviet media were generally quiet about the movement during the pre-summit period, and more reports appeared with the closing of the summit. During this period of time, most stories carried by the Soviet media were focused on the significance and historical meanings of the Sino-Soviet normalization.

Another evidence of the influence of diplomatic sensitivity on the Soviet coverage was the fact that even though the media carried fair stories and analyses of the student movement's causes and demands, more sympathy and understanding were demonstrated towards the Chinese government. The Soviet media's sympathy for the students only went as far as not conflicting with the Chinese government policies or interests. Of equal importance is the fact that most of their stories emphasized more of the common experiences these two countries shared than their common ideology. Diplomatic consideration was shown to be their primary concern. Political ideology was secondary in influencing the actual content and the themes of Soviet coverage.

The Chinese and Vietnamese governments were in a delicate situation during the pro-democracy movement period. Relations between the two countries were in a transition period from a hostile to a possibly new and friendlier one. Several normalization talks were underway, but their relationship could hardly be described as friendly. It was a good policy for both the Vietnamese government and news media to keep a low profile regarding the event. Consequently, only seven stories were found in FBIS *Daily Reports* on the Chinese student movement. Most of these stories adopted the official Chinese explanations in reporting the events.

The second part of the hypothetical expectation was supported by the case of VOA coverage of the events, that diplomatic sensitivity plays an important role especially for official or government media and may even ameliorate differences in political ideology.

Both are American news media, the VOA news treatment of the student demonstration was very different from that of the *New York Times*. They differed not only in the tone of reporting (objective and balanced vs. emotional, respectively), in their treatment of the Chinese government positions (neutral vs. extremely negative) and their use of the official Chinese sources, but also in the fact that political ideology did not affect the VOA's coverage of the news. No anti-communism message was found in their coverage. As an American government agency, VOA's coverage of the Tiananmen events was seen to be more influenced by diplomatic considerations of the Sino-American relationship.

C. Cultural Affinity and Geographical Proximity

The hypothetical expectation regarding cultural affinity, that it does not necessarily produce positive news coverage, was supported. As the findings show, Hong Kong shares the closest cultural affinity with China, but its coverage of the events was shown to be one of the most negative; whereas the Soviet Union is culturally dissimilar to China, but had the most positive coverage of the Chinese government. Cultural affinity appears to be irrelevant when the news events involve complicated factors or backgrounds such as political, ideological, or economic situations.

The fourth hypothetical expectation, that geographical proximity may affect the extent of coverage but does not necessarily affect the direction, was partly supported by the findings. It was shown to be valid that the direction of the coverage would not necessarily be affected by geographical proximity. The three countries/territories that share the closest geographical proximity with China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Hong Kong, presented very different coverage of the events, from the most positive (the USSR) to one of the most emotional and negative (Hong Kong).

The findings did not, however, support the first part of the expectation that the extent of coverage may be affected by geographical proximity. Vietnam shares the national border with China, but its news media provided the least coverage of the 1989 Chinese student pro-democracy movement. Like the factor of cultural affinity, the influence of geographical proximity on foreign news coverage proved to be minor, especially when other factors are involved.

Overall, the general directions of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement patterns of coverage from communist and capitalist countries were shown to be influenced most by political ideology, and secondly diplomatic sensitivity. As for the actual content of these media's news treatment of the event, it was found that political ideology plays the most important role in influencing the Western capitalist press coverage, whereas diplomatic sensitivity was shown to have most influence on the communist media's as well as the government media's news treatment of the event. Political ideology was shown to be secondary. Cultural affinity and geographical proximity's influence on the foreign news coverage were shown to be minor.

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The Rational vs. Irrational Public:
Modeling Media Effects in the People's Republic of China

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August 1991

A Top-Three Paper

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
Communication Theory and Methodology Division
Boston

This research is supported by a summer research stipend generously provided by the School of Communications, Pennsylvania State University, where the first author was instructor and then assistant professor in 1989-1990. Editorial assistance of Thomas Bowers and enormous encouragement of Brian Winston, Katherine Frith and Joseph Keefer are gratefully acknowledged. Three anonymous reviewers of CT&M division have provided extensive and valuable comments, although, due to time limit, we will not be able to adopt all their suggestions into this paper until next revision.

The Rational vs. Irrational Public:
Modeling Media Effects in the People's Republic of China

Abstract

The assumption of the rationality vs. irrationality of the public underlies many debates regarding press freedom and media control. This study explored a way of testing such assumptions empirically.

The authors proposed three competing models describing the relations among media use, knowledge, and attitudes of Chinese people regarding economic reform. One model assumes a quite rational public, while the other two describe a relatively irrational audience.

A stratified random sample of 969 Beijing residents (90 percent of those selected) were interviewed. After preliminary Factor and Linear Regression analysis, the three hypothesized models were tested by LISREL technique. The model of rationality found strong support from the data, while the two models of irrationality found no support.

The Rational vs. Irrational Public:
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I. The Rational vs. Irrational Public

The assumption of the rationality vs. irrationality of the public underlies, explicitly or implicitly, many debates on fundamental issues regarding press freedom and media control. The rational public, for example, is considered one of the strongest arguments supporting the Western free press, while the opposite is regarded as one of the most important assumptions behind the Soviet Communist system. As the widely read Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963, p.5-6) puts it:

> We think of the audiences of our press as "rational men," able to choose between truth and falsehood; the Soviets think of theirs as needing careful guidance from caretakers, and to this end the Soviet state sets up the most complete possible safeguards against competing information.

The rationality or irrationality assumption has also been highlighted in debates within both systems. Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, argued for more glasnost in Soviet media on the basis that Soviet people's intelligence and ability are trustable and respectable:

> Broad, timely and frank information is testimony to trust in people, respect for their intelligence and feelings, their ability to interpret events themselves. (Quoted in Smith, 1990, p.98)

Critics in the western countries, on the other hand, often attack the commercial dominance in the U.S. media and argue for more government and/or public control over the media with the assumption that what media customers want from the media is not what they should get. As paraphrased by Stevenson (1991, Chapter 5, p.9):

> If anything, American media are controlled by us, the customers. Media officials are right when they say they'd be happy to give us the highest-quality cultural and current affairs programming hour after hour. All we have to do is watch it. Which we don't. American media may not give us what we should get, but they certainly give us what we want. In a lot of other countries, many of them firmly in the tradition of Western democracy, they think this is foolish and dangerous.

It is not surprising, therefore, that whether or not the public under media influence are indeed rational has been a subject of heated debate. Cooley (1909, p. 121), for example, viewed the public as a social group in which members communicate relevant facts with each other, pay attention to these facts and, based on these facts, the group "makes up its mind" to take collective actions. Lippmann (1922, 1925), on the contrary, attacked forcefully this "rational portrayal" of the process. He argued that people form their ideas and opinions from indirect and incomplete accounts, resulting in shallow "stereotyped" images of the political world; that public opinion is inherently capricious, subject to whim and susceptible to demagoguery; and that democratic theory had profoundly misplaced its trust in public decision making.

The issue is vital, yet the debates did not generate much empirical research in the West or in the East, so more research has been called for (Price & Roberts, 1987). This paper reports the results of a preliminary effort of this kind in the context of economic reform in China, a country with one-fourth of the world's population, and a country now regarded as one of the few "remaining outposts of traditional communism." (Stevenson, 1991, Chapter 8, p. 1)

II. The Concept of Rationality

People use media, and the media are believed to affect people (for evidences of media effects in China, see Chaffee & Chu, forthcoming; Zhao, Zhu & Li, 1991 and X.Y. Zhao, 1989). There are different ways people can use media, and therefore there are different ways the media can affect people. The focus of this study is to test whether Chinese people use media in a rational way or, in other words, whether the Chinese public affected by media are rational.

What do we mean by "rational"?

A dictionary definition of "rational" is simply "based on reason, logical" (Morris, 1976, p.1083). This definition may be too broad and vague to be handled by most social science research. Many economists and psychologists tried to solve this problem by defining "being rational" as "maximizing utility (e.g. monetary gain) expected by probability theory," or as "judging according probability theory." Many widely accepted economics theories and some well respected psychology studies used such conceptualizations (e.g. Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Kahneman & Tversky, 1971, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1981). But they have also been criticized for their implications that a person should always try to maximize expected utility, or always act according to probability theory. Lopes (1987), for example, argued that it is unreasonable to ask any person to, every time and all the time, maximize utility calculated by probability theory. To save time and energy, Lopes argued, there is nothing wrong with using "heuristic" impulses to quickly solve daily, routine problems even though they do not guarantee maximum utility expected by statistical probability.

The following paragraphs will explain our reasons for not adopting this popular "expected utility" definition for the purpose of this study and, in the process, develop our conceptualization of rationality.

The first reason is that the "expected utility" definition is so narrow that it is not easily applicable to many communication issues, and particularly not easily applicable to the issue under discussion in this paper. The above-cited Cooley and Lippmann portrayals of the public, for example, had no clear, direct connection with monetary gain or statistical probability, even though to communication scholars it seemed obvious that Cooley described a rational public while Lippmann conceived an irrational one (Price & Roberts, 1987).

The second reason for not adopting the "expected utility" definition is its emphasis on the final product of a decision making process rather than the process itself -- a decision or an act is defined as irrational if it's different from "the right decision" prescribed by probability theory. In the area of public opinion and communication, we argue, often there is no "right answer." Reasonable people differ. Different or even contradicting opinions may all be reasonable as long as they are the results of informed and logical decision making processes. We, like Cooley, Price and Roberts, emphasize the communication and decision processes rather than their results.

The third reason for not adopting the "expected utility" definition is its dichotomous connotation -- an act is considered either rational or irrational. We argue for a continuous conceptualization of rationality. We conceive "rationality" or "irrationality" in a relative, comparative sense. One decision making process can be seen as more rational when it is compared with a less reasonable alternative, yet both can be termed as irrational when they are compared with a even more reasonable process. Later in this paper, for example, we will hypothesize a model in which the Chinese public support or oppose economic reform because they like or dislike the Communist Party that advocated the reform. We say this approach is irrational only because there is a more rational approach -- to support or oppose the reform according to a broad range of reasons behind the reform (including the capability of the Party that proposed the reform). But the approach we call "irrational" could look relatively "rational" if we compare it with even less reasonable approaches, such as relying on fortune tellers.

Having explained our conceptualization of rationality, in the next section we will operationalize the concept by offering three models -- one of which will be argued as "rational" and two of which will be argued as "irrational" -- describing the Chinese public under media influence.

III. Modeling Chinese Mentality Under Media Influence

American communication scholars have argued that public opinion is formed in a dynamic process in which communication, including mass communication, is a key element (Price & Roberts, 1987). Our earlier empirical studies (Zhao, Zhu & Li, 1991) indicate that knowledge about economic reform (KNOWLEDGE hereafter), attitude toward reasons for economic reform (A-REASON hereafter), attitude toward the reform itself (A-REFORM hereafter) and attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party (A-PARTY hereafter) are four important elements in Chinese mentality regarding economic reform. We also reported that these four elements are affected by Chinese government propaganda to various degrees.

Based on theoretical writings and empirical findings, this section will hypothesize three models describing how the above-mentioned four mental elements interact with each other and how they are affected by the Chinese government media. We will argue that one of the three models describes a quite rational audience in

China, while the other two portray a relatively irrational audience.

We will also discuss three other types of causal relations pertaining to media effects in China and their theoretical or methodological implications. These causal relations can be added to any of the above-mentioned three models.

Learning Model: Hypothesizing a Rational Public. Ray (1973) conceptualized persuasion in terms of hierarchies in which one element of mentality has to change before another. In learning hierarchy, for example, cognition (knowledge) should change before affection (attitude), and affection should change before conation (behavior). Although Ray's ideas were presented in the context of marketing communication, they have been applied to a wide range of persuasion situations (e.g. Chaffee & Roser, 1986). Modified models were also introduced. In advertising research, for example, the learning hierarchy was sometimes presented as consisting of six stages: awareness, knowledge, liking, preference, conviction, and purchase (Lancaster & Katz, 1989, p. 88).

Synthesizing empirical studies on the subject, Ray (1973) concluded that the learning model should be used when product (issue) involvement is high and differences between alternative actions are clear. This was probably the case in Chinese economic reform. The involvement was high -- the economic reform policy was often regarded as the most important Chinese government policy in the 1980s that affected the daily life of almost every Chinese. And differences between alternatives were clear -- to many Chinese, reform meant to move China forward, no-reform or pseudo-reform meant to let China stay where she was, or move it backward to the 1950s (Vogel, 1989; Chen, 1990).

Figure 1 About Here

Following such reasoning, we hypothesize that one way of modeling media effects could be: MEDIA-USE affects KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE affects A-REASON, A-REASON affects A-REFORM, and A-REFORM affects A-PARTY (Figure 1). All four causal relations are assumed to bear a positive sign -- more media use led to more knowledge about economic reform, more knowledge led to a more favorable attitude toward reasons for reform, a more favorable attitude toward the reasons for reform led to a more favorable attitude toward reform itself, and a more favorable attitude toward reform led to a more favorable attitude toward the Party that had proposed and organized reform.

This model is consistent with Cooley's portrayal of the rational public -- people learned facts from media, considered reasons behind the policy, formed their attitude toward the policy, and decided their attitude toward the Party that was supporting the policy.

Direct-Effect Model: Hypothesizing an Irrational Public. Lippmann's assertions clearly and strongly contradict that learning model. While assuming communication had an effect on the audience's opinion, Lippmann asserted that such effect did not occur through the audience's increased knowledge or through its improved reasoning. Lippmann's assertions were echoed in the 1970s and 1980s by criticism of Western media -- particularly broadcasting media -- as image creators rather than information sources (Patterson & McClure, 1976, p. 54; O'Keefe & Atwood, 1981, p. 339).

Lippmann's assertions may also be seen to be supported by statements of many communist leaders. Lenin, for example, prescribed roles of a newspaper as a "propagandist," an "agitator," and an "organizer," but not as an information provider (Lenin, 1901). Mao often spoke of four tasks for the mass media -- to propagate the policies of the Party, to educate the masses (so as to ensure a "correct" political attitude), to organize the masses, and to mobilize the masses (cited in Lu, 1979/80, p. 45). Lin Biao referred to media as one of the two "barrels" -- gun barrel and pen barrel -- that Chinese communists used to obtain and sustain their power (cited in Lu 1979/80, p. 44). Similar views were reiterated time and again by many past and present top leaders of China, reform-minded or not (Hu, 1985; Rui, 1988; Jiang, 1990; Li, 1990). Indeed, none of these top leaders have ever appeared to be interested in the media's role of informing people.

Based on such reasoning, Figure 2 hypothesizes a model in which media directly influenced each of the three attitude variables without being mediated by changes in knowledge or in any prior reasoning.

Figure 2 About Here

Compared with the "thinking" public depicted in the learning model (Figure 1), what is portrayed in the direct-effect model (Figure 2) is a relatively irrational public. According to the model, there was no connection between people's attitudes toward reasons for reform, attitudes toward reform, and attitudes toward the Party; people's attitudes toward the Party were influenced by the media not because they supported or opposed the Party policy propagated in the media; people's attitudes toward reform policy were influenced by the media not because they agreed or disagreed with the arguments (reasons) presented by the media; and people's attitudes toward reasons for reform were influenced by media not because of their acceptance or ignorance of the information (knowledge) distributed by the media. Thus, according to this model, people's attitudes must have been influenced by something else carried in the media, presumably images, slogans, sensations, or emotions.

Cognitive Consistency Model: Hypothesizing an Irrational Public. Unlike learning theorists who assume that people form attitudes based on knowledge and reasoning, cognitive consistency theorists assume that people's attitude formation is driven by an intrinsic need for affective consistency (Sears et al., 1985, p. 140). Cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958), which is considered a major variation within the consistency school, argues that people form their attitude toward an object depending on whether or they like or dislike the person who praises or smears the object. Dissonance-attribution theory (Festinger, 1957, Bem, 1967), which is another variation of the consistency school, argued that people first form attitudes in consistency with their prior behavior, and then look for reasons supporting their existing attitudes.

Based on such reasoning, Figure 3 hypothesizes a set of causal relations that are in opposite direction of what are hypothesized by the learning model (Figure 1): people supported or opposed the reform policy not because they thought the policy itself was or was not reasonable, but because they liked or disliked the Party that was advocating the policy; and it was after they had decided their position on reform that they tried to find reasons supporting their position.

Figure 3 About Here

Media Content Subject to Contradicting Interpretations - a Possible Source of Campaign Ineffectiveness. After the death of Mao, especially when Deng Xiaoping and his allies resumed power in the late 1970s, a new era in Chinese media history started (Zhao & Rong, 1981). From time to time stories appeared in Chinese media, especially print media, that revealed the "dark side" of Chinese society. Compared with "bright side" stories, they were tiny in number but attracted far more attention from society. Topics of such stories included sufferings of rightists since the late 1950s, sufferings of cadres and intellectuals during and shortly after the Cultural Revolution, privilege and corruption of officials and their families, waste and inefficiency in production and the economy, deteriorating environment, and deteriorating educational conditions. One of the reasons for allowing and even encouraging such stories was that Deng Xiaoping and his allies needed to rally support for economic reform -- the miserable past and unsatisfactory present may justify a change for a better future. Furthermore, it was hoped that support for reform would somehow be transformed into renewed support for the Party that supposedly had proposed the reform (see Hu, 1985; Li, 1989; Zhu, 1989; Zhuang, 1989.) The causal links assumed by this strategy coincide with the causal links postulated in the learning model (Figure 1).

However, as many top Chinese leaders have constantly been worrying, "dark side" information (knowledge) in the media could be interpreted in a totally different way -- it might be seen as evidence confirming many individuals' secret belief that the Communist Party had failed miserably to improve the nation's well being so it no longer had a legitimate claim for people's support (Hu, 1985; Jiang, 1990; Li, 1990). The negative causal link assumed by this line of thinking is represented in Figure 4 by the arrow from KNOWLEDGE directly to A-PARTY. This is the only path with a negative sign in this model. It, together with the indirect positive paths from KNOWLEDGE through A-REASON and A-REFORM to A-PARTY, postulates a process in which information (knowledge) distributed by the media has simultaneously a positive impact **AND** a negative impact on the Party's popularity.

There have been reports that Party propaganda has not been effective in persuading Chinese people to support the Party (Rosen, 1989; Zhao, Zhu & Li, 1991). If supported by the data, the contradicting-interpretation theory proposed above may provide an interesting explanation to such ineffectiveness: the opposite effects of the knowledge disseminated by the government propaganda canceled each other.

Figure 4 About Here

Newspaper v.s. Radio v.s. Television - Comparing Effectiveness of Different Media. Newspaper, radio and television have been shown to have different effects on knowledge, attitude or behavior of people in the U.S., Soviet Union, or former East European socialist countries (e.g., Campeanu, 1972; Welsh, 1981, p. 484; Zhao & Chaffee, 1986). Although few studies have been reported to address this issue in the context of China, regression analysis on our data shows that these three media do differ from each other in effectiveness (Zhao, Zhu, and Li, 1991).

Being consistent with the popular view of "the media" as one concept, we will treat newspaper reading, radio listening, and television watching as three indicators of a latent variable, MEDIA-USE, as shown in Figure 4. We will test relative strengths of media by comparing the contributions of these three indicators to the latent variable.

Selective Exposure -- Addressing a Methodological Concern.

Since Hyman & Sheatsley (1947) emphasized the existence of selective exposure -- people's tendency to attend to messages that are consistent with their prior attitudes and experience -- it has not only become a popular subject of study itself (see Rogers & Storey, 1987) but also a source of methodological concern for those who were interested in studying media effects on attitudes using cross-sectional surveys. A correlation that has been found to exist between media use and attitudes, a methodologist may argue, may not necessarily indicate media effects on attitudes, but may indicate effects of attitudes on media use, that is, the existence of selective exposure.

The three thick, long arrows with dotted lines in Figure 4 represent the causal relations postulated by this selective exposure theory.

IV. Methodological Issues in Studying Chinese Media Effects

Although media effects on public opinion in Western countries are typically studied by surveys or experiments with multi variate statistical analysis, such luxury was hard to imagine for China scholars, simply because China's door was closed to the outside world until the late 1970s, and surveys or experiments were practically prohibited by the Chinese government until the mid 1980s (Wong, 1979, p. 73-75; Rosen and Chu, 1987; Rosen, 1989b). As a result, researchers who were interested in China's communication, like most other Western students on China, had to rely mostly on what could be read in Chinese publications and learned from Chinese refugees and travelers (Schramm & Roberts, 1971, p. 836; Lampton, 1986, p. 183).

This situation troubled scholars deeply. Houn (1961, p. 2) noted that "in the absence of careful public opinion studies, we will be unable to make an accurate assessment of present attitudes on the Chinese mainland." Yu (1964, p. 9) commented on his own work on China's mass persuasion by saying "Ideally, study of this kind should include data from on-the-spot observation or direct interview with the people in China. This is clearly out of question for students in the West." Chu (Chu and Hsu, 1979, p.396), referring to traditional Chinese herbal physicians who were forbidden from directly seeing or touching their female patients, wrote "students of modern China are in reality more like the traditional physician taking a pulse by remote control than social scientists analyzing systematic, empirical evidence". Barnett (1979) expressed his discontent by proposing,

> In order to understand how the system actually works in practice, a greater effort should be made to combine media research with interviewing. One cannot know how the Chinese system really works, and what effects it has, simply by reading the press or listening to the radio. There needs to be deeper analysis of the actual impact of the system through direct observation through intensive interviewing ... Research of this kind is needed to provide greater understanding not just of surface appearance of China's new communication system but also of its strengths and weaknesses.

This view was echoed again by Briggs in his comments on the work of Howkins (1982, Foreword)

> While there never has been any want of slogans - communications are of vital importance to China's changing leadership -- there has usually been a severe shortage of facts. The available statistics are unreliable, and in any event do not cover all the necessary range of indicators: no details are collected, for example, about audience research and this must affect both domestic and foreign reactions.

In the mid 1980s, following the re-legitimization of survey research by the Chinese government, its popularity quickly spread among Chinese social researchers. Rosen (1989b) reported that by the end of 1986, Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (CESRRI), a leading public opinion research center founded in 1984, alone conducted 14 large-scale surveys. Our information indicates that by June 1989, when CESRRI was virtually disbanded, the number of surveys conducted by CESRRI mounted to 30, and the total number of surveys conducted by universities, social research institutes, mass media, government organs, and professional associations throughout China were estimated to be several hundred (For examples of published reports, see Qingnian Yanjiu 1987; People's Daily, 1988a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i; China Daily, 1989; Center Daily, 1989; World Journal, 1990a,b,c).

The quality of sampling varied from institution to institution and from survey to survey, but generally it improved rapidly in a short period of a couple years (Rosen, 1989b). The technique of analysis and interpretation, however, was often unsophisticated. In the survey reports printed in Chinese publications, univariate frequency count was the norm. In a few occasions where bivariate comparisons of means or percentages were made, simple testing statistics routinely reported in quantitative studies in the West, such as T, F, chi square, correlation, or probability coefficient, were not reported by Chinese researchers. Methodological issues like measurement error, validity, reliability, etc., were simply ignored.

Much worthy work has been done by Western scholars to translate Chinese survey reports into English (e.g. Reynolds, 1987; Li et al., 1989a, 1989b; Sun, Zhang, et al., 1989; Yang, Li, et al., 1990; Research and Reference, 1990), or to synthesize and reinterpret the meaning of these reports (e.g. Reynolds, 1987; Rosen, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990; Nathan, 1990). Some of them provided very interesting and indeed valuable information about Chinese propaganda, mass media, and public opinion. However, since the original reports were based on univariate analysis, the interpretation of these reports was also restricted by the limitations of such analysis. As Zhao, Zhu & Li (1991) have argued, such analysis is incapable of accessing media effects, which usually requires multivariate or at least bivariate analysis.

Seven years ago, a delegation of American social scientists went to China to assess the status of the field. They voiced a vision upon return. "If something of the American technical wizardry is blended with the Chinese subtle appreciation of the inter-connectedness of communal institutions, the explanatory power of the social sciences may undergo an exponential intellectual growth" (Rossi, 1985, p. 132).

Some very recent studies appeared to be going in that direction. Chaffee & Chu (forthcoming) and X.Y. Zhao (1989) used regression technique to access media impact on Chinese people's beliefs. Zhao, Zhu & Li (1991) used regression analysis to assess media impact on Chinese people's knowledge and attitudes. We hope this study will also contribute its bit to this collective effort.

Specifically, we will employ a structural equation technique

(Linear Structural Relationships, i.e., LISREL; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986) to analyze data from a sample of Beijing residents. Recently used by more and more communication researchers (e.g. Chaffee & Roser, 1986; Allen, Dawson & Brown, 1989), LISREL offers some functions that are particularly useful for our purposes. LISREL's modeling concept, for example, allows us to test the three models we have hypothesized. Its idea of latent variables and observed indicators allows us to compare the effects of newspaper, radio and television as three indicators of a latent concept, media-use. Its ability to test recursive systems allows us to address the issue of selective exposure vs. media effects.

V. Data Collection

This study is based on a secondary analysis of survey data collected in spring 1986 under the name of CESRRI to investigate public response to media campaigns. CESRRI, founded by the now-ousted Premier and Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1984 as a think tank to provide guidance on strategic planning of economic reform, was regarded as the leading social research institute in China for its methodological sophistication as well as its closeness to the power center (Rosen, 1989b). The role of CESRRI in the revival of survey research in China in the mid 1980s is hard to overstate. As Stanley Rosen (1989b), an American political scientist who has written extensively on Chinese public opinion research, put it, "(CESRRI's) extensive research project on the effects of urban industrial reform became the crucial impetus for public opinion work based on scientific sampling (in China)".

The respondents to this particular survey were a stratified sample of all adult permanent legal residents [1] of Beijing Municipality, which is administratively equivalent to a province and includes 10 urban districts and 9 rural counties. In the first step of the sampling, a list of the "grassroots units", such as factories, stores, bureaus, villages, schools, research institutes, museums, residents' committees, etc., was adapted from the telephone directory and was checked against the list obtained from the Beijing municipal government to assure its completeness. In the second step, 100 "grassroots units" were randomly selected from the list. In the third step, survey teams composed of university teachers, graduate students and undergraduate students were sent to these selected "grassroots units" to conduct interviews. Lists of people affiliated with the units were obtained from the personnel offices or the Party Committees of the units. In the fourth step, a systematic sampling method was employed to select interviewees from lists provided by the units. The number of respondents sampled from each unit was proportional to the total number of people affiliated with the unit, so equal probability would be ensured. In the last step, interviewers handed questionnaires to respondents. Respondents usually filled out questionnaires in the absence of interviewers, and interviewers would go back to pick up the completed questionnaires. Interviewers would read the questionnaire to respondents if they were illiterate.

Of 1,080 contacts, 969 (90%) completed questionnaires were returned. Three demographic variables -- gender, education and occupation -- were checked against Chinese census data and annual statistics released by the State Statistical Bureau of People's Republic of China (SSBPRC, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987; Domschke & Goyer, 1986). No significant discrepancy was found to warrant serious concerns with the quality of this sample.[2]

We have to recognize from the outset that a representative sample from Beijing Municipality by no means represents the national population of China. As the political, historical, cultural, economic, and communication center of China, and as the birth place of several earthshaking mass movements, including May 4th, Cultural Revolution, and the 1989 Democratic Movement, Beijing has a population of six million (SSBPRC, 1987, p. 71) that are on average more educated and more politically active than people of most of the other 29 Chinese provinces and municipalities. We argue, however, precisely because of Beijing's importance and uniqueness, understanding what happened there is an excellent starting point to understand what happened and will happen in the whole nation.

VI. Measurements

Knowledge. Each respondent was asked 13 knowledge questions about major events related to economic reform (Table 1), including

7 matching questions (Question 16 in Table 1) and 6 multiple-choice questions (Question 17-22). In LISREL analysis, there are two indicators for the latent variable KNOWLEDGE. The correction rate of the 7 matching questions was used as the first indicator (y1), and the correction rate of 6 multiple-choice questions was used as the second indicator (y2).

Table 1 About Here

Attitudes. Thirteen questions measured respondents' attitudes on a five-point Likert scale (Table 2). In our earlier paper (Zhao, Zhu, & Li, 1991) we reported the results of factor analysis on these thirteen items: three factors were obtained that account for 47.9% of total variance. Seven items are loaded on A-REASON (Cronbach Alpha: 0.75), three on A-REFORM (Cronbach Alpha: 0.52), and three on A-PARTY (Cronbach Alpha: 0.54). In LISREL analysis, these thirteen items are used as indicators (y3-y9, y10-y12, y13-y15) of three latent attitude variables (A-REASON, A-REFORM, A-PARTY) respectively.

Table 2 About Here

Media Use. Media use was measured by three variables: reading newspaper news, listening to radio news, and watching television news (Table 3). In LISREL analysis they were used as three indicators (x1, x2, and x3, respectively) of the latent variable MEDIA-USE.

Table 3 About Here

The standard deviations of these 18 measurements and the standard deviations between them appear in Table 4. They will be used as input data for a series of LISREL testing.

Table 4 About Here

VII. LISREL Analysis and Findings

Our strategy of LISREL analysis does not differ from what is often used by other social scientists using LISREL. Specifically, we will follow a four-step plan. First, we will build a base model to simultaneously estimate as many hypothesized relations (paths) as the data permit, and we will test the overall fit of the model to see if it is indeed a good base model. Second, if the base model does fit, we will proceed to test the weakest path within the model, which is done in LISREL by building a new model with the path under test assumed to be zero (non-existent) and by comparing the new model with the base model. If the path under test is indeed non-existent, we will proceed further to test the weakest path within the new model. We will follow this procedure repeatedly until LISREL shows that the next "weakest" path is in fact sufficiently strong. Since the other paths in the model under test are all stronger than the "weakest but strong" path, the model is efficient. Third, we will test the hypothesis about equal strengths of different media on the basis of the efficient model. Fourth, on the basis of efficient model, we will test other relations that were not included in the first base model to see if they should be included in the new model.

The results from these tests are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5 About Here

The First Step: General fit of base model. The base model in Figure 5 (also see Model 1 of Table 5) is the result of combining all the relations hypothesized by the learning model (Figure 1), the direct-effect model (Figure 2), the cognitive-consistency model (Figure 3), dual-interpretation theory (solid, dark paths in Figure 4) and different-media-effect (three short, thin and dotted paths in Figure 4) into one complex model. The relationship between latent variables is "just identified," which means that mathematically no more relation between any of the latent variables can be added before one or more relations already in the model is eliminated. The relations hypothesized by selective-exposure theory (three thick, long and dotted paths in Figure 4) were the ones temporarily omitted from the model because their significance in this study is more methodological than theoretical. We do, however, plan to bring them back to be tested after we have tested the paths already in the model and, therefore, are able to eliminate some insignificant ones.

Figure 5 About Here

Besides the assumptions shown explicitly in Figure 5, the model also assumes that there are measurement errors associated with each of the 18 input variables, but assumes no correlation between any of those error terms.

As shown in Table 5, the model fits the data very well. X^2 is 109.16 with 125 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.842$), the Goodness of Fit index is 0.941, the Adjusted Goodness of Fit index is 0.78, and the Root Mean Square Residual is 0.195. This model is also clearly a significant improvement over the null model (Model 8), which assumes zero relations among any of the 18 input variables, -- the difference in X^2 statistics is 7159.87 with 46 degrees of freedom ($p<0.001$).

These statistics suggest that assumptions of Model 1 are in general a good set of explanations of the data, and the model can serve as a reasonable bench mark against which more specific hypotheses can be tested.[3]

Starting the Second Step: Testing direct media effects on attitudes -- a model of irrationality. In Model 1, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the direct effect of Media Use on Attitude Toward Party (standardized solution = -.03, Figure 1). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 2 (Table 5). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 1 and Model 2 is close to zero (0.02, df=1, $p > 0.8$), suggesting no direct effect of media use on attitude toward the Party.

In Model 2, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the direct effect of Media Use on Attitude Toward Reason (standardized solution = -.04). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 3 (Table 5). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 2 and Model 3 is again negligible (0.08, df=1, $p > 0.7$), suggesting no direct effect of media use on attitude toward the reasons of the reform.

In Model 3, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the direct effect of Media Use on Attitude Toward Reform (standardized solution = 0.15). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 4 (Table 5). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 3 and Model 4 is quite small (0.74, df=1, $p > 0.3$), suggesting no direct effect of media use on attitude toward the reform.

These three relations happen to represent all the paths through which Media Use is hypothesized to exert direct influence on an irrational public. Clearly, LISREL analysis described above provides no support for such direct influence.

The Second Step Continued: Testing cognitive consistency -- another model of irrationality. In Model 4, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the effect of Attitude Toward Reason on Attitude Toward Reform (standardized solution = 0.11). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 5 (Table 5). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 4 and Model 5 is again small (0.14, df=1, $p > 0.7$), suggesting no effect of attitude toward reform on attitude toward the reasons for reform.

In Model 5, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the effect of Attitude Toward the Party on Attitude Toward Reform (standardized solution = -0.04). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 6 (Table 5, and Figure 3). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 5 and Model 6 is again close to zero (0.01, df=1, p > 0.9), suggesting no effect of attitude toward the Party on attitude toward reform.

These two relations happen to represent the two paths hypothesized by cognitive consistency theory. Clearly, the LISREL analysis described above provides no support for such irrationality.

Normally, at this stage of LISREL analysis, it could be informative to go back to earlier models and try different restrictions and combinations of restrictions. For example, in Model 2 we may replace restriction on Media Use - Attitude Toward Party linkage with restriction on Media Use - Attitude Toward Reason linkage. None of these is necessary, however, in our particular situation, since evidence we have already collected indicates that none of the five restrictions nor any combination of the five restrictions would be statistically significant. This evidence is the fact that change in X^2 caused by all the five restrictions combined (Model 6 against Model 1) is merely 0.99 (df=5, p > 0.95). This X^2 is far from significant even with one degree of freedom (p > 0.3). And it is mathematically impossible for any one or any combination of the five restrictions to produce a X^2 larger than what all the five combined can do.

The Second Step Continued: Testing self-contradicting effects of knowledge on attitude. In Model 6, the weakest estimated relation between latent variables is the direct effect of Knowledge on Attitude Toward the Party (standardized solution = -0.29, see Figure 6). This relation is therefore fixed to zero to form Model 7-1 (Table 5). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 6 and Model 7-1 is quite big (5.40, df=1, p = 0.02), suggesting that there is a direct, negative effect of knowledge on attitude toward the Party. We may notice that among the six relations tested so far by LISREL, the Knowledge - Attitude Toward Party linkage is the only one that has provided a standardized solution with an absolute value larger than 0.15, and a difference in X^2 statistics that is larger than 1.

Finishing the Second Step: Testing learning paths -- a model of rationality. Since the KNOWLEDGE to A-PARTY linkage appeared to be significant, we should go back to Model 6, which assumes the existence of the linkage. As shown in Figure 6, this model happens to be composed by the paths postulated by learning theory plus the path speculated by the contradicting-interpretation hypothesis.

Figure 6 About Here

We could have tested each path in Model 6, but it was unnecessary, since we already found that the KNOWLEDGE to A-PARTY linkage was significant. Every other linkage between latent variables in Model 6 is stronger than the KNOWLEDGE to A-PARTY linkage, so every one of them will surely be found significant if we test.

This suggests that learning model has a strong support from the data.

In Model 1 through 5, it is always one of the irrational paths that appears to be the weakest linkage, which suggests that rational causal hypotheses fit the data better than the irrational paths do. Further more, none of these five irrational paths is even close to surviving the conventional 0.05 significance test, which suggests that, assuming the existence of the rational paths, the irrational paths are not supported by the data.

Since Model 6 appears to be efficient, our analysis will turn to compare the effects of different media.

The Third Step: Comparing strengths of different media. Figure 6 shows that, in Model 6, the contribution of Newspaper Reading to the latent concept Media Use (standardized solution = 3.13) is bigger than that of Radio Listening (standardized solution = 1.93), and the contribution of the latter is bigger than that of TV Watching (standardized solution = 1.12). The objective of the following models is to ascertain whether the observed relations are due to random chance.

Model 7-2 is formed by adding a restriction to Model 6 -- factor loading of newspaper reading is set to be equal to that of radio listening. The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 6 and Model 7-2 is 9.11 ($df=1$, $p < 0.01$), suggesting no evidence that the difference between newspaper reading and radio listening is a product of random chance.

Model 7-3 is formed by replacing the above-tested restriction by another one -- factor loading of newspaper reading is set to be equal to that of TV watching (but not necessarily equal to that of radio listening). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 6 and Model 7-3 is 26.05 (df=1, $p < 0.001$), suggesting no evidence that the difference between newspaper reading and TV watching is a product of random chance.

Model 7-4 is formed by replacing the above-tested restriction by a third one -- factor loading of radio listening is set to be equal to that of TV watching (but not necessarily equal to that of newspaper reading). The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 6 and Model 7-4 is 5.41 (df=1, $p = 0.02$), suggesting no evidence that the difference between radio listening and TV watching is the product of random chance.

Model 7-5 is formed by adding a triple restriction to Model 6 -- factor loadings of newspaper reading, radio listening, and TV watching are set to be equal to each other. The difference in X^2 statistics of Model 6 and Model 7-5 is 26.14 (df=2, $p < 0.001$), suggesting no evidence that the differences among three media use indicators are the product of random chance.

The Fourth Step: Testing selective the exposure hypothesis and other possible relations. Earlier in this paper we discussed methodological concern over selective exposure and reverse causality, i.e., possible effects of attitudes on media use. LISREL analysis offers a convenient way of testing such possibility.

In Models 1 through 6, all the effects of attitudes on media use are assumed to be zero. The plausibility of such assumptions is tested simply by observing the modification indices. Since a modification index is equivalent to a X^2 with one degree of freedom, an index larger than 3.82 (p=0.05) indicates that the restriction in question is not supported by the data at 0.05 level. In these six models, however, the modification indices range from 0 (Model 2: effect of A-REASON on MEDIA-USE) to 0.62 (Model 4: effect of A-REFORM on MEDIA-USE), suggesting no evidence of selective exposure.

Also to be noted is the fact that no modification index for any restricted-to-zero relation among latent variables reaches 1.00 in Models 1 through 6, suggesting no evidence for omission of important causal relations.

VIII. Conclusions

The learning model, which assumes a relatively rational public, appears to be a good description of how people in Beijing were affected by the media campaign for economic reform in the mid-1980s -- people supported or opposed the Communist Party because they supported or opposed reform, people supported or opposed reform because they supported or opposed the reasons for reform, and people supported or opposed the reasons for reform because they acquired or ignored the knowledge disseminated by the media. The direct-effect model and cognitive consistency model, both of which assume a relatively irrational public, do not explain the data very well -- people supported or opposed reasons for reform not because they supported or opposed reform, people supported or opposed reform not because they supported or opposed the Party, and there was no direct media effects on people's attitudes without first changing their knowledge and some logical reasoning.

Evidence from our data also offer some support for the contradicting-interpretation hypothesis -- if the Party propaganda had been ineffective in persuading the audience to support the Party, it was not because no one was affected, but because different people were affected in opposite directions. As a result of increase in knowledge disseminated by the media, some people became more supportive of the Party because they became more supportive of reasons for reform and more supportive of reform. But at the same time, some other people became less supportive of the Party, also because of an increase in knowledge disseminated by the media.

Evidence from this study also suggest that different media's contributions to the effects of media as a whole were quite different: newspaper reading contributed the most, followed by radio listening, and then television watching, under the assumption, of course, that newspaper reading, radio listening and TV watching are three indicators of one latent concept, namely media use.

We started this paper with a brief discussion on world-wide debates regarding media control and press freedom. Findings of this study bear some relevance to the debates. Some top Chinese officials' repeated arguments that the Chinese people are not educated enough to deserve a free press and democratic system should find no support from this study. On the other hand, those in the East and the West who have been arguing for freer press and more democratic systems on the basis of rationality of the public may be happy to see that at least at one turning point in history, people in one of the world's most important cultural, political and economic centers appeared to be relatively rational in forming their attitudes regarding several vital issues facing their gigantic nation.

But jumping too fast and too far to a sweeping conclusion should be cautioned against. As we emphasized, people in Beijing are on average more educated, more politically active and, therefore, should be more "rational" than any other group in the nation. The economic reform campaign is probably not typical of Chinese government campaigns, nor is 1986 a representative sample of the past or the future, not to mention that China by no means represents any other nation in the world. Besides, there should be many legitimate ways other than ours to define or operationalize the concept of rationality.

So, let's conclude this paper with a cliche, which is yet almost never too erroneous -- we need more research on this complex but exciting topic, both in the East and in the West!

Notes

1. Those who have Hukou.

2. A brief report on the results of this checking is available upon request.

3. For those readers who are not familiar with the logic of linear structural equations, we would like to emphasize that a generally good model, as this model appears to be, is not necessarily most efficient. That is, it is possible that some of the causal links that have been assumed to exist should have been assumed to be non-existent. In Figure 5, the two paths leading from Media-Use to A-Party and A-Reason, each of which has standardized solution close to zero (-.03 and -.04), are good candidates for such elimination. Furthermore, in a LISREL model, estimation of each relation is based on the assumption that all the other relations specified in the model do exist. So estimation of standardized solutions in an inefficient model may be erroneous since it may be based on some wrong assumptions. In fact, in the following paragraphs we will report that some of the paths specified in Model 1 (Figure 5), e.g., from Media-Use to A-REFORM, from A-PARTY to A-REFORM, and from A-REFORM to A-REASON, even though their magnitudes (.20, -.44 and .30) appear substantial in Model 1 (Figure 5), did not survive the 0.05 statistical significance when some other non-existent paths were dropped, .

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Table 1
Knowledge Questions

		Proportion Correct
y1: (Question 16) Please match the following persons with appropriate titles:		
1) Ma Shenli	1) Vice Premier	61.0%
2) Sheng Qishun	2) Vice Chairman of China National Labor Union	63.7
3) Tian Jiyun	3) Ex-director of Beijing Utility Bureau	71.5
4) Ma Xueliang	4) Vice President of Yingkou City College of Education	37.0
5) Zheng Changlu	5) Associate Professor at China Science & Technology Univ.	10.2
6) Qu Xiao	6) Chief Manager of Shijiazhuang Paper Mill	61.7
	7) War hero of Laoshan front	
7) Wen Yuankai	8) Good Party member from Jilin Province who led his fellows to the prosperity	23.0

Note: In LISREL analysis, there are two indicators for latent variable KNOWLEDGE. The average correction rate of the 6 questions in this page was used as the first indicator (y1), and the average correction rate of 6 questions on the next page was used as the second indicator (y2).

Table 1
Knowledge Questions
(Continued)

y2: (Questions 17-22)

	Proportion Correct %
Q17: Who is the author of the short story Bus Aria? 1) Zhang Xianliang 2) Wang Meng 3) Liu Xinwu 4) Don't Know	45.9
Q18: Late last year, media gave heavy coverage to a big plant that started the first stage of operation. Which of following plants was it? 1) Capitol Steel Works 2) Hubei Second Motor Works 3) Shanghai Baoshang General Steel Works 4) Don't Know	61.0
Q19: In the fourth quarter of last year, with whom did the Central and provincial Party and government leaders hold direct talks to discuss reform? 1) Peasants 2) College Students 3) Technicians 4) Don't Know	26.9
Q20: Recently the Central Party Committee and the State Council issued a document calling for the elimination of all corruption. How many "urgent problems" have been addressed in the document? 1) Six 2) Seven 3) Eight 4) Don't Know	23.3
Q21: What resolution was discussed and passed by the National Party Congress last September? 1) The Proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan 2) The Resolution on Economic System Reform 3) The Resolution on Educational System Reform 4) Don't Know	55.7
Q22: At the Meeting of Central Party and Government Functionaries held recently, what was the main theme of Comrade Tian Jiyun's speech? 1) The build up of spiritual civilization 2) Current economic circumstances and economic system reform 3) Correcting the Party members' common practice in the central Party and government organs 4) Don't Know	23.4

Table 2: Attitude Measures

Question 23: How do you agree with the following statements? (Note: in data analysis, all negatively worded questions are recoded to pro-party, pro-reform direction.)

	D	SD	N	SA	A	M
A-REASON, Attitudes Toward Reasons for or against reform (y3-y9):						
y3: (Q. 23.6) If the reform goes on, it's hard to say that our country is still socialist.	52.2	27.1	1.0	11.5	8.2	0
y4: (Q. 23.11) The current situation of our nation's economic development (under reform) is worrisome.	37.6	29.9	1.3	17.6	13.7	0
y5: (Q. 23.17) Reform will inevitably create a society in which everyone is after only money.	44.0	31.8	0.8	10.7	12.6	0
y6: (Q. 23.10) If it was all right to reform, it has gone too far by now.	36.7	38.5	1.8	14.6	8.4	0
y7: (Q. 23.3) The open door policy has brought in so many negative things that the gain is not worth the harm.	42.5	35.5	1.5	11.1	9.3	0
y8: (Q. 23.16) Whether the reform will be successful or not does not have much to do with my personal interest.	62.4	21.8	0.7	7.6	7.4	0
y9: (Q. 23.1) The level of people's thoughts (ethics & morality) will naturally advance when their life prospers.	22.6	13.8	1.6	13.1	38.9	0
A-REFORM, Attitudes Toward Reform (y10-12):						
y10: (Q. 23.19) No reform, no hope for socialist modernization.	5.1	7.5	0.8	27.5	59.2	0
y11: (Q. 23.12) People's life can be significantly improved ONLY if we reform.	3.1	8.0	0.6	31.6	56.7	0
y12: (Q. 23.8) In the past ten years, the direction (of reform) along which our society is developing is where people wish to go.	2.5	7.5	1.3	40.5	48.3	0

Table 2: Attitude Measures (Continued)

Question 23: How do you agree with the following statements? (Note: in data analysis, all negatively worded questions are recoded to pro-party, pro-reform direction.)

	D	SD	N	SA	A	M
A-PARTY, Attitudes Toward Party (y13-15):						
y13: (Q. 23.9) It is possible that the widespread disgusting behavior within the Party will be corrected within two years.	13.1	29.4	1.1	35.2	21.0	0.1
y14: (Q. 23.4) No matter what problems arise in the reform, the Party and the government can eventually overcome them all.	2.5	10.5	0.8	32.5	53.2	0.1
y15: (Q. 23.2) The Party's policy of reform in the recent several years is successful.	1.7	10.8	0.6	50.0	36.9	0

* D: Disagree,
SD: Somewhat Disagree,
N: Neutral,
SA: Somewhat Agree,
A: Agree,
M: Missing -- no response,etc.

* In the original questions in Chinese, y10-y12 are in the tone of a determined, slogan-chanting reformist using clichés like "improving people's life", "socialist modernization", which supposedly no body dares to disagree with, to sell his point; while y3-y9 are in the tone of an undecided observer who is calmly weighing the pros and cons of reform. We hope these subtle tones are not totally lost in our English translation.

Table 3
Media Use

	Codes	Percent
x1: (Question 2) How often do you read news in newspapers?		
Never	0	8.2%
Rarely (between 1/month and 1/week)	0.83	9.7
Occasionally (between 1/week and 3/week)	2.14	21.1
Often (between 3/week and everyday)	6.43	32.8
Every day	10	27.2
No valid answer	*	1.0
x2: (Question 3) How often do you listen to news on the radio?		
Never	0	7.2
Rarely (between 1/month and 1/week)	0.83	10.6
Occasionally (between 1/week and 3/week)	2.14	29.9
Often (between 3/week and everyday)	6.43	30.1
Every day	10	29.2
No valid answer	*	0.6
x3: (Question 4) How often do you watch news on television?		
Never	0	4.3
Rarely (between 1/month and 1/week)	0.83	7.2
Occasionally (between 1/week and 3/week)	2.14	17.4
Often (between 3/week and everyday)	6.43	36.2
Every day	10	34.8
No valid answer	*	0.3

Note: "x1", "x2", "x3" are LISREL symbols.

Table 4
Correlation Matrix and Standard Deviation for Linear Structural Relation (LISREL) Analysis

	y1	y2	y3	y4	y5	y6	y7	y8	y9
KNOWLEDGE:									
y1	1.00								
y2	.65**	1.00							
A-REASON:									
y3	.34**	.32**	1.00						
y4	.27**	.31**	.37**	1.00					
y5	.27**	.34**	.41**	.40**	1.00				
y6	.21**	.26**	.39**	.41**	.34**	1.00			
y7	.25**	.32**	.36**	.31**	.26**	.31**	1.00		
y8	.28**	.28**	.29**	.34**	.37**	.27**	.22**	1.00	
y9	.34**	.34**	.25**	.16**	.20**	.19**	.23**	.18**	1.00
A-REFORM:									
10	.17**	.17**	.10**	.10**	.07*	.10**	.13**	.12**	-.01
11	.09**	.11**	.24**	.21**	.22**	.20**	.16**	.20**	-.02
12	.17**	.16**	.21**	.27**	.18**	.19**	.17**	.15**	.08**
A-PARTY:									
13	-.11**	-.16**	.05	.06*	.04	-.00	-.09**	-.01	-.18**
14	-.02	.01	.09**	.12**	.09**	.03	-.02	.06*	-.08*
15	.04	.07*	.16**	.28**	.12**	.15**	.15**	.08**	-.07*
MEDIA-USE:									
x1	.51**	.52**	.23**	.24**	.25**	.18**	.19**	.26**	.24**
x2	.27**	.30**	.14**	.22**	.18**	.13**	.13**	.22**	.11**
x3	.15**	.13**	.04	.01	.04	.02	-.04	.10**	.04

	y10	y11	y12	y13	y14	y15	x1	x2	x3
A-REFORM:									
10	1.00								
11	.35**	1.00							
12	.16**	.28**	1.00						
A-PARTY:									
13	.05	.13**	.14**	1.00					
14	.08*	.15**	.19**	.35**	1.00				
15	.13**	.27**	.28**	.23**	.27**	1.00			
MEDIA-USE:									
x1	.16**	.11**	.12**	-.12**	.05	.04	1.00		
x2	.10**	.13**	.20**	-.04	.07*	.11**	.45**	1.00	
x3	.01	.08*	.07	.00	.10	.03	.28**	.32**	1.00

Standard Deviation:

y1	y2	y3	y4	y5	y6	y7	y8	y9
.316	.286	1.314	1.472	1.411	1.299	1.311	1.241	1.630

y10	y11	y12	y13	y14	y15	x1	x2	x3
1.129	1.040	.981	1.403	1.064	.977	3.592	3.642	3.411

Table 5
Test of LISREL Models

MODEL	X^2	df	Prb.	Goodness Of Fit	Adj. Goodness Of Fit	Root Mean Sqr. Residual	Bench Mark Model	Chg. in X^2	Chg. in df
1	109.16	125	.842	.941	.780	.195	-	-	-
2	109.18	126	.857	.941	.776	.195	1	0.02	1
3	109.26	127	.870	.941	.770	.195	2	0.08	1
4	110.00	128	.873	.940	.763	.200	3	0.74	1
5	110.14	129	.884	.940	.756	.199	4	0.14	1
6	110.15	130	.896	.940	.751	.199	5	0.01	1
7-1	115.55	131	.830	.936	.725	.203	6	5.40*	1
7-2	119.26	131	.760	.935	.721	.224	6	9.11**	1
7-3	136.20	131	.360	.926	.683	.334	6	26.05**	1
7-4	115.56	131	.830	.938	.735	.274	6	5.41*	1
7-5	136.29	132	.381	.926	.675	.345	6	26.14**	2
8	7269.03	171	.000	.143	.	1.718	1	7159.87**	46

*: $p < 0.05$ **: $p < 0.01$

For the purpose of LISREL runs, N is set to be 200

Comments on models:

1. Base model, with the least restrictions among the models tested (see Figure 5).
2. Restriction "no direct effect of Media Use on Attitude-Party" added to Model 1.
3. Restriction "no direct effect of Media Use on Attitude-Reason" added to Model 2.
4. Restriction "no direct effect of Media Use on Attitude-Reform" added to Model 3.
5. Restriction "no direct effect of Attitude-Reform on Attitude-Reason" added to Model 4.
6. Restriction "no direct effect of Attitude-Party on Attitude-Reform" added to Model 5. (See Figure 6)

7-1. Restriction "no direct effect of Knowledge on Attitude-Party" added to Model 6.

7-2. Restriction "equal effects of Newspaper and Radio" added to Model 6.

7-3. Restriction "equal effects of Newspaper and Television" added to Model 6.

7-4. Restriction "equal effects of Radio and Television" added to Model 6.

7-5. Restriction "equal effects of Newspaper, Radio, and Television" added to Model 6.

8. Null model. Restriction "nothing is correlated with anything" is imposed.

Figure 1: Learning -- A Model of Rationality



Knowledge
+
+
Media Use
Attitude-Reason
+
+
Attitude-Party
Attitude-Reform

Figure 2: Direct-Effect -- A Model of Irrationality


Knowledge
+
Media Use
+
Attitude-Reason
+
+
Attitude-Party
Attitude-Reform

Figure 3: Consistency -- A Model of Irrationality


Knowledge
+
Media Use
Attitude-Reason
+
+
Attitude-Party
Attitude-Reform
+

Figure 4: Other Hypotheses


Knowledge
News-
paper
Radio
TV
Media Use
Attitude-
Reason
Attitude-
Party
Attitude-
Reform
+
+
+
−
+
+
+
+
Newspaper-Radio-TV
Comparison
Selective Exposure
Hypothesis
Dual-Interpretation
Hypothesis

Figure 5: Base Model (LISREL Model 1)


Knowledge
$X^2 = 109.16$
df = 125
.72
.57
Media Use
−.04
Attitude-Reason
−.32
.24
.20
−.03
.30
.91
Attitude-Party
Attitude-Reform
−.44

Figure 6: Media Effects and Public Opinion (LISREL Model 6)



y1
y2
Knowledge
X^2=110.15
df=130
News-paper
3.13
.71
.63
1.93
Radio
Media Use
1.12
TV
−.29
Attitude-Reason
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
y9
.56
Attitude-Party
.71
Attitude-Reform
y15
y14
y13
y12
y11
y10